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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
EU regulatory framework on online content moderation 
The EU regulatory framework on content moderation is increasingly complex and has been 
differentiated over the years according to the category of the online platform and the type of content 
reflecting a risk-based approach. The e-Commerce Directive of 2000 contains the baseline regime 
applicable to all categories of platforms and all types of content. The Directive provides the following 
rules: (i) the 'country of origin' principle, which is the cornerstone of the Digital Single Market; (ii) an 
exemption of liability for hosting platforms which remain passive and neutral and which remove the 
illegal content online as soon as they are made aware of it; (iii) the prohibition of general monitoring 
measures to protect fundamental rights; and (iv) the promotion of self- and co-regulation as well as 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
This baseline regulatory regime has been complemented in 2018 by the revised Audio-Visual Media 
Services Directive, which imposes more obligations to one category of online platforms, the Video-
Sharing Platforms. They should take appropriate and proportionate measures, preferably 
through co-regulation, in order to protect the general public from illegal content (terrorist content, 
child sexual abuse material, racism and xenophobia or other hate speech), and to protect minors from 
harmful content. Those measures must be appropriate in the light of the nature of the content, the 
category of persons to be protected and the rights and legitimate interests at stake and be 
proportionate taking into account the size of the platforms and the nature of the provided service.  
Those rules are then strengthened by stricter rules for four types of content for which illegality 
has been harmonised at the EU level: 
• first, the Counter-Terrorism Directive defines the public provocation to commit a terrorist 
offence and requires, following transparent procedures and with adequate safeguards, 
Member States to take removing and blocking measures against websites containing or 
disseminating terrorist content. The European Commission aims to go further and has made 
a proposal, which has not yet been adopted by the EU co-legislators, for a regulation which 
would require hosting services providers to take measures to remove terrorist content; 
• second, the Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Directive defines child pornography and 
requires, following transparent procedures and with adequate safeguards, Member States to 
take removing and blocking measures against websites containing or disseminating 
child sexual abuse material; 
• third, the Counter-Racism Framework Decision provides that Member States must ensure 
that racist and xenophobic hate speech is punishable, but does not impose detailed 
obligations related to online content moderation practices; 
• fourth, the Copyright in Digital Single Market Directive establishes a new liability regime for 
online content-sharing platforms; they must conclude an agreement with the rights-holders 
for the exploitation of the works and, if they fail to do so, they are liable for the content violating 
copyright on their platforms unless they make their best effort to alleviate such violations. 
Those stricter rules imposed by EU hard-law are all complemented by self-regulatory initiatives 
agreed by the main online platforms, often at the initiative of the European Commission. They contain 
a range of commitments, some of which are directly related to content moderation practices and 
others which support such practices. However, the evaluation of those initiatives shows difficulties in 
measuring the commitments taken and in reporting on their effectiveness. 
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With regard online disinformation, which is not always illegal but can be very harmful to EU values, 
the main platforms have agreed to a Code of Practice in 2018. Such Code is closely monitored by the 
European Commission.  
In addition to this multi-layered EU regulatory framework, several Member States have adopted 
national rules on online content moderation, in particular for hate speech and online disinformation. 
The legal compatibility of those national initiatives with the EU legal framework is not always clear and 
the multiplication of national laws seriously risks undermining the Digital Single Market. 
Online Content Moderation Practices and their effectiveness 
Online platforms, big and small, rely on Terms of Service/Terms of Use or Community 
Standards/Guidelines to regulate and user behaviour and base their illegal content online 
moderation practices. These Terms and Standards/Guidelines do not necessarily reflect a specific 
legal system. However, as they are designed to prevent harm, online platforms' policies do overlap in 
several instances with local law. These private Codes of Conduct implemented by online platforms may 
vary from one country to another; they are often stricter in identifying illegal content online to be 
removed than national laws or jurisdictions within which they provide their services. 
The main tools used by online platforms to identify illegal content online are 'notice-and-
takedown'/flagging by users, keywords/filters and AI tools based machine learning models. Most 
platforms noted that depending on the type of illegal content online, automated tools have their limits 
in terms of accuracy, and thus, frequently must be accompanied by pre-/post-human moderation to 
ensure accuracy. The majority of online platforms have argued that the policies put in place by them 
to moderate illegal content online contribute to reducing the aggressive nature and the quantity 
of illegal content online.  
All online platforms interviewed have implemented transparency policies on how they operate and 
respect fundamental rights. Moreover, all of them have complaint mechanisms in place for their users 
to report on illegal content online. However, some platforms have emphasised that many user 
complaints are off-topic or unsubstantiated and consequently unactionable. Almost all online 
platforms interviewed allow users to appeal against their decisions on the moderation of illegal 
content online through a 'counter-notice' procedure.  
However, most of the interviewed NGOs, trade/industry associations and hotlines reporting illegal 
content online stated that the measures used by online platforms are not sufficiently effective in 
moderating illegal content online and in striking an appropriate balance with fundamental 
human rights. Most NGOs and hotlines reporting illegal content online have argued that the 
effectiveness of the measures deployed by platforms to enable users to report illegal content fluctuates 
according to the online platform. Additionally, they noted that access to 'notice-and-takedown' 
procedures is not always user-friendly, whereas they should be easily accessible and not hidden in 
obscurity. 
The main challenges in moderating illegal content online are linked to the large quantity of 
online content on platforms, which makes it difficult for users, regulators or moderators to assess all 
content as well as the fragmentation of laws regarding online content. The Member States are free 
to set their own rules regarding illegal content online, which limits the efficiency of platforms that have 
to create country-specific processes accordingly. The lack of a common definition of "illegal content" 
also makes the moderation by platforms more complex as Member States may refer to different 
definitions. Therefore, some online platforms mentioned that this places the burden on them to 
Online Platforms' Moderation of Illegal Content Online 
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identify the intent of the content uploader, which might incentivise online platforms to block lawful 
content in case of doubt on the illegality of the content.  
Several stakeholders also note that the current legislative framework on content moderation 
focuses mainly on the responsibility of online platforms, while they argue that this should be 
balanced with rights and obligations of other stakeholders. Most NGOs and industry/trade associations 
interviewed disagreed with the idea of specific duty of care regimes. They pointed out that new 
statutory obligations to remove illegal content online should apply horizontally to any type of 
illegal content to avoid regulatory fragmentation. 
Almost all online platforms interviewed considered the terms of the existing liability principles of 
intermediary service providers of the e-Commerce Directive as fit-for-purpose. However, two 
indicated that the concept of 'active' and 'passive' intermediary service providers should be reformed. 
This is because the concept may no longer adequately reflect the economic, social, and technical reality 
of current services across their lifecycle. Most platforms mentioned that the limitation of liability for 
Internet intermediaries is a good solution. This is because it allows for protection of fundamental rights, 
the rule of law and the open Internet. 
Regarding the solutions to improve the moderation of illegal content online by platforms, 
stakeholders suggested to put in place harmonised and transparent 'notice-and-action' processes. 
Some stakeholders suggested strengthening the networks of fact-checkers and hotlines across the 
EU. In terms of fundamental rights, several stakeholders recommended to enforce existing EU 
rules and to make them more consistently interpreted across Member States.  
Almost all NGOs, industry/trade associations and online platforms interviewed consider that the 
existence of different content moderation practices in EU Member States hinder the fight 
against illegal content online. Several online platforms stressed that a harmonised approach would 
enable service providers to have more clarity on what they must do to fulfil their legal responsibilities, 
while upholding fundamental rights. 
In the context of safeguarding fundamental rights, most NGOs noted that online platforms' 
moderating practices should increase moderation transparency, access to data, and information 
regarding platforms' decision-making processes. In addition, they should ensure human review of the 
decisions on the user-generated content and contextual expertise. Some online platforms have 
acknowledged that platforms' incentive to over-remove legal content constitutes the most 
considerable threat of unjustified interference with fundamental rights. 
International benchmarking 
The analysis conducted in six countries/regions of the world shows that all of these countries have a 
regulatory and policy framework related to illegal content online. The policies may relate either to 
online hate speech, defamation, child sexual abuse material, copyright infringements or online 
disinformation. The large majority of the countries investigated have regulatory measures in place 
related to at least one or several of these areas. Some policy guidelines have also been established 
by some countries to guide online platforms when moderating illegal content online. In almost all 
countries covered, NGOs and academics have recommended ways to improve the online content 
moderation practices.  
In addition to the regulatory and policy measures put in place to frame illegal content online, most of 
the online platforms worldwide apply their own Terms of Service/Terms of Use to moderate 
online content, which often stem from the large US online platforms. 
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In comparison to the set of measures identified in the various countries, the EU seems to have one of 
the most developed regulatory frameworks related to illegal content online and its moderation 
by online platforms.  
Policy Recommendations for the Digital Services Act 
The revised EU regulatory framework for online content moderation, which will result from the 
forthcoming Digital Services Act, could be based on the following objectives and principles:  
• sufficient and effective safeguards to protect fundamental rights;  
• a strengthening of the Digital Single Market; 
• a level playing field between offline and online activities; 
• technological neutrality; 
• incentives for all stakeholders to minimise the risk of errors of over and under removal of 
content; 
• proportionality of the potential negative impact of the content and the size of the platforms; 
and 
• coherence with existing content-specific EU legislation. 
The baseline regulatory regime applicable to all types of content and all categories of platforms could 
strengthen in an appropriate and proportionate manner the responsibility of the online platforms to 
ensure a safer Internet. To do that, it could include a set of fully harmonised rules on procedural 
accountability to allow public oversight of the way in which platforms moderate content. Those rules 
could include: (i) common EU principles to improve and harmonise the 'notice-and-takedown' 
procedure to facilitate reporting by users; (ii) the encouragement for the platforms to take, where 
appropriate, proportionate, specific proactive measures including with automated means; and (iii) 
the strengthening of the cooperation with public enforcement authorities. Those new rules could 
be based on the measures recommended by the European Commission in its 2018 Recommendation 
on measures to effectively tackle illegal online content as well as on the measures imposed on Video-
Sharing Platforms by the revised 2018 Audio-Visual Media Services Directive. 
This baseline regulatory regime could be complemented with stricter rules imposing more 
obligations, when the risk of online harm is higher. Stricter rules are already imposed according to 
the type of content: more obligations are imposed for the moderation of the online content with the 
highest potential negative impact on the society such as terrorist content, child sexual abuse material, 
racist and xenophobic hate speech and some copyright violations. Stricter rules could also be imposed 
according to the size of the platform: more obligations could be imposed on the platforms whose 
number of users is above a certain threshold, which could be designated as Public Space Content-
Sharing Platforms (PSCSPs). 
As often in EU law, enforcement is the weak spot and therefore, the forthcoming Digital Services Act 
should ensure that any online content moderation rule is enforced effectively. Such enforcement 
should be ensured by public authorities, in particular regulatory authorities and judicial courts. The 
'country of origin' principle should be maintained, hence the online platforms should in principle be 
supervised by the authorities of the country where they are established. However, the authorities 
of the country of establishment may not have sufficient means and incentives to supervise the largest 
platforms; hence, an EU authority could be set up to supervise the PSCSPs. In addition, the 
enforcement could be improved with, on the one hand, a better coordination between national 
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authorities by relying on the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network and, on the other hand, 
better information disclosure in the context of Court proceedings. 
Given the massive explosion of online content, public authorities may not be sufficiently well- 
geared to ensure the enforcement of content moderation rules and may need to be 
complemented with private bodies. Those could be the platforms themselves, self-regulatory bodies 
or co-regulatory bodies. The involvement of private bodies seems inevitable, but should not lead to full 
delegation of State sovereign power to private firms or a privatisation of the public interest, hence co-
regulation could be an effective tool, preferred to self-regulation. 
Next to specific obligations regarding the moderation of illegal content online, complementary 
broader measures are also necessary such as more transparency on the way moderation is done and 
support to journalists, Civil Society Organisation or NGOs, which contribute to the fight against illegal 
content. 
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1. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY1 
Background 
Online platforms have created content moderation systems, particularly in relation to tackling illegal 
content online. Such moderation practices can include depublication, delisting, downranking and can 
lead to some forms of censorship of information and/or user accounts from social media and other 
online platforms. Those practices may have an impact on the overall quality and quantity of online 
content. They are usually based on an alleged violation of online platforms' Community 
Standards/Guidelines policies. Whether faced with online disinformation, harassment, or violence, 
content moderators have a fundamental role to play in online platforms. However, the tools that online 
platforms use to curb trolling, ban hate speech, or restrict pornography can also silence content 
relevant to the public. In recent years, content moderation practices have become a matter of intense 
public interest. Also, the co-existence of different moderation practices at national level could affect 
the functioning of the Internal Market. 
In its 2020 Digital Strategy Communication, the European Commission noted that "it is essential that the 
rules applicable to digital services across the EU are strengthened and modernised, clarifying the roles and 
responsibilities of online platforms. The sale of illicit, dangerous or counterfeit goods, and dissemination of 
illegal content must be tackled as effectively online as it is offline". Therefore, the Commission announced 
as one key action part of the Digital Services Act (DSA) package: "new and revised rules to deepen the 
Internal Market for Digital Services, by increasing and harmonising the responsibilities of online platforms 
and information service providers and reinforce the oversight over platforms' content policies in the EU" 2. 
Aim of the Study  
This study analyses the current EU legal framework on online content moderation, the practices of key 
online platforms active in the EU and, on that basis, makes recommendations for reforms. 
The study is organised as follows: after this introduction, Section 2 reviews the EU legal framework for 
online content moderation and also briefly summarises interesting national laws or initiatives (in 
Germany, France and the UK). Section 3 provides an overview of the online content moderation 
practices on the basis of interviews of online platforms and other stakeholders. Section 4 reviews briefly 
some policies and recommendations on online content moderation practices made in other regions of 
the world. On the basis of all the information included in the previous sections, Section 5 makes 
recommendations to improve the EU legal framework on online content moderation.  
                                                             
1 The authors want to thank Aleksandra Kuczerawy for her very helpful comments and suggestions. 
2 Communication from the Commission of 19 February 2020, Shaping Europe's digital future, COM(2020) 67, pp.11-12. See also the 
European Commission Evaluation Roadmap/Inception Impact Assessment of 3 June 2020 on the Digital Services Act package: deepening 
the Internal Market and clarifying responsibilities for digital service, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/hav e-
your-say/initiatives/12417-Digital-Services-Act-deepening-the-Internal-Market-and-clarifying-responsibilities-for-digital-services. 
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The EU regulatory framework on content moderation is increasingly complex and has been 
differentiated over the years according to the category of the online platform and the type of 
content reflecting a risk-based approach. The e-Commerce Directive of 2000 contains the baseline 
regime applicable to all categories of platforms and all types of content. The Directive provides the 
following rules: (i) the 'country of origin' principle, which is the cornerstone of the Digital Single 
Market; (ii) an exemption of liability for hosting platforms which remain passive and neutral and 
which remove the illegal content online as soon as they are made aware of it; (iii) the prohibition 
of general monitoring measures to protect fundamental rights; and (iv) the promotion of self- and 
co-regulation as well as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
This baseline regulatory regime has been complemented in 2018 by the revised Audio-Visual 
Media Services Directive, which imposes more obligations to one category of online platforms, the 
Video-Sharing Platforms. They should take appropriate and proportionate measures, 
preferably through co-regulation, in order to protect the general public from illegal content 
(terrorist content, child sexual abuse material, racism and xenophobia or other hate speech), and 
to protect minors from harmful content. Those measures must be appropriate in the light of the 
nature of the content, the category of persons to be protected and the rights and legitimate 
interests at stake and be proportionate taking into account the size of the platforms and the 
nature of the provided service.  
Those rules are then strengthened by stricter rules for four types of content for which 
illegality has been harmonised at the EU level: 
• First, the Counter-Terrorism Directive defines the public provocation to commit a terrorist 
offence and requires, following transparent procedures and with adequate safeguards, 
Member States to take removing and blocking measures against websites 
containing or disseminating terrorist content. The European Commission aims to go 
further and has made a proposal, which has not yet been adopted by the EU co-legislators, 
for a regulation which would require hosting services providers to take measures to 
remove terrorist content; 
• Second, the Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Directive defines child pornography 
and requires, following transparent procedures and with adequate safeguards, Member 
States to take removing and blocking measures against websites containing or 
disseminating child sexual abuse material; 
• Third, the Counter-Racism Framework Decision provides that Member States must 
ensure that racist and xenophobic hate speech is punishable, but does not impose 
detailed obligations related to online content moderation practices; 
• Fourth, the Copyright in Digital Single Market Directive establishes a new liability regime 
for online content-sharing platforms; they must conclude an agreement with the rights-
holders for the exploitation of the works and, if they fail to do so, they are liable for the 
content violating copyright on their platforms unless they make their best effort to 
alleviate such violations. 
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2.1. Definition of illegal content online 
EU law makes illegal four types of content: (i) child sexual abuse material; (ii) racist and xenophobic 
hate speech; (iii) terrorist content; and (iv) content infringing Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Beyond 
those four types, there is no EU harmonisation of the illegal content online. Thus, the same type of 
content may be considered illegal, legal but harmful or legal and not harmful across the Member States. 
This study distinguishes between online content that is illegal under EU law and a residual category, 
which includes content that may be illegal under national law.  
2.1.1. Online content illegal under EU law  
The Counter-Terrorism Directive (CTD)3 defines the public provocation to commit a terrorist 
offence4 in broad terms as it covers indirect advocacy and ill-defined 'glorification' of terrorist acts. It 
only requires that the conduct causes a danger that the offences may be committed. It does not require 
that the conduct creates an actual risk or an imminent danger of harm, which would be harder to 
establish. In 2018, the European Commission proposed a Regulation on preventing the 
dissemination of terrorist content online (TERREG) to complement the CTD, in particular by 
tackling the misuse of hosting services for terrorist purposes5. The Commission proposes to define 
terrorist content as covering material that incites or advocates the commission of terrorist offences, 
encourages the contribution to terrorist offences, promotes the activities of a terrorist group or 
provides methods and techniques for committing terrorist offences 6. However, such definition has 
                                                             
3 Directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism, OJ [2017] L 88/6. 
4 CTD, Article 5 defines the public provocation to commit a terrorist offence as "the distribution, or otherwise making available by any 
means, whether online or offline, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of [terrorist offences], where such 
conduct, directly or indirectly, such as by the glorification of terrorist acts, advocates the commission of terrorist offences, thereby causing 
a danger that one or more such offences may be committed". 
5 Proposal of the European Commission of 12 September 2018 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online, COM (2018) 640. 
6 TERREG Proposal, Article 2(5) defines terrorist content as: "(a) inciting or advocating, including by glorifying, the commission of terroris t 
offences, thereby causing a danger that such acts be committed; (b) encouraging the contribution to terrorist offences; (c) promoting the 
activities of a terrorist group, in particular by encouraging the participation in or support to a terrorist group within the meaning of CTD; 
(d) instructing on methods or techniques for the purpose of committing terrorist offences". 
Those stricter rules imposed by EU hard-law are all complemented by self-regulatory initiatives 
agreed by the main online platforms, often at the initiative of the European Commission. They 
contain a range of commitments, some of which are directly related to content moderation 
practices and others which support such practices. However, the evaluation of those initiatives 
shows difficulties in measuring the commitments taken and in reporting on their effectiveness. 
With regard online disinformation, which is not always illegal but can be very harmful to EU 
values, the main platforms have agreed to a Code of Practice in 2018. Such Code is closely 
monitored by the European Commission.  
In addition to this multi-layered EU regulatory framework, several Member States have adopted 
national rules on online content moderation, in particular for hate speech and online 
disinformation. The legal compatibility of those national initiatives with the EU legal framework is 
not always clear and the multiplication of national laws seriously risks undermining the Digital 
Single Market. 
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been criticised for being too broad and including legitimate forms of expression (e.g. journalists and 
NGO reports on terrorist content)7 and the European Parliament suggests to align the definition of 
terrorist content in TERREG with the definition contained in the CTD8.  
The Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Directive (CSAED) establishes minimum rules concerning 
the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of child sexual exploitation and abuse9. The 
Directive provides for a broad definition of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) that includes real 
child pornography that visually depicts a child engaged in real or simulated sexually explicit conduct 
or virtual child pornography, i.e. computer-generated pornographic material involving children 10.  
The Counter-Racism Framework Decision (CRFD), which was adopted by the Council alone, seeks to 
combat particularly serious forms of racism and xenophobia through criminal law but does not define 
racism and xenophobia nor use the terms racist and xenophobic hate speech11. Instead, the CRFD 
criminalises two types of speech - publicly inciting to violence or hatred and publicly condoning, 
denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes - when they 
are directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, 
colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. The list of protected grounds is limited to these 
five characteristics.  
With regard to Intellectual Property Rights, some harmonisation has been achieved at the EU level 
through different EU Directives such as the InfoSoc Directive12, which harmonises the rights of 
reproduction, distribution and communication to the public and the legal protection of anti-copying 
devices and rights management systems. 
2.1.2. Illegal content online under national law  
While only the hate speech which is racial and xenophobic has been made illegal by the CRFD, Member 
States may go beyond the EU minimum and criminalise other types of hate speech, by referring to a 
broader list of protected characteristics (a list including e.g. religion, disability, sexual orientation). 
Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights can serve as a reference point for the Member States 
in that it prohibits all forms of discrimination with regard to a detailed list of protected characteristics13. 
Also, Member States can be guided by a recent Resolution of the European Parliament, which 
condemns hate crime and speech by bias against a person's disability, sexual orientation, gender 
                                                             
7 Opinion 2/2019 of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 12 February 2019 on the Proposal for a Regulation on preventing 
the dissemination of terrorist content online and its fundamental rights implications.  
8 LIBE Committee Report of April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online 
(C8-0405/2018), AM 52-57. 
9 Directive 2011/92 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, O.J. [2011] L 335/1. This study uses the terms Child Sexual Abuse Material, rather than 
child pornography, following the Resolution of the European Parliament of 11 March 2015 on child sexual abuse online, point 12 and the 
Resolution of the European Parliament of 14 December 2017 on the implementation of Directive 2011/93 on combating the sexual abuse 
and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, point 4. 
10 CSAED, Article 2: child pornography means: "(i) any material that visually depicts a child engaged in real or simulated sexually explicit 
conduct; (ii) any depiction of the sexual organs of a child for primarily sexual purposes; (iii) any material that visually depicts any person 
appearing to be a child engaged in real or simulated sexually explicit conduct or any depiction of the sexual organs of any person 
appearing to be a child, for primarily sexual purposes; or (iv) realistic images of a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct or realistic 
images of the sexual organs of a child, for primarily sexual purposes." See also Jeney (2015).  
11 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia 
by means of criminal law, O.J. [2008] L 328/55.  
12 Directive 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society, O.J. [2001] L167/10.  
13 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 21(1): "Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, 
age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited".  
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identity, sex characteristics or minority status. Finally, Member states must also take into account the 
framework imposed by the Council of Europe.  
Online disinformation – a term preferred to fake news – is not per se illegal, although it may be harmful 
to society as it can be detrimental to the formation of informed and pluralistic opinions, which are 
essential for citizens to freely exercise their democratic choices. It can therefore be damaging to 
democratic elections, decreasing trust among citizens and creating tensions within society. The 
European Commission has defined online disinformation as "verifiably false or misleading information 
that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, 
and may cause public harm" 14. Such an approach excludes unintentional journalistic errors. Moreover, 
the principle of the relationship to the truth ("verifiably false or misleading information") also excludes 
content that is part of the opinion's register. The European Commission also points out that it does not 
cover clearly identified partisan news and commentary. 
2.2. EU regulatory framework on moderation of illegal content online  
The EU regulatory framework on content moderation is complex as illustrated in Figure 1 below. It 
consists of: 
• some horizontal rules applicable to all categories of online platforms and to all types of content, 
i.e. the e-Commerce Directive (ECD)15; 
• some stricter rules applicable to Video-Sharing Platforms (VSPs) and to certain types of illegal 
content online, i.e. the revised Audio-visual Media Service Directive (AVMSD)16; and 
• those rules are then complemented by vertical rules applicable to the four types of illegal 
content, which are illegal under EU law (i.e. terrorist content, child sexual abuse material, racist 
and xenophobic hate speech and violations of Intellectual Property). 
                                                             
14 Communication from the European Commission of 26 April 2018, Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach, COM(2018) 236, 
pp. 3-4. 
15 Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services,  
in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L 178/1. 
16 Directive 2010/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audio-visual media services (Audio-Visual Media 
Services Directive), OJ [2010] L 95/1, as amended by Directive 2018/1808. The 2018 revision of the Directive which contains the new 
regime for VSPs should be transposed in the Member States by September 2020. On this Directive, see Valcke (2019). 
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Figure 1: EU regulatory framework for online content moderation 
 
Source: Authors' own elaboration 
2.2.1. EU rules applicable to all online platforms 
a.  Objective and scope 
In 2000, when online platforms were in their infancy, the ECD established a special liability regime for 
online intermediary services. As explained by the European Commission 17, this legal regime pursued 
four main objectives: 
• first, to share responsibility for a safe Internet between all the private actors involved and a 
good cooperation with public authorities, thus, injured parties should notify online platforms 
on any illegality they observe and online platforms should remove or block access to any illegal 
material of which they are aware; 
• second, to encourage the development of e-Commerce in Europe by ensuring that the online 
platforms did not have an obligation to monitor the legality of all material they store; 
• third, to strike a fair balance between different fundamental rights of the several stakeholders, 
in particular privacy and freedom of expression, freedom to conduct business (for platforms) 
and the right to property including Intellectual Property of injured parties18; and 
• fourth, to strengthen the Digital Single Market by adopting a common EU standard on liability 
exemptions, especially at a time when national rules and case law were increasingly divergent. 
                                                             
17 Commission, 'Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission proposal for a directive on certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in 
the internal market', COM(1998)586. 
18 As protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 7, 8, 11, 16 and 17. 
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While the ECD provides liability exemptions for three categories of online platforms, i.e. mere 
conduit, caching and hosting, this study focuses on the latter category which is defined as the storage 
of information provided by a recipient of the service19. 
Regarding the scope of the liability exemptions, reference should also be made to the criterion of 
neutrality. The Court of Justice decided that "in order to establish whether the liability of a referencing 
service provider may be limited under Article 14 of the ECD, it is necessary to examine whether the role 
played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical, automatic 
and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it stores"20. Following the case 
law of the Court of Justice, the exemption of liability cannot be excluded on the sole basis that the 
service is subject to payment, or that general information is provided by the platform to its clients. An 
assessment should be made by the national jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis and for that purpose, 
the special assistance provided by the online platform to the client could, for instance, be relevant21. 
A related issue is whether the ECD dis-incentivises the online platforms to proactively monitor the 
legality of the material they host because, if they would do so, they may lose the benefit of the liability 
exemption. This is sometimes referred to as the 'Good Samaritan' paradox22. For instance, a platform 
carrying out ex ante moderation practices could be considered as playing an active role and, therefore, 
be excluded from the liability exemption. During the public consultations that the European 
Commission did on the ECD, online platforms have mentioned this legal risk of voluntary introducing 
more proactive measures 23. However, in its Communication of September 2017 on tackling illegal 
online content, the European Commission considers that voluntary proactive measures "do not in and 
of themselves lead to a loss of the liability exemption, in particular, the taking of such measures need 
not imply that the online platform concerned plays an active role which would no longer allow it to 
benefit from that exemption"24. Without any judgement of the Court of Justice or clarification of the 
legal framework, uncertainty remains.  
                                                             
19 ECD, Article 14. In 2000, the storage of information meant the provision of technical services consisting of storage space on a server (e.g. 
hosting an Internet website). With the so-called web 2.0 (social networks, electronic marketplaces, etc.), the question arose whether 
hosting also covered virtual storage of content provided by users. Virtual storage means that online platforms provide storage space for 
data provided by users (product sales announcements, messages or posts published on social networks, video content or photos 
exchanged on the platforms), so that such data are made available to other users through social networks or electronic marketplaces, 
etc. Although national judges sometimes decided that these kinds of services should not be considered as hosting services, the Court of 
Justice confirmed that they could fall within the scope of the liability exemption for hosting: Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France v 
Louis Vuitton EU:C:2010:159, para. 111; Case C-324/09 L'Oreal et al. v. eBay EU:C:2011:474, para. 110; Case C-360/10 SABAM v. Netlog 
EU:C:2012:85, para. 27. 
20 Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton EU:C:2010:159, para. 113 where the Court of Justice decided that: 'the exemptions 
from liability established in the directive cover only cases in which the activity of the information society service provider is 'of a mere technical, 
automatic and passive nature', which implies that that service provider 'has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is 
transmitted or stored'; Case C-324/09 L'Oreal et al. v. eBay EU:C:2011:474, para. 116 where the Court of Justice decided that: 'Where, the 
operator has provided assistance which entails, in particular, optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in question or promoting those 
offers, it must be considered not to have taken a neutral position between the customer-seller concerned and potential buyers but to have played 
an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data relating to those offers for sale. It cannot then rely, in the case of 
those data, on the exemption from liability'; Case C-484/14 Mc Fadden EU:C:2016:689, para. 62. Those cases are well explained in Van Eecke 
(2011), Husovec (2017), Nordemann (2018), Van Hoboken et al. (2018). 
21 See he example of Google AdWords: should the provider play a role in the drafting of the commercial message which accompanies the 
advertising link: Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France v Louis Vuitton, EU:C:2010:159, para. 118. 
22 Note that the US law provides explicitly for a 'Good Samaritan' clause, hence does not carry this dis-incentive against voluntary proactive 
measures: Section 230(c) of the US Communication Decency Act states that: '(…) No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable (…)'. 
23 For the 2011 public consultation: Commission Staff Working Document of 11 January 2012, Online services, including e-Commerce, in 
the Single Market, SEC(2011) 1641, p.35. For the 2015-2016 consultation, Communication from the Commission of 25 May 2016, Online 
Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, COM(2016) 288, p. 9 and Commission Staff Working 
Document of 10 May 2017 on the Mid-Term Review on the implementation of the Digital Single Market Strategy, SWD(2017) 155, p. 28. 
24 Communication of the Commission of 28 September 2017, Tackling Illegal Content Online. Towards an enhanced responsibility for online 
platforms, COM (2017) 555, p.13. 
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b. Rights and duties of the hosting provider  
Article 14 of the ECD creates an exemption from the national liability regime to which the hosting 
platform is subject and determine the requirements to be met by the providers to benefit from such 
exemption. Liability exemptions are horizontal: many types of illegal content or activities are covered 
(unfair market practices, violation of data protection rules, damage to honour and reputation, etc.), as 
well as various kinds of liabilities (criminal or civil). Note that, even when the platform cannot benefit 
from the liability exemption, it does not mean that it will necessarily be considered as liable under the 
applicable legal framework. In this case, the national jurisdiction should determine whether legal 
requirements applicable in the Member State are fulfilled (e.g. a negligence under Tort Law) and, if so, 
to decide that the online platform shall be held liable. 
Following Article 14 of the ECD, a hosting platform can escape liability for illegal material uploaded by 
users when it "does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims 
for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is 
apparent". Should the platform have such knowledge or awareness, it can however benefit from the 
liability exemption if it "acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information". 
Since the adoption of the Directive in 2000, the interpretation of Article 14 gave rise to various 
discussions, in particular with regard to the concepts referred to in the provision ("actual knowledge", 
"acting expeditiously", etc.). In this context of legal uncertainty, the hosting provider has to manage 
conflicting claims between, on the one hand, the victim of the illegal content (who may engage the 
provider's liability if it is not removed or blocked) and, on the other hand, the originator of the content 
(whom the intermediary has contractually committed to host). Moreover, if for certain types of content 
the illicit character is obvious (child pornography, massive violation of copyright, etc.), for other types 
of content it is less certain (attack on honour or reputation, violation of image rights or privacy, etc.).  
Another pillar of the ECD consists in the prohibition for EU Member States to impose a general 
obligation on the hosting platforms to monitor the material hosted25. The Court of Justice has drawn 
a blurred line between general monitoring measures and specific monitoring measures, in particular 
in case of suspected violation of Intellectual Property Rights. The first are prohibited26; the second are 
allowed when achieving a fair balance between the fundamental rights of the different stakeholders27. 
Although there is not any general obligation to monitor, the online platforms could decide, on a 
voluntary basis, to carry out spot checks on the online content. This is not prohibited, however, while 
doing so, the online platform could be considered as playing an active role (and therefore lose the 
benefit of the liability exemption). 
                                                             
25 ECD, Article 15. 
26 Case C-360/10 SABAM v. Netlog EU:C:2012:85 where the Court of Justice decided that the e-Commerce Directive precludes: 'a national 
Court from issuing an injunction against a hosting service provider which requires it to install a system for filtering information which is stored 
on its servers by its service users; which applies indiscriminately to all of those users, as a preventative measure, exclusively at its expense, and 
for an unlimited period; which is capable of identifying electronic files containing musical, cinematographic or audiovisual work in respect of 
which the applicant for the injunction claims to hold intellectual property rights, with a view to preventing those works from being made 
available to the public in breach of copyright'. Also Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM EU:C:2011:771. 
27 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH EU:C:2014:192 where the Court of Justice decided that the injunction 
must: 'strike a balance, primarily, between (i) copyrights and related rights, which are intellectual property and are therefore protected under 
Article 17(2) of the Charter, (ii) the freedom to conduct a business, which economic agents such as internet service providers enjoy under 
Article 16 of the Charter, and (iii) the freedom of information of internet users, whose protection is ensured by Article 11 of the Charter' (at para. 
47 of the Case) and that such balance is found when the injunctions do not: 'unnecessarily deprive internet users of the possibility of lawfully 
accessing the information available and that they have the effect of preventing unauthorised access to protected subject-matter or, at least, of 
making it difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using the services of the addressee of that injunction from 
accessing the subject-matter that has been made available to them in breach of the intellectual property right' (at para. 63 of the case). Also 
more recently, Case C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 96. 
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In addition, Member States may impose on hosting providers the duty to cooperate with the 
competent authorities28. Two types of duties are possible: spontaneous communication to the 
authorities or communication at their request. Information related to the identification of the user who 
posted illegal content anonymously could be communicated to the victim of the illegal content (in 
order to bring a claim against the author) or only to the competent authorities.  
The last pillar of the ECD is the encouragement of co- and self-regulation to implement the rules and 
principles of the Directive29. In particular, the ECD mentions the importance of involving consumers in 
drafting Codes of Conduct to ensure that the rules remain balanced. To ensure the effectiveness of 
those rules, monitoring the implementation of the codes is essential. This provision has led to an 
increasing reliance on co- and self-regulation to tackle certain types of illegal materials which have very 
negative impact on the society, such as child abuse content, terrorist content, hate speech or 
counterfeit goods. 
c. Commission Recommendation of March 2018 
In March 2018, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation setting principles for the 
providers of hosting services and Member States to take effective, appropriate and proportionate 
measures to tackle illegal content online30. It sets out the general principles for all types of illegal 
content online and recommended stricter moderation for terrorist content: 
• regarding the 'notice-and-takedown', the Recommendation calls for procedures that (i) are 
effective, sufficiently precise and adequately substantiated, (ii) respect the rights of content 
providers with possibilities of 'counter-notices' and out-of-Court dispute settlements and (iii) 
are transparent31; 
• regarding proactive measures, the Recommendation encourages appropriate, proportionate 
and specific measures, which could involve the use of automated means, provided some 
safeguards be in place, in particular human oversight and verification32; and 
• regarding cooperation, the Recommendation encourages close cooperation with national 
judicial and administrative authorities and trusted flaggers with the necessary expertise and 
determined on clear and objective basis; it also encourages cooperation among hosting 
services providers, in particular smaller ones which may have less capacity to tackle illegal 
content 33. 
d. Evaluation of the rules 
In 2016, the Commission did an evaluation of the ECD with a focus on the liability regime, its 
harmonisation across the EU and its effectiveness in tackling illegal content online, whose results 
should be taken into account in the forthcoming Digital Services Act. According to the 2016 
Commission public consultation34, "[a] majority of the respondents stands behind intermediary 
liability principles of the e-Commerce Directive, but also demands some clarifications or 
                                                             
28 ECD, Article 15(2) requires to "promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information 
provided by recipients of their service or obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, information enabling 
the identification of recipients of their service with whom they have storage agreements". 
29 ECD, Article 16. 
30 Recommendation 2018/334 of the European Commission of 1 March 2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online, OJ 
[2018] L 63/50. This Recommendation follows the Communication of the European Commission of 28 September 2017, Tackling Illegal 
Content Online. Towards an enhanced responsibility for online platforms, COM (2017) 555. 
31 European Commission Recommendation 2018/334, Points 5-17. 
32 European Commission Recommendation 2018/334, Points 16-21. 
33 European Commission Recommendation 2018/334, Points 22-28. 
34 TILT (2016, p. 4). 
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improvements. A significant proportion of respondents who criticized the Directive complained about 
the national implementations rather than the EU law itself. The stakeholders broadly supported the 
horizontal nature of the Directive, but demanded a differentiated approach on 'Notice-and-takedown'; 
by adjusting or improving the practice of takedown for specific types of content, such as hate speech, 
terrorist content, child abuse material, copyright infringements, etc." 
Regarding the functioning of the ECD rules, the most attention was paid to the hosting safe harbour, 
in particular its concept of "passive hosting". The concept was criticised for not being entirely 
clear, and for divergent national interpretations. Regarding the missing components, an 
"[o]verwhelming majority of respondents supported the establishment of a 'counter-notice' 
mechanism (82.5%), i.e. possibility for content providers to give their views to the hosting service 
provider on the alleged illegality of their content" 35. The consultation also recorded a significant 
support for more transparency on the intermediaries' content restriction policies 36. On the side of 
proactive duties, a majority of intermediaries reported that they do put in place voluntary or proactive 
measures to remove certain categories of illegal content from their system beyond what was required 
by the legal framework. In the consultation, only 36.1% of respondents reported a need to impose 
specific duties of care for certain categories of content. 
With regard to the liability of platforms, some of the empirical studies look at the question of removal 
of illegal content online. However, most of them are copyright-centred, and not necessarily focused on 
EU markets only. The other problem is that in the online environment, where many companies are 
operating globally with global version of products, the broadly drafted EU rules sometimes could give 
a way to more prescriptive rules from the US (especially in copyright law).  
As noted by de Streel and Husovec (2020), among the academic studies, the studies of the ecosystem 
fit into several categories: (i) interviewing notifiers, providers and users37; (ii) experimental upload of 
content 38; (iii) analysis of transparency reports or data sets shared publicly by providers, such as Lumen 
data 39; (iv) tracking of the public availability of the content over a pre-set period40; and (v) experimental 
testing of redesign of the ECD41. The studies so far show a number of global trends, which are not 
always restricted to the European setting, namely: 
• the quality of notifications sent to the providers is often low (at least in some areas) and there 
is a diverging quality of such notifications among different actors; 
• the notifications are increasingly out-sourced to professional companies and also sent by 
algorithms, and not humans; and 
• providers tend to over-remove content to avoid liability and save resources, they equally 
employ technology to evaluate the notifications; and the affected users who posted content 
often do not take action. 
                                                             
35 Ibidem, p. 5. 
36 Ibidem, p. 6. 
37 Urban et al. (2017a).  
38 Perel and Elkin-Koren (2017); Sjoera (2004). 
39 See www.lumendatabase.org; Urban and Quilter (2006); Urban et al. (2017a) and (2017b); Seng (2014) and (2015). 
40 Erickson and Kretschmer (2018). 
41 Fiala and Husovec (2018). 
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e. EU data protection rules to protect privacy 
Two key EU legislations, which regulate the collection and the processing of personal data in order 
to protect the privacy of EU citizens, have important impacts on the online content moderation 
practices:  
• first, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) imposes strict rules for the collection and 
the processing of personal data, in particular the principles of lawfulness/fairness/transparency, 
purpose limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity/confidentiality 
and accountability 42. Thus any content moderation practices involving personal data, which is 
often the case given the broad definition of personal data, should comply with those principles; 
and  
• second, the e-Privacy Directive complements the GDPR and imposes even stricter rules for 
telecommunications operators, in particular to protect the confidentiality of 
communications43. In 2017, the European Commission proposed a new e-Privacy Regulation in 
order to update the current legislation and to better align it with the new rules of the GDPR. 
However, the proposal is still being discussed in the Council, and negotiations between the two 
EU co-legislators have not yet started. 
2.2.2. Additional rules applicable to Video-Sharing Platforms 
The 2018 revision of the AVMSD imposes on the VSPs 44 to take appropriate measures to45: 
• protect the general public from: (i) the three types of online content which are illegal under 
EU law (terrorist content, child sexual abuse material and racism and xenophobia) and (ii) hate 
speech based on the illegal grounds mentioned in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (sex, 
race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any 
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation)46; and 
• protect minors from content which may impair their physical, mental or moral 
development47. 
The AVMSD lists the possible measures to be taken such as transparent and user-friendly mechanisms 
to report and flag the content; systems through which VSPs explain to users what effect has been given 
                                                             
42 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 (General Data Protection  
Regulation), OJ [2016] L 199/1, Article 5. 
43 Directive 2002/58 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ [2002] L 201/37 
as amended by Directive 2009/136. The European Commission has proposed a new e-Privacy Regulation in order to update the legislation 
and better align it with the new rules of the GDPR. However, the proposal is still being discussed in the Council, and negotiations between 
the EU co-legislators have not yet started: Proposal of the Commission of 10 January 2017 for Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing 
Directive 2002/58 (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM(2017) 10. 
44 AVMSD, Article 1(1aa) defines the Video-Sharing Platform service as "a service as defined by Articles 56 and 57 TFEU, where the principal 
purpose of the service or of a dissociable section thereof or an essential functionality of the service is devoted to providing programmes, 
user-generated videos, or both, to the general public, for which the Video-Sharing Platform provider does not have editorial 
responsibility, in order to inform, entertain or educate, by means of electronic communications networks (…) and the organisation of 
which is determined by the Video-Sharing Platform provider, including by automatic means or algorithms in particular by displaying, 
tagging and sequencing". 
45 AVMSD, Article 28b. As AVMSD is based on the minimum harmonisation, Member States can adopt more detailed or stricter rules 
provided they respect EU law, in particular the ECD and the CSAED. 
46 AVMSD, Article 28b (1b) and (1c). 
47 AVMSD, Article 28b (1a); content in the meaning of the AVMSD, i.e. programmes, user-generated videos and audio-visual commercial 
communications.  
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to the reporting and flagging; easy-to-use systems allowing users to rate the content; transparent, easy-
to-use and effective procedures for the handling and resolution of users' complaints48. However, as 
explained by Kukliš (2020), the AVMSD "does not create a duty of care or any other general 
responsibility of VSPs vis-à-vis their users, nor does it create any actual substantive rights worth that 
name." 
The Directive specifies that the measures must be appropriate in the light of the nature of the content, 
the potential harm, the characteristics of the category of persons to be protected, the rights and 
legitimate interests at stake (in particular those of the VSPs and the users having created and/or 
uploaded the content, as well as the public interest). The measures should also be proportionate 
taking into account the size of the VSP and the nature of the provided service49. A National Regulatory 
Authority (often the media regulator) should assess the appropriateness of the measures50. According 
to the European Commission, the requirements of the AVMSD are compatible with the liability 
exemption for hosting service providers of the ECD, as the measures imposed on VSPs relate to the 
responsibilities of the provider in the organisational sphere and do not entail liability for any illegal 
information stored on the online platforms as such51. Moreover, the measures imposed on VSPs cannot 
lead to any ex-ante control measures or upload-filtering of content52. 
In its Impact Assessment leading to the proposal to amend the AVMSD53, the Commission considered 
that minors and consumers were not sufficiently protected when viewing videos on VSPs. By 
encouraging co-regulatory measures, the additional cost would be limited because most online 
platforms have already similar mechanisms in place and the costs are shared between the industry and 
regulators. Moreover, the proposed measures strike an adequate balance between, on the one hand, 
the need to enhance the protection viewers and, on the other hand, the need to protect the 
fundamental rights (in particular, the freedom of speech and the freedom to conduct a business). 
2.2.3. Stricter rules applicable for terrorist content 
To better fight terrorist content online, the baseline regulatory regime is complemented by the 
following legislative and non-legislative elements:  
• the CTD, which may be complemented by TERREG if adopted by the co-legislators;  
• the Guidelines of the European Commission on effectively tackling illegal content online54; and 
• a Forum with the main stakeholders involved in the fight against terrorist content online, which 
has been established in 2015. 
a. Counter-Terrorism Directive 
The CTD requires Member States to take content removal and blocking measures against 
websites containing or disseminating terrorist content55. Those measures must be set following 
transparent procedures and provide adequate safeguards, in particular to ensure that they are limited 
to what is necessary and proportionate and that users are informed of the reason for those measures.  
                                                             
48 AVMSD, Article 28b (3). 
49 AVMSD, Article 28b (3). 
50 AVMSD, Article 28b (5). 
51 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain  
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audio-visual media services 
in view of changing market realities, COM(2016) 287.  
52 AVMSD, Article 28b(3). 
53 Commission Staff Working of 25 May 2016, Impact Assessment of AVMSD Proposal, SWD(2016) 168. 
54 European Commission Recommendation 2018/334, Chapter III. 
55 CTD, Article 21. 
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As of September 2018, 15 Member States had already transposed the Directive by adopting two main 
types of measures56: 
• The 'notice-and-takedown' measures under the ECD, which differ on several points among 
the Member States: offences covered, time limits for removal and consequences of non-
compliance; and 
• The criminal law measures allowing a prosecutor or a Court to order companies to remove 
content or block content or a website, within a period of 24 or 48 hours in some circumstances. 
However, those measures may not lead to a sufficient reduction of terrorist content online because it 
does not target directly the online platforms which are in the best position to know what technology 
can be applied and how to ensure a safe online environment for their users. Furthermore, those 
measures do lead to an effective EU-wide approach to ensure the removal of terrorist content with 
proactive efforts57. 
b. Proposal for a Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online  
The TERREG Proposal goes further than the CTD as it imposes duties of care and proactive measures 
on Hosting Services Providers (HSPs) to remove terrorist content58. The main elements of the 
proposal are:  
• removal orders within one hour issued by a national competent authority, not necessarily a 
judicial body 59; 
• content referrals sent from either a national competent authority or an EU body such as Europol 
that the HSPs must expeditiously assess60; and 
• proactive measures taken by HSPs – when appropriate – to remove terrorist material from their 
services, including by deploying automated detection tools61. 
This system (and in particular the proactive measures) has been criticised by Van Hoboken (2019) as 
undermining the ECD safe harbour, by "creating a proactive duty of care for hosting service providers 
and moving beyond the reactive notice-and-takedown obligations that follow from the ECD 
framework"62. Moreover, such a system carries the risk of negatively affecting fundamental rights, in 
particular the right to freedom of expression:  
• the one-hour response deadline is very difficult to meet in practice. Moreover, small online 
platforms are unlikely to have the resources to comply with this obligation. Multiple NGOs have 
also underlined that such removal orders "must be met within this short time period regardless 
of any legitimate objections platforms or their users may have to the removal of the content 
specified, and the damage to freedom of expression and access to information may already be 
irreversible by the time any future appeal process is complete"63. According to Van Hoboken 
                                                             
56 Commission Staff Working Document of 12 September 2018, Impact Assessment TERREG Proposal, SWD(2018) 408, p. 22.  
57 Ibidem, pp. 18-22.  
58 TERREG Proposal, Article 2(1) defines Hosting Service Provider as "a provider of information society services consisting in the storage of 
information provided by and at the request of the content provider and in making the information stored available to third parties." HSPs 
are e.g. social media, Video-Sharing Platforms (VSP), cloud services and websites where users can post comments. 
59 TERREG Proposal, Article 4. 
60 TERREG Proposal, Article 5. Article 2(8) defines "referral" as "a notice by a competent authority or, where applicable, a relevant Union body 
to a hosting service provider about information that may be considered terrorist content, for the provider's voluntary consideration of 
the compatibility with its own terms and conditions aimed to prevent dissemination of terrorism content".  
61 TERREG Proposal, Article 6. 
62 Also in this sense, Kuczerawy (2018). 
63 Article 19 and Others (2018), Joint letter on European Commission regulation on online terrorist content, available at: 
https://www.article19.org/resources/joint- letter-on-european-commission-regulation-on-online-terrorist-content/. 
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(2019), a more flexible obligation to act quickly without undue delay would better support the 
necessary and proportionate requirement of interference with speech online; 
• the proposal does not impose an independent judicial review for takedown orders. Moreover, 
the proposal does not provide the content provider or the HSP with a mechanism to effectively 
challenge the order before the removal is executed. The European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA, 2019) recommends that the competent authority issuing removal 
orders should be an independent judicial authority or to guarantee minimum standards 
concerning the reviewing of the removal orders; 
• the proposal does not include sufficient safeguards for affected speakers/audiences. Not only 
service providers, but also other users can rely on the freedom of expression when confronted 
with takedown orders and referrals (e.g. Internet users who would have wanted to access the 
deleted content). Van Hoboken (2019) suggests "broadening standing in relevant appeal 
procedures beyond the user (re-)posting particular content to others unduly impacted in their 
freedom of expression";  
• proactive measures require automated means, which may threaten the freedom of expression. 
Indeed, these means do not include safeguards to prevent abuse or provide redress when 
content is mistakenly removed. Furthermore, the proposal does not provide for appropriate 
transparency, accountability and redress mechanisms to mitigate this threat; and 
• finally, this obligation applies to all hosting service providers, irrespective of their size, scope, 
purpose or revenue models, and does not allow flexibility for collaborative platforms64. 
In April 2019, the European Parliament made several amendments to the Commission proposal 65. 
To ensure that the competent authority should be a judicial or a functionally independent 
administrative authority66, to remove the provision concerning the referral67, and to increase the 
safeguards to fundamental rights (including a ban on general monitoring, remedies and complaints 
mechanisms, transparency obligations on HSPs)68.  
c. EU Internet Forum 
In December 2015, the EU Internet Forum to counter terrorist content online was established 
among EU Interior Ministers, high-level representatives of major online platforms (such as 
Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Twitter), Europol, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the 
European Parliament69. One of its goals is to address the misuse of the Internet by terrorist groups and 
to reduce accessibility to terrorist content online. 
The Forum led to an efficient referral mechanism in particular with the EU Internet Referral Unit of 
Europol, a shared database with more than 200,000 hashes, which are unique digital fingerprints of 
terrorist videos and images removed from online platforms. At its third meeting in December 2017, 
online platforms noted the increasing use and accuracy of Artificial Intelligence (AI), such as photo and 
video matching and text-based machine learning to identify terrorist content 70. At its fourth meeting 
                                                             
64 Ibidem. 
65 LIBE Committee Report of April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online 
(C8-0405/2018). 
66 Ibidem, AM n° 126.  
67 Ibidem, AM n° 83.  
68 For example, AM n° 100, 103, 104, 106, 129.  
69 European Commission Press release of 3 December 2015, IP/15/6243. 
70 European Commission Press release of 6 December 2017, IP/17/5105. For instance, the Google representative notes that "98 percent of the 
videos we remove for violent extremism on YouTube are flagged to us by machine-learning algorithms, up from 75 percent just a few 
months ago". 
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in December 2018, participants stressed the importance of cooperation between public and private 
sectors and noted that out of more than 77,000 reported contents, 84% have been removed from 
online platforms 71. During its fifth meeting in October 2019, participants committed to setting up an 
EU crisis protocol between the European Commission and Europol to facilitate international 
cooperation in the event of extraordinary situations for which national legal frameworks and crisis 
management mechanism are insufficient72. 
2.2.4. Stricter rules applicable for child sexual abuse material 
To better fight child sexual abuse online material, a Directive against child sexual abuse was adopted 
in 2011 complemented by several self-regulatory initiatives.  
a. Child Sexual Exploitation Directive 
Similarly to the CTD, the CSAED requires Member States to take content removal and blocking 
measures against websites containing or disseminating child sexual abuse material. Such 
measures must be based on transparent procedures and provide adequate safeguards, in particular be 
necessary and proportionate, inform the users on the reasons for restriction and ensure the possibility 
of judicial redress 73. 
To ensure the prompt removal of web pages containing or disseminating child pornography, Member 
States have adopted two categories of measures74: 
• first, 'notice-and-takedown' measures based on the ECD with national hotlines to which 
Internet users can report child sexual abuse material that they find online75; Moreover, INHOPE, 
a global umbrella organisation for the hotlines, encourages exchange of expertise76; and 
• second, measures based on national criminal law such as general provisions that allow the 
seizure of material relevant to criminal proceedings (e.g. material used in the commission of an 
offence) or more specific provisions on the removal of child sexual abuse material. 
With regard to the optional blocking measures, about half of the Member States have chosen to apply 
such measures by using various means (legislative, non-legislative, judicial or other, including 
voluntary action by the Internet industry). Blacklists of websites containing or disseminating child 
sexual abuse material are commonly used in the implementation of blocking measures.  
Noting that "in the fight against the dissemination of child sexual abuse material, removal measures 
are more effective than blocking, since the latter does not delete the content", the European 
Parliament recommends further measures, such as the speeding up of 'notice-and-takedown' 
procedures in cooperation with the Internet industry, the removal of child sexual abuse material at 
source with efficient judicial and law enforcement actions, the establishment of partnerships (with 
online platforms, Europol and Eurojust) to prevent networks and systems from being hacked and 
misused to distribute child sexual abuse material, the legal obligation for Internet Service Providers 
                                                             
71 European Commission Statement of 5 December 2018, Statement/18/6681. 
72 European Commission Press release of 7 October 2019, IP/19/6009.  
73 CSAED, Article 25. Measures may consist in various types of public action, such as legislative, non-legislative, judicial or others. 
74 Report from the Commission of 16 December 2016 assessing the implementation of the measures referred to in Article 25 of Directive  
2011/93 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, COM(2016) 872.  
75 In practice, a person can anonymously report illegal content online to a hotline. Content analysts review the reported content, classify 
the illegality of the material and warn the local law enforcement agency. In many cases, the relevant Internet Service Provider will receive 
a 'notice-and-takedown' order. 
76 This organisation is supported by the European Commission's Safer Internet Programme and since 2014, by the Connecting Europe 
Facility framework. The Network consists of 47 hotlines in 43 countries (as of June 2019). Hotlines have memoranda of understanding 
with the corresponding national Law Enforcement Agencies. See INHOPE Annual Report 2018. 
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(ISPs) to report child sexual abuse material detected in their infrastructure proactively to law 
enforcement authorities and national hotlines77. 
b. Alliance to Better Protect Minors Online  
In 2017, the Alliance to Better Protect Minors Online, a multi-stakeholder forum facilitated by the 
European Commission, was set up in order to address emerging risks that minors face online, 
such as illegal and harmful content (e.g. violent or sexually exploitative content), conduct (e.g. 
cyberbullying) and contact (e.g. sexual extortion)78. It is composed of actors from the entire value chain 
(device manufacturers, telecoms, media and online platforms used by children)79. Its action plan 
includes the provision of accessible and robust tools that are easy-to-use, the provision of feedback 
and notification as appropriate, the promotion of content classification when and where appropriate, 
and the strengthening of the cooperation between the members of the Alliance and other parties (such 
as Child Safety Organisations, Governments, education services and law enforcement) to enhance best 
practice-sharing 80.  
In its evaluation, Ramboll (2018) indicates that many commitments are difficult to measure, hence 
their effectiveness is difficult to assess. It also notes that the effectiveness of the Alliance is limited by 
low public awareness and limited internal knowledge-sharing. It therefore recommends to 
increase public awareness in order to strengthen the external monitoring of the commitments and to 
incentivise the Alliance participants to meet them and to reinforce sharing of good practices between 
members. It also recommends to intensify discussions on new technologies and that they become 
more central to the commitments.  
2.2.5. Stricter rules applicable for racist and xenophobic hate speech 
To better fight racist and xenophobic hate speech, the Counter-Racism Framework Decision was 
adopted in 2008 but does not deal specifically with online content and a Code of Conduct has been 
agreed in 2016.  
a. Counter-Racism Framework Decision 
The CRFD provides that Member States must ensure that hate speech is punishable but does not 
provide for detailed obligations related to online content moderation practices, contrary to the 
CTD or the CSAED. In its Implementation Report, the European Commission indicates that the 
fragmentation of criminal procedural rules across Member States make it difficult to enforce the 
                                                             
77 European Parliament Resolution of 14 December 2017 on the implementation of Directive 2011/93 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography 
(2015/2129(INI)), in particular, para 40-53.  
78 European Commission, "Alliance to better protect minors online", available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/alliance-
better-protect-minors-online. Previous self-regulatory initiatives were: The a CEO Coalition to Make the Internet a Better place for Kids set 
up in 2011 (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/self-regulation-and-stakeholders-better-internet-kids) and the ICT Coalition for 
Children Online set up in 2012 (http://www.ictcoalition.eu). 
79 The signatory companies are: ASKfm, BT Group, Deutsche Telekom, Disney, Facebook, Google, KPN, The LEGO Group, Liberty Global,  
Microsoft, Orange, Rovio, Samsung Electronics, Sky, Snap, Spotify, Sulake, Super RTL/Mediengruppe RTL Deutschland, TIM (Telecom 
Italia), Telefónica, Telenor, Telia Company, Twitter, Vivendi, Vodafone. The associated signatories are: BBFC, Child Helpline International,  
COFACE, eNACSO, EUN Partnership, FFTelecoms, FOSI, Foundation T.I.M., FSM, GSMA, ICT Coalition, NICAM, Toy Industries of Europe, 
UNICEF. However, the independent evaluation of the implementation of the Alliance shows that the majority of members are for now 
large companies and the telecommunication sector. The report therefore calls for more representation of small businesses and for a 
better diversity in the range of stakeholders to increase mutual learning opportunities: Ramboll, 2018. 
80 The common action is complemented by individual company commitments with specific timeline to better protect minors online, see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/individual-company-statements-alliance-better-protect-minors-online. 
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Framework Decision and many Member States could not provide detailed information on how their 
general jurisdictional rules cover online hate speech situations81. 
b. EU Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online 
In 2016, the main online platforms agreed, at the initiative of the European Commission, an EU 
Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online82 and commit to fight the 
dissemination of illegal hate speech as defined according in the CRT. The Code considers that 
online platforms have a role key role to play in ensuring compliance with CRT and the platforms have 
made a series of commitments: 
• drawing users' attention to the types of content not allowed by their Community 
Standards/Guidelines and specifying that they prohibit the promotion of incitement to 
violence and hateful behaviour; 
• putting in place a clear and effective process to review reports/notifications of illegal hate 
speech to remove them or make them inaccessible; reviewing notifications on the basis of the 
Community Standards/Guidelines and the national transposition laws, and reviewing the 
majority of valid reports within 24 hours; 
• regularly training online platform staff, particularly in relation to societal developments; 
• encouraging the reporting of illegal hate speech by experts, including through partnerships 
with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) - so that they can potentially act as trusted reporters - 
and strengthening partnerships and collaboration with CSOs to support them; and 
• strengthening communication and cooperation between the online platforms and the national 
authorities, in particular with regard to procedures for submitting notifications; collaborating 
with other online platforms to improve and ensure the exchange of best practices between 
them. 
The implementation and the impact of the Code is regularly assessed by the Commission on the basis 
of information given by the platforms. The fourth evaluation of January 2019 indicates that 83: 88.9% 
of notifications are reviewed within 24 hours (up to 40% in 2016), the speed of the review of 
notifications improves and an average of 71.7% of reported illegal hate speech is removed.  
However, there is little information on how the statistics are calculated. With regard to transparency 
towards users, only 65.4% of notifications receive feedback and only Facebook systematically informs 
users by providing feedback 84. The percentage of feedback is higher when the notification came from 
a trusted flagger 85. Quintel and Ullrich (2019) note that the evaluation of effectiveness focuses on the 
number and speed of removals but not on the actual illegality of the removed content. 
                                                             
81 Report of the European Commission of 27 January 2014 on the implementation of Council Framework Decision 2008/913 on combating 
certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, COM(2014)27.  
82 The Code of Conduct was signed in 2016 by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube. Since then, Google+, Instagram, Dailymotion 
and Snapchat and Jeuxvideo.com have joined. The Code is available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-
conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en.  
83 European Commission, Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online: fourth evaluation confirms self-regulation works,  
Factsheet, February 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-
conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en#theeucodeofconduct.  
84 Facebook 92.6%, Twitter 60.4% and YouTube only 24.6%. 
85 Facebook 96.8%, Twitter 88.2%, Youtube 40.5% and Instagram 95.5%. 
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Commentators have pointed towards the following weaknesses86:  
• risks of private censorship practices through the priority application of Community 
Standards/Guidelines; 
• lack of precision in determining the validity of a notification; 
• absence of appeal mechanisms for users whose content has been withdrawn; 
• illegal content does not have to be reported to the competent national authorities when 
removed on the basis of the Community Standards/Guidelines; and 
• the 24-hour deadline could either make it impossible for online platforms to meet their 
commitments or lead them to over-blocking practices.  
2.2.6. Stricter rules applicable for violation of Intellectual Property 
a. Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive 
The CDSMD states that Online Content-Sharing Service Providers perform an act of communication to 
the public or an act of making available to the public when they give the public access to protected 
works or other protected subject matter which are uploaded by their users 87. Therefore, the Directive 
provides the platforms with this option to avoid direct liability for their users' uploads88:  
• conclude an agreement with the right holder for the exploitation of the works; or 
• (i) make their best efforts to obtain an authorisation from copyright holders, (ii) make their best 
efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works violating copyright, which the rights 
holders have provided them with the relevant and necessary information and (iii) act 
expeditiously to disable access to, or to remove from their websites, the notified works, and 
make their best efforts to prevent their future uploads. 
The CDSMD also provides for user safeguards to minimise the risks of broad filtering and over-
blocking89. Internet service providers have to put in place rapid and effective measures to enable users 
of their services to lodge a complaint against the blocking or removal of content. Complaints shall be 
processed without undue delay, and decisions to disable access to or remove uploaded content shall 
be subject to human review (not an automated device).  
b. Memorandum of Understanding on the sale of counterfeit goods via the Internet  
A Memorandum of Understanding on the sale of counterfeit goods via the Internet was signed 
in 2011 between rights owners, online platforms and associations90. It aims to improve 'notice-
and-takedown' measures and enhance proactive measures taken by rights owners and online 
intermediaries, to increase cooperation and to better fight against repeated infringements. In its first 
evaluation report, the European Commission noted that voluntary cooperation has been a useful tool 
to reduce online counterfeiting and piracy when used alongside legislation and offered the flexibility 
                                                             
86 Coche (2018); Quintel and Ullrich (2019). 
87 Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single 
Market and amending Directives 96/9 and 2001/29, OJ [2019] L 130/92, Article 17(1). 
88 CDSMD, Article 17(4). 
89 CDSMD, Article 17(9). 
90 Memorandum of Understanding of 21 June 2016 on the sale of counterfeit goods via the Internet, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/intellectual-property/enforcement/memorandum-understanding-sale-counterfeit-goods-
internet_en. 
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to quickly adapt to technological developments and deliver efficient solutions91. However, it also noted 
the need to measure more precisely the effects of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).  
Accordingly, a set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) has been added in a revised version of the 
MoU in 2016 92 and data based on KPIs are collected every six months. In its overview of the revised 
MoU, the Commission indicates that the number of lists deleted as a result of the commitments taken 
by online platforms increases almost tenfold between December 2016 and June 2017 (from 2.65 to 
13.7%)93. Moreover, the feedback received shows that 'notice-and-takedown' measures are useful and 
have been improved by the MoU. However, as they are only ex-post, they need to be complemented 
by proactive measures. Those measures require a close cooperation between online platforms and 
right holders.  
2.2.7. Summary of the EU regulatory framework 
Table 1 outlines the EU rules against illegal content online according to the nature of the legal 
instrument (hard-law, soft-law, or self-regulation). The baseline regime is contained in the e-Commerce 
Directive, which applies to all categories of hosting platforms and all types of illegal content online. The 
Audio-Visual Media Services Directive provides for additional rules applicable to Video-Sharing 
Platforms and to certain type of illegal content online. In addition, a number of vertical measures have 
been adopted, applicable to specific type of content (terrorist content, child sexual abuse material, 

















                                                             
91 Report of the European Commission of 18 April 2013 on the functioning of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit 
Goods via the Internet, COM(2013) 209. 
92 Memorandum of Understanding of 21 June 2016 on the sale of counterfeit goods via the Internet. 
93 European Commission Staff Working Document of 29 November 2017, Overview of the functioning of the Memorandum of 
Understanding on the sale of counterfeit goods via the internet, SWD(2017) 430, p. 4.  
Online Platforms' Moderation of Illegal Content Online 
 
 
 33 PE 652.718 
Table 1: Main EU rules against illegal content online 
Type of illegal 
content 
Hard-law Soft-law Self-regulation 
BASELINE 
All types of hosting 
platforms and all 
types of illegal 
content online 
- Directive 2000/31 
on e-Commerce. 
- Communication (2017) 
on Tackling Illegal 
Content Online.  
- Commission 
Recommendation 
2018/334 on measures to 
effectively tackle illegal 
content online. 
 
Additional rules for 
Video-Sharing 
Platforms 
- Directive 2010/13 
Audio-Visual Media 






- Directive 2017/541 on 
combating Terrorism. 




dissemination of terrorist 
content online.  
- Commission 
Recommendation 
2018/334 on measures to 
effectively tackle illegal 
content online.  
- EU Internet Forum 
(2015). 
 
Child sexual abuse 
material 
- Directive 2011/93 on 
combating the sexual 
abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children 
and child pornography.  
 - Alliance to Better 




Illegal hate speech 
- Council Framework 
Decision 2008/913 on 
combating certain forms 
and expressions of 
racism and xenophobia.  
 - Code of Conduct on 






- Directive 2019/790 on 
Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market. 
- Directive 2004/48 
on enforcement of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights. 
 - Memorandum of 
Understanding on 
counterfeit goods online 
(2011, rev. 2016). 
Source: Authors' own elaboration 
 
Table 2 compares the main elements of the EU legislations on online content moderation on the 
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Type of illegal 
content 
All.  - Public 
provocation 
to commit a 
terrorist 
offence. 
- Child sexual 
abuse material. 








































best efforts.  
Source: Authors' own elaboration 
 
2.3. EU rules regarding the moderation of online disinformation  
a. Communication from the European Commission 
On the basis of a Report of the High-Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation94, the 
results of the public consultation and a Eurobarometer survey95, the European Commission adopted in 
April 2018 a Communication on tackling online disinformation which is based on four principles 96: 
• credibility of information with trustworthiness indicators, trusted flaggers and information 
traceability measures; to guarantee their credibility, fact-checkers must maintain their 
independence and comply with strict rules of ethics and transparency, such as the International 
Fact-Checking Network's Code of Principles; 
                                                             
94 A High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) on Fake News and Online Disinformation was set up by the European Commission. In its report, the 
HLEG considers that most effective solutions to combat online disinformation, while respecting freedom of expression, must involve the 
collaboration of all stakeholders and should be based on five pillars: transparency, media literacy, development of technical tools,  
preservation of media diversity and sustainability and continuous scientific research and evaluation of measures: High-Level Expert Group 
on Fake News and Online Disinformation (2018). 
95 Synopsis Report of the European Commission of 26 April 2018 of the public consultation on fake news and online disinformation,  
available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/synopsis-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-online-disinformation. 
Report of 27 April 2018 on Fake news and disinformation online Flash Eurobarometer 464, available at:  
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2d79b85a-4cea-11e8-be1d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 
96 Communication from the European Commission of 26 April 2018, Tackling online disinformation: a European approach, COM(2018) 236. 
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• transparency of the origin, production, dissemination, targeting and sponsorship of 
information (especially for political advertisings and sponsored contents) to enable Internet 
users to directly evaluate online information and to detect any disinformation; 
• diversified offer of information to citizens to encourage informed decisions based on critical 
thinking; this requires support for media literacy and quality journalism that play an important 
role in uncovering, counter-balancing, and diluting disinformation; and 
• inclusive solutions, including awareness-raising campaigns for Internet users, media literacy 
and the mobilisation and the cooperation of all stakeholders (public authorities, online 
platforms, advertisers, fact and source checkers, journalists and media, etc.). 
b. Code of Practice on Disinformation 
In September 2018, some of the biggest online platforms (Facebook, Google, Twitter, Mozilla and 
Microsoft) and advertisers, as well as the advertising industry agreed a Code of Practice on 
Disinformation with several commitments97. Some of the commitments directly relate to content 
moderation practices such as: closing false accounts by developing clear policies regarding the 
identity and misuse of automated bots on their services; investing in technologies to help Internet 
users make informed decisions when receiving false information (e.g. reliability indicators/trust 
markers, reporting mechanisms); prioritising relevant and authentic information; or facilitating the 
finding of alternative content on issues of general interest.  
Other commitments can support better content moderation practices, such as: improving 
transparency of political and issue-based advertising, in particular by clearly distinguishing advertising 
content from editorial content and by disclosing the identity of the sponsor and the amounts spent; 
refusing remuneration and placements from accounts or websites that consistently disseminate 
disinformation; empowering the research community, fact-checkers and other relevant stakeholders, 
for instance with better access to data; or ensuring partnerships with other stakeholders to improve 
critical thinking and media literacy. 
The European Commission monitored the actions undertaken by the stakeholders on a monthly basis 
before the European elections (between January and May 2019). In October 2019, the first annual Code 
of Practice self-assessment reports by the stakeholders were adopted. On that basis, the Commission 
notes an improved transparency and closer dialogue on policies against online disinformation. 
However, the progress achieved differs greatly between online platforms, and the self-
assessment reports do not provide sufficient information on the impact of the measures 
undertaken and on mechanisms for independent scrutiny98.  
In its assessment Report, the European Regulators Group for Audio-Visual Media Services (ERGA, 2020) 
notes (i) a need for greater transparency on the implementation of the Code with a mechanism to 
ensure independent verification of information provided; (ii) the overly general nature of the 
commitments (both in terms of content and structure); and (iii) the need to increase the number of 
signatories, in particular to include all the big platforms. ERGA believes that improving the effectiveness 
of the Code requires that all online platforms must uniformly comply with the same obligations and 
that more precise definitions, procedures and commitments need be adopted. ERGA calls for a shift 
                                                             
97 Code of Practice on Disinformation", 26 September 2018, last updated 17 June 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation.  
98 European Commission Statement of 29 October 2019, Statement/19/6166. 
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from self-regulation to co-regulation to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against online 
disinformation. 
In an Evaluation Study done for the European Commission, VVA (2020) analyses the Terms of 
Service/Use and Community Standards/Guidelines that online platforms have implemented to comply 
with the Code of Practice. The study makes three main criticisms: (i) given its self-regulatory nature, it 
is not possible to force signatories to comply with their commitments and they do not cover all 
stakeholders; (ii) fragmented implementation of the commitments across the different online 
platforms, pillars and Member States; and (iii) a lack of clarity around the scope and the key concepts 
of the Code of Practice. In this respect, VVA suggests, on the one hand, the adoption of a common 
terminology among signatories and, on the other hand, that the actions undertaken should be as 
concrete as possible. This would make it easier to implement and monitor the commitments and to 
define expected results and key performance indicators. VVA also makes recommendation to 
strengthen the effectiveness of the Code of Practice such more debates on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Code, establishing mechanism for sanctions and redress in case of non-compliance 
with the commitments in the Code while considering proposals for co-regulation. 
2.4. Summary of some national laws and initiatives on online content 
moderation 
Next to the EU regulatory framework, national laws impose, for some categories of online platforms, 
additional obligations to moderate some types of illegal content online. This study focuses on 
Germany, France and the UK as their respective laws or proposals have been heavily debated in the 
policy circles and the academic literature. In Germany, the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) was 
adopted in June 2017 to improve the enforcement of existing criminal provisions on the Internet and, 
more specifically, on social networks99. In France, two related laws on information manipulation were 
adopted in December 2018 and a law on online hate speech, the so-called Avia law, was adopted in 
May 2020100. The legal compatibility of those national initiatives with the EU legal framework is not 
always clear. Moreover, the multiplication of national laws seriously risks undermining the Digital 
Single Market. In the UK, the Online Harms White Paper with proposals to combat online harms was 
adopted in April 2019101.  
Table 3 below summarises the main elements of the national laws and initiatives, which are analysed 
in more details in Annex I of this study. The main points emerging from the comparison are the 
following:  
• regarding the category of online platform, the online platform must have an activity that 
exceeds a certain threshold. The German NetzDG targets the most well-known online platforms 
with more than 2 million registered users in Germany. The French laws on information 
manipulation apply to online platforms whose activity exceeds 5 million unique visitors per 
month on French territory. The UK Online Harms White Paper suggests a proportionate 
approach; 
• regarding the type of illegal content online, the German NetzDG and the French Avia Law are 
based on national criminal laws. The French laws on information manipulation cover 
                                                             
99 The NetzDG is available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/netzdg/BJNR335210017.html.  
100 French draft law to fight hate content on the Internet, as adopted in final reading by the National Assembly, adopted text n° 419, 
13 May 2020. The law will enter into force on 1 July 2020. However, the text of the law has not yet been published in the Official Journal 
of the French Republic. See also Pierrat & Ullern (2019).  
101  Online Harms White Paper, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper/online-harms-white-paper. 
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deliberate, artificial or automated manifestly false information that could manifestly alter the 
truthfulness of the election. By contrast, the UK Online Harms White Paper has a very broad 
scope and covers both illegal and harmful content; 
• regarding the obligations imposed on platforms, the different laws (or proposals) impose the 
establishment of a reporting system for illegal content, of internal appeal mechanisms and 
transparency obligations; in particular for content removal, the French laws on information 
manipulation impose the removal of terrorist content and child sexual abuse material within 
one hour; the German NetzDG and the French Avia Law impose obligations to remove within 
24 hours the obviously/manifestly illegal content and the NetzDG also imposes to remove 
other illegal content within seven days; and 
• regarding the enforcement, the German and French laws provide for sanctions (fines, in 
particular) for non-compliance; the French laws and the UK White Paper reinforce the role of 
the regulator. 
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Table 3: Comparing national laws or initiatives in Germany, France and the UK 
Country & 
Instruments 
Germany France UK 









Social networks with 
more than 2 million 
registered users in 
Germany. 
Online platforms linking 
several parties for 
sharing public content 
and search engines 
whose activity in France 
exceeds a certain 
threshold. 
Online platforms 
whose activity exceeds 
5 million unique 
visitors per month on 
French territory. Also 
possibility to impose 
measures to hosting 
platforms and Internet 
providers. 
Companies providing 
social media or online 
messaging services used 
in the UK: social media 
platforms, cloud hosting 
providers, file hosting 
sites, public discussion 
forums, retailers 
allowing reviewing of 
products, messaging 







Type of illegal 
content online 
22 offences of the 
German Criminal Code, 
such as child sexual 
abuse material, 
terrorism and serious 
act of violence, 
incitement to hatred 
and violence, hate 
speech, defamation, 
some kind of 
disinformation. 
Some offences already 
existing in French 
legislation, such as child 
sexual abuse material, 
terrorism, incitement to 
violence, hate speech 
with a broad definition, 
sexual harassment. 
Deliberate, artificial or 
automated manifestly 
false information 
during election periods 
that could manifestly 
alter the truthfulness of 
the results. 
Some online harms, such 
as child sexual abuse 
and exploitation, 
















- Establishment of an 




- Storage of removed 







- Designation of a 
representative in 
Germany. 
- Establishment of a 
uniform reporting 
system for illegal 
contents for all online 
platforms. 
- Storage of removed 
content for cooperation 
with judicial authorities. 





- Designation of a 




- Possibility for the 
judge hearing the 
summary proceedings 
to impose measures on 
hosting platforms and 
on Internet providers 
during election periods 
to stop false 
information's 
dissemination. 
- Put in place measures 
to combat the 
dissemination of false 
information, including 
the establishment of a 
mechanism to report 
false information). 




- Designation of a 
representative in 
France. 
Statutory duty of care for 
companies:  
- relevant Terms of 
Service/Terms of Use;  
- transparent decision-
making over actions 
taken in response to 
reports of harms; 
- effective internal 
complaint mechanisms.  
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Country & 
Instruments 
Germany France UK 







- Removal of "obviously 
illegal content" within 
24 hours. 
- Removal of illegal 
content within seven 
days.  
- Removal of terrorist 
content and child sexual 
abuse material within 
one hour. 
- Removal of "manifestly 
illegal content" within 
24 hours. 





  High Audio-Visual 
Council ensures that 
online platforms and 




to the fight against 
disinformation and 
ensures that online 












Fines from EUR 500,000 
to EUR 5M. 
Fines up to EUR 250,000 
in case of non-removal 
of illegal content online. 
Fines up to EUR 20 
million/4% of the 
worldwide annual 
turnover for online 
platforms and search 
engines that do not 
comply with measures 
imposed by the High 
Audio-Visual Council. 
Other heavy penalties 
for Internet users who 
voluntarily make false 
reporting. 




Source: Authors' own elaboration  
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Online platforms, big and small, rely on Terms of Service/Terms of Use or Community 
Standards/Guidelines to regulate and user behaviour and base their illegal content online 
moderation practices. These Terms and Standards/Guidelines do not necessarily reflect a specific 
legal system. However, as they are designed to prevent harm, online platforms' policies do overlap 
in several instances with local law. These private Codes of Conduct implemented by online 
platforms may vary from one country to another; they are often stricter in identifying illegal 
content online to be removed than national laws or jurisdictions within which they provide 
their services. 
The main tools used by online platforms to identify illegal content online are 'notice-and-
takedown'/flagging by users, keywords/filters and AI tools based machine learning models. 
Most platforms noted that depending on the type of illegal content online, automated tools have 
their limits in terms of accuracy, and thus, frequently must be accompanied by pre-/post-human 
moderation to ensure accuracy. The majority of online platforms have argued that the policies put 
in place by them to moderate illegal content online contribute to reducing the aggressive nature 
and the quantity of illegal content online.  
All online platforms interviewed have implemented transparency policies on how they operate 
and respect fundamental rights. Moreover, all of them have complaint mechanisms in place for 
their users to report on illegal content online. However, some platforms have emphasised that 
many user complaints are off-topic or unsubstantiated and consequently unactionable. Almost all 
online platforms interviewed allow users to appeal against their decisions on the moderation of 
illegal content online through a 'counter-notice' procedure.  
However, most of the interviewed NGOs, trade/industry associations and hotlines reporting illegal 
content online stated that the measures used by online platforms are not sufficiently effective 
in moderating illegal content online and in striking an appropriate balance with 
fundamental human rights. Most NGOs and hotlines reporting illegal content online have 
argued that the effectiveness of the measures deployed by platforms to enable users to report 
illegal content fluctuates according to the online platform. Additionally, they noted that access to 
'notice-and-takedown' procedures is not always user-friendly, whereas they should be easily 
accessible and not hidden in obscurity. 
The main challenges in moderating illegal content online are linked to the large quantity of 
online content on platforms, which makes it difficult for users, regulators or moderators to assess 
all content as well as the fragmentation of laws regarding online content. The Member States 
are free to set their own rules regarding illegal content online, which limits the efficiency of 
platforms that have to create country-specific processes accordingly. The lack of a common 
definition of "illegal content" also makes the moderation by platforms more complex as Member 
States may refer to different definitions. Therefore, some online platforms mentioned that this 
places the burden on them to identify the intent of the content uploader, which might incentivise 
online platforms to block lawful content in case of doubt on the illegality of the content. 
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The objective of the stakeholder consultation was to identify the main areas where reforms are 
necessary due to existing or upcoming barriers or inefficiency/ineffectiveness of current legal solutions 
in addressing market or regulatory failures.  
The first step consisted in mapping the relevant stakeholders to gain information from a broad range 
of entities.  
As a second step, a list of 58 stakeholders was prepared including, online platforms, trade/industry 
associations, academics, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and hotlines reporting illegal 
content online. In total, 24 stakeholders agreed to participate to the consultation and provided their 
input. This means that for the purpose of this study, nine online platforms, six industry/trade 
associations, one hotline, and eight NGOs have been interviewed. The following online platforms were 
interviewed: eBay, Facebook, Google, JustPaste.it, Microsoft, Mozilla, Olx, Snap and YouTube. A 
complete list of the interviewed stakeholders can be found in Annex III.  
Several stakeholders also note that the current legislative framework on content moderation 
focuses mainly on the responsibility of online platforms, while they argue that this should be 
balanced with rights and obligations of other stakeholders. Most NGOs and industry/trade 
associations interviewed disagreed with the idea of specific duty of care regimes. They pointed out 
that new statutory obligations to remove illegal content online should apply horizontally to 
any type of illegal content to avoid regulatory fragmentation. 
Almost all online platforms interviewed considered the terms of the existing liability principles 
of intermediary service providers of the e-Commerce Directive as fit-for-purpose. However, 
two indicated that the concept of 'active' and 'passive' intermediary service providers should be 
reformed. This is because the concept may no longer adequately reflect the economic, social, and 
technical reality of current services across their lifecycle. Most platforms mentioned that the 
limitation of liability for Internet intermediaries is a good solution. This is because it allows for 
protection of fundamental rights, the rule of law and the open Internet. 
Regarding the solutions to improve the moderation of illegal content online by platforms, 
stakeholders suggested to put in place harmonised and transparent 'notice-and-action' 
processes. Some stakeholders suggested strengthening the networks of fact-checkers and 
hotlines across the EU. In terms of fundamental rights, several stakeholders recommended 
to enforce existing EU rules and to make them more consistently interpreted across Member 
States.  
Almost all NGOs, industry/trade associations and online platforms interviewed consider that the 
existence of different content moderation practices in EU Member States hinder the fight 
against illegal content online. Several online platforms stressed that a harmonised approach 
would enable service providers to have more clarity on what they must do to fulfil their legal 
responsibilities, while upholding fundamental rights. 
In the context of safeguarding fundamental rights, most NGOs noted that online platforms' 
moderating practices should increase moderation transparency, access to data, and information 
regarding platforms' decision-making processes. In addition, they should ensure human review of 
the decisions on the user-generated content and contextual expertise. Some online platforms 
have acknowledged that platforms' incentive to over-remove legal content constitutes the most 
considerable threat of unjustified interference with fundamental rights. 
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As a third step, the study team prepared and sent out two tailored questionnaires: one to online 
platforms and one to other stakeholders, i.e. trade/industry associations, NGOs, and hotlines reporting 
illegal content online. A large majority of the interviewees sent written replies to the questionnaire. The 
graph below presents the percentage of replies to the questionnaire, per type of stakeholders. 
Figure 2: Survey replies per type of stakeholders 
 
Source: Authors' own elaboration 
During the final step, the answers from the stakeholders were summarised and cross-analysed to draw 
conclusions on general trends and on the evaluation of the current practices deployed by online 
platforms and other hosting services providers with regard to illegal online content moderation.  
The questionnaires included a set of questions divided into four main thematic groups: 
• measures to moderate illegal content online and their effectiveness: the objective of the 
questions listed in this group was two-fold: identifying the measures deployed by online 
platforms to tackle the illegal content online, and assessing their effectiveness. More precisely, 
the questions focused on measures aimed at distinguishing legal from illegal content online 
and at detecting and removing illegal content online. Moreover, the questions enabled to 
evaluate the impact of these measures and whether there were safeguards in place to ensure 
that decisions to remove illegal content online are accurate and well-founded; 
• involvement of platforms' users in reporting illegal content online: the objective of 
questions listed in this group was to describe complaint mechanisms implemented by online 
platforms for their users to report on illegal content online. The scope of these questions 
referred to a 'counter-notice' procedure for content providers; a stay-down issue, namely when 
the platform should not only remove identified copies of illegal content online, but also detect 
and remove the same or similar material elsewhere on its platform; and to whether the users of 
Online Platforms' Moderation of Illegal Content Online 
 
 
 43 PE 652.718 
online platforms are notified when a content they flagged as illegal has been taken down or 
censored; 
• challenges in moderating/reporting illegal content online and enforcing legal rules, and 
potential solutions: the main aim of the questions in this group was to identify areas of the EU 
Internal Market and its regulatory framework, which require reforms to address existing or 
upcoming barriers or inefficiency/ineffectiveness of current legal solutions regarding online 
platforms' illegal content moderation. In addition, these questions concerned the challenges 
faced by online platforms to enforce legal rules and/or private regimes on illegal content 
moderation and aimed to identify potential solutions at the EU level to improve the moderation 
by online platforms of illegal content online; and 
• other issues: the main aim of the questions in the miscellaneous group was to assess whether 
the existing liability principles of intermediary service providers (on which Section IV of the ECD 
is based) are fit-for-purpose, as well as to describe the safeguards mechanisms which would 
ensure that fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression and information, and the 
right not to be discriminated, are not infringed in the context of moderation of illegal content 
online. 
3.1. Measures taken by stakeholders and their effectiveness  
3.1.1. Moderating measures deployed by online platforms  
According to all stakeholders interviewed, online platforms (regardless if they are a major platform 
or a small entity) use Terms of Service/Terms of Use or Community Standards/Guidelines to 
regulate content moderation activities and the behaviours of its users. As stated by one online platform 
interviewed, due to their global nature and the extremely broad and diverse community to whom they 
provide services, their Community Standards/Guidelines do not necessarily reflect any specific legal 
system. However, as they are designed to prevent harm, online platforms' policies do overlap in several 
instances with local law. These policies are grounded on feedback from the community and the advice 
of experts in fields such as technology, public safety and human rights. Importantly, one of the online 
platforms has indicated that their policies concerning moderation of illegal content online are based 
on national laws, although in some cases, they may also base such policies on input from public 
authorities, users and their own discretion, in particular, when unsafe or sensitive items are at stake. 
The stakeholder in question has, in the light of consumer protection, committed to additional voluntary 
requirements to ensure the safety of products that are sold via that platform by signing the EU Product 
Safety Pledge. This initiative provides for dedicated voluntary actions which go beyond what is already 
required by EU legislation.  
The private Codes of Conduct implemented by online platforms may vary from one country to another 
and are stricter in nature in identifying illegal content online to be removed than national laws 
of a relevant jurisdiction within which they provide their services. According to some NGOs 
interviewed, online platforms tend to remove more content than just what is illegal under the law of a 
given jurisdiction within which they operate, to stay on the safe side, as they are not equipped with the 
same tools which are at the disposal of the Courts. In addition, their knowledge and incentives to carry 
out a proper legality assessment and balance different rights at stake are limited. This means that online 
content removals are mostly based on online platforms' stricter Terms of Service/Terms of Use rather 
than the legal rules of a given country. 
In terms of specific measures that have been deployed by online platforms to distinguish legal from 
illegal content online, the main tools used to identify illegal content are 'notice-and-
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action' 102/flagging by users, machine learning models to replicate human decision making, keyword 
filters and the removal of entire content from a given platform.  
Regarding the 'notice-and-takedown'/flagging mechanism, several online platforms indicated that 
this tool is deployed as it is not possible to detect the majority of illegal content online by technical 
means and is impractical to do so at scale through human moderation. As contended by one of the 
platforms, although the 'notice-and-takedown' process is the same, the set of information which needs 
to be provided by notice providers to the platform's dedicated team differs according to the various 
types of infringements. As a result, the actions taken in response to illegal content also differ according 
to the type of illegal content. This is the case both in terms of speed of action against specific types of 
content and of the degree of severity of measures deployed which generally go beyond local law.  
In terms of automated content moderation, one of the online platforms highlighted that automated 
tools could "damage user experience by over-detection and the generation of false-positives" .  
Consequently, automated content moderation cannot be treated as 'a complete solution', as most 
content moderation requires human verification, leading to significant economic and human 
investments on the platforms' side. 
In order to ensure that decisions to remove illegal content from a platform are accurate and well-
founded, especially when automated tools are used, online platforms use human moderators and 
treat their decisions as superior to those made independently by machines. One of the platforms 
emphasised that the main advantage of human moderators is that their review will always allow for a 
greater degree of context and common sense to be applied to the online content in question. Elements 
of context such as local culture, traditions, politics, etc., play an important role for edge cases where it 
may not be fully clear whether the platform's Terms of Service/Terms of Use or Community 
Standards/Guidelines have been breached. 
Regarding the speed of action to take down illegal content, the majority of platforms interviewed 
usually remove terrorist-related content and material of child sexual exploitation within one hour, 
while any other illegal content online is removed within 24 hours.  
All online platforms interviewed have stated that they have implemented transparency policies to 
ensure full transparency in how they operate and respect fundamental human rights. Consequently, 
online platforms have certain standards in place for how they communicate with users when informing 
them about moderation practices which have been taken in relation to content they have posted. 
There are also standards for how platforms communicate with third parties who notify allegedly illegal 
content online to them. Moreover, online platforms publish on a regular basis transparency reports 
which provide insights into volumes and types of requests regarding online content moderation they 
have received, for instance, from law enforcement authorities. Furthermore, one of the online platforms 
has recommended not to disclose algorithms, rules-based filters or other factors, that would "inevitably 
allow fraudsters to game the protective systems" deployed by online platforms.  
3.1.2. Online platforms' perspective on the effectiveness of the deployed moderating 
measures 
With regard to the automated moderation of content that appears online, six out of nine online 
platforms indicated that the use of automated tools for moderation of illegal content online brings 
efficiency into practice and is valuable in dealing with large volumes of data. The artificial intelligence-
                                                             
102 'Notice-and-action' is an umbrella term for a range of mechanisms designed to eliminate illegal or infringing content from the Internet. 
It comprises mechanisms such as the 'notice-and-takedown' scheme which currently results from Article 14 of ECD.  
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based tools used by platforms include upload keyword filters, machine learning models and shared 
industry databases of hashes (or 'digital fingerprints') to increase the volume of content which can be 
caught at the moment of uploading by their machines.  
However, most platforms also pointed out that depending on the type of content, automated tools 
have their limits in terms of accuracy, and thus frequently must be accompanied by pre-/post-
human moderation to ensure precision. One of the online platforms acknowledged that, for instance, 
in the context of counterfeit goods, even experienced and highly specialised human moderators do 
not always have the expertise to make 100% accurate decisions because of the high number of 
products, manufactured by an enormous number of brands, for them to be able to be precise in their 
analyses. Thus, such online platform has to rely heavily on the external expertise of specialised NGOs, 
brand owners, or other competent third parties. Seven out of nine online platforms interviewed use 
automated moderating tools based on artificial intelligence (AI) and most of them strive for human 
review of the content that has been removed.  
The majority of online platforms argued that the policies put in place by them to moderate content 
contribute to reducing the aggressiveness and quantity of illegal content online. According to one 
of the platforms, the moderating policies and the tools used are "certainly successful" in stopping large 
quantities of illegal content from appearing online. However, at the same time, this stakeholder 
pointed out that criminals are innovative and are continually coming up with new ways to circumvent 
the oversight measures deployed by platforms. As a result, online platforms are in a constant 'arms race' 
against cyber criminals. Regarding the removal of videos containing illegal content, in 2019, one of the 
online platforms interviewed removed more than 30 million videos for violating their Community 
Standards/Guidelines. Furthermore, another platform has noted that in 2018 more than 2.3 billion 'bad 
ads' were removed from their systems due to violating their advertising policy. Furthermore, in 2018, 
they intervened against almost 1 million bad advertiser accounts. Additionally, with regards to unsafe 
products, one of the platforms has disallowed 5 million listings that were identified via monitoring of 
public recall websites, namely, RAPEX, for the period of April-September 2019 under the Product Safety 
Pledge.  
Importantly, it has been noted that successful and effective work against illegal content is impossible 
for online platforms to achieve in isolation. Thus, the success equally depends on the cooperation 
and the sharing of data and knowledge with other key digital market players, such as Internet 
providers, third parties and national law enforcement authorities. 
3.1.3. Other stakeholders' perspective on the effectiveness of the moderating practices 
From the perspective of most of the NGOs, trade/industry associations and hotlines reporting illegal 
content online, the measures used by online platforms are not sufficiently effective in moderating 
illegal content online and striking the balance with fundamental human rights.  
One of the NGOs pointed out that not all online platforms are at similar levels in terms of quality 
moderation because they have very different sets of internal policies applied to moderate illegal 
content online. It was stated that there are more and more similar initiatives developed by well-
established platforms such as Facebook, Twitter or YouTube, while others such as TikTok, Yobo or Snap, 
for instance, use different protocols, which differ in terms of AI investments or partnership with NGOs.  
One of the NGOs also mentioned that the fact that online platforms apply their own standards makes 
them "biased by definition". It has been emphasised by most of the interviewed platforms that there is 
no one-size-fits-all approach in relation to content moderation measures. This is because various online 
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service providers play fundamentally different roles and have divergent responsibilities. Online 
platforms provide a variety of products and services, and the measures they take may vary accordingly. 
In addition, according to one of the NGOs interviewed, many of the largest platforms, like Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, do not involve enough their end-users or civil society, beyond trusted 
flaggers. Facebook and TikTok are currently assembling advisory councils, but it remains to be seen 
whether these councils will meaningfully involve end-users. Wikimedia was mentioned as an example 
of a larger platform, which does implicate users in the process of moderating content, and it does so 
through multiple mechanisms that encourage users to increase their moderation responsibilities and 
become members of the community103. 
Furthermore, two other NGOs estimated that the transparency reports published by some online 
platforms are not complete enough to assess the effectiveness of the measures deployed to 
moderate illegal content online. The data published by larger platforms (such as Facebook, YouTube, 
Twitter, Wikimedia, LinkedIn, Reddit, Jeuxvideo.com) in their transparency reports demonstrate that 
they have been effective at responding to illegal content online. However, the NGOs at stake argued 
that this data does not provide them with clear information on what type of content is taken down and 
on what basis. One of the NGOs added that they lack information regarding false-positives, and 
regarding the migration of illegal content online between platforms, i.e. "a platform may be successful 
at eschewing illegal content, but what damage does that content cause elsewhere?". Importantly, most of 
the interviewed NGOs highlighted the "porosity of illegal and legal content" which may lead to incorrect 
classifications of content online or the failure to identify content (false-positives or false-negatives). 
Several NGOs also mentioned that there are a number of cases where legitimate content online was 
blocked by social media platforms, while, on the other hand, reports concerning clearly harmful and 
illegal content online have been ignored. 
3.2. Involvement of platforms' users in reporting illegal content online 
3.2.1. Online platforms' perspective  
All online platforms interviewed have complaint mechanisms in place for their users to report on illegal 
content online. The majority of online platforms interviewed used reporting mechanisms based 
on flagging tools, while only one uses email alias as a direct reporting channel for users. The 
different flagging tools for users consist, depending on the platform, of:  
• a dedicated button or link in the listing; 
• a simple flagging tool allowing a user to press down on any item of online content (i.e. private 
or public), following which a flag appears, alongside a series of categories of common content 
complaints (e.g. nudity or sexual content, hate speech, threatening, violent or concerning, etc.). 
Users can select one of these categories, or just indicate that they do not want to see such 
content. Users may provide more information via a free text box; or 
• a dedicated on-platform support inbox, used to share information about the status of the 
report. 
Moreover, three of the online platforms interviewed indicated that they deploy separate mechanisms 
for flagging potential violations of their Terms of Service/Terms of Use or Community 
Standards/Guidelines, and for flagging content, which users believe violates national law and is not 
otherwise covered by platforms' policies. This two-fold distinction of the mechanisms results from the 
                                                             
103 Details of this initiative of the Wikimedia Foundation are available at: https://wikimediafoundation.org/participate/. 
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fact that the online platforms' Terms of Service/Terms of Use or Community Standards/Guidelines are 
developed for a global user base and are not intended to cover all local laws.  
Regarding the first type of mechanisms on infringements of online platforms' Terms of Service/Terms 
of Use or Community Standards/Guidelines, the user can choose from different content categories to 
select the reason why they are reporting the content. Moreover, one of the platforms has also 
developed a 'Trusted Flagger' programme to help encourage simultaneous submissions of multiple 
high-quality flags about content that potentially violates their Community Standards/Guidelines. The 
role of trusted flaggers is played by NGOs, government agencies and individuals who have a high 
accuracy rate and domain expertise that makes their flagging a valuable input for the overall system. 
According to one of the platforms, the majority of users' reports are reviewed within 24 hours. To 
achieve this, the platform uses a combination of human review and automation. If the reported online 
content violates their Community Standards/Guidelines, the platform takes it down, otherwise, they 
leave it up. If the online platforms at stake delete users' content for violating Community 
Standards/Guidelines, they inform the posting users of their action and that the content violated the 
Community Standards/Guidelines.  
With regard to the second type of reporting mechanisms, i.e. concerning legal complaints, the same 
three online platforms indicated that the users who intend to complain have to complete the 
appropriate form, which helps to ensure that the platforms have all necessary information to 
investigate a specific enquiry and resolve it as quickly as possible. One of the online platforms 
interviewed has provided a list of legal reporting channels available to platform's users, which includes:  
• publicly accessible Intellectual Property reporting channels allowing Intellectual Property 
Rights-holders to report online content they believe violates their rights, including copyright 
infringement, trademark infringement and counterfeits. These channels feature dedicated 
reporting forms for each type of infringement, as well as a dedicated email alias for reporting; 
• a defamation reporting form allowing users to report content they believe is defamatory under 
local law; 
• a legal removal request form allowing individuals in EU Member States to report content they 
believe violates local laws; and 
• a reporting form allowing users in Germany to report content they believe violates one or more 
of the German Criminal Code provisions. 
One of the platforms has stated that allowing users to easily access an intuitive reporting flow adjacent 
to the content may lead to a high number of clicks and complaints that are often unreliable. This is 
due to the fact that many of the users' complaints are off-topic or unsubstantiated and consequently 
unactionable. There are also users who submit a complaint without providing any information on why 
they think the content is illegal. In addition, one of the platforms at stake has noted that according to 
their analyses of cease-and-desist and takedown letters, many users seek to remove potentially 
legitimate or protected speech. Importantly, this stakeholder has also pointed out that a vast majority 
of complaints, regarding alleged infringements of the German Criminal Code, are unsubstantiated, 
regardless of the fact that the platform has explicitly asked for further details 104. Therefore, if the 
analysed online content does not violate the platform's Community Standards/Guidelines, the 
platform will conduct a careful legal review to confirm the validity of the report. In cases where reports 
                                                             
104 More precisely, the platform in question has noted that 74% of content reported under the form dedicated to users in Germany were not 
removed or blocked, since the content has neither constituted an infringement of their Community Standards/Guidelines nor the German 
criminal law. 
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are not legally valid, overly broad, or are inconsistent with international norms, a request for 
clarifications will be sent or no action will be taken by the platform. If the content is found to indeed 
violate local law, the platform will make it unavailable in the relevant country or territory and will 
publish the aggregate information about the requests in their transparency report.  
Another online platform, acting as an online marketplace, has stated that they treat the "vast majority 
of third-party notices (e.g. from brand owners about counterfeit goods or from wildlife NGOs about 
CITES-protected animals or animal products) as justified". This is because their expertise is limited to be 
able to dispute the claims. According to a rough estimate of that platform, the number of notices of 
allegedly illegal content that they reject is in the low single digits in terms of percentage of total notices 
received. In this context, the platform in question has added that "while this percentage might appear 
negligible, each unjustified action against user content creates the potential for lengthy, costly, and 
reputation-damaging disputes". 
Eight of the interviewed online platforms allow users to appeal against their decisions on content 
moderation through a 'counter-notice' procedure. However, two of those platforms do not notify the 
users when the content they have flagged as illegal has been taken down or censored, but only display 
a message on a content page stating that the content that has been removed. The platforms 
interviewed indicated a number of advantages and disadvantages of having content providers being 
able to give their views to platforms on the alleged illegality of the content through a 'counter-notice' 
procedure. The advantages of 'counter-notice' systems include:  
• greater content provider satisfaction because of a perception that their interests are protected; 
• a decreased likelihood of spurious or unjustified claims by users flagging the content online; 
• a higher likelihood of accurate decisions concerning content moderation due to appeal 
requests which are reviewed by human senior reviewers who did not make the original 
decision to remove the content in question; and 
• the removal of illegal content that is linked to one platform but hosted on the other. 
The disadvantages are associated with online platforms becoming akin to dispute resolution bodies 
and include:  
• the legal risks associated with becoming a party to a dispute between a user and a third party; 
• the resources required to mediate (i.e. time, systems, tools and external legal advice); and 
• the risk for the protection of identity and anonymity of users who flagged illegal content during 
the course of a 'counter-notice' procedure. 
As it has been emphasised by one of the platforms, such risks only increase when the user has flagged 
content posted by violent individuals or groups. 
Among the nine online platforms interviewed, only three provided information on how long the 
measures they take against illegal content online remain effective and the way the stay-down issue is 
addressed by them. Generally, platforms either prevent upload of individual pieces of content 
permanently, or remove the content permanently if it is caught after upload. Their moderating systems 
are able to identify duplicated (i.e. identical) content, for instance, if a user tries to re-upload data that 
has already been removed. This is usually done by using hashes to catch copies of known content 
before they become accessible to Internet users or by preventing exact match URLs from being re-
indexed. However, one of these platforms has clearly stated that from a technical perspective, it is very 
complicated for them to block similar online content, in particular at scale. Consequently, they argued 
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that in practice it is very problematic to apply stay-down measures requiring the removal of content, 
which is similar, but not an exact match. Therefore, this regime would be impractical and cause  
"a massive wave of litigation", because of inadvertent blocking of legal content and the risk of overly 
broad removals. The current regime strikes a good balance in this field, as can be inferred from the 
views of these three online platforms. 
3.2.2. Other stakeholders' perspective  
The vast majority of other stakeholders interviewed, namely NGOs, industry/trade associations and a 
hotline indicated that online content providers should be able to give their views to the hosting 
service on the alleged illegality of the content through a 'counter-notice' procedure. Most of the 
NGOs interviewed stressed that a 'counter-notice' procedure constitutes one of the crucial mechanisms 
to prevent content over-blocking and that 'counter-notices' should be part of a larger users' recourse 
process that is transparent, accessible and timely. One of those organisations stated that the procedure 
in question should be used in cases involving complex legal assessment, such as Intellectual Property-
related issues. This allows to have greater safeguards against abusive notices and avoid suppression of 
legitimate content. Furthermore, according to another NGO interviewed, a 'counter-notice' procedure 
serves as a significant tool for protecting freedom of expression and diversity of opinion online, as well 
as fair competition in the Digital Single Market. This stakeholder also pointed out that it should be a 
basic right of content providers to defend their viewpoints and interests in dispute settlements, unless 
inappropriate, and to contest the opinion of the notifier. 
Most of the interviewed NGOs and hotlines reporting illegal content online argued that the 
effectiveness of the measures deployed by platforms to enable users to report on illegal content 
is fluctuating depending on the online platform. For example, according to one of the hotlines 
dedicated to Intellectual Property Rights, the reaction time and the intervention of Facebook varies 
significantly when they have reported on closed user groups with illegal services and products. The 
same experience applies to Google when calling for the removal or demotion of illegal search results. 
In relation to the share of content taken down as a result of the reporting by users, five out of nine 
online platforms indicated that the percentage of the illegal content taken down is low and most of 
the content that is removed is first detected by automated flagging mechanisms or by human 
moderators. More precisely, one of these five online platforms noted that between October and 
December 2019, they removed over 5.8 million videos for violating their Community 
Standards/Guidelines. Machines rather than humans first flagged 90% of these removed videos. Of 
those detected by machines, 64.7% had never received a single view. Considering illegal content online 
taken down by a platform due to the users' notifications/complaints in comparison to other sources of 
first detection, another interviewed platform added that the proportion at stake is "probably also in the 
low single digits, or even less than 1%, of the total number of notices we receive". Apart from the 
aforementioned online platforms, the other online platform noted that between July and September 
2019, 98.4% of illegal content online actioned was found and flagged by the platform before users 
reported it. Thus, the percentage of violating content that users reported first between July and 
September 2019 was only 1.6%.  
Many stakeholders have also noted that accessibility of the 'notice-and-takedown' procedures is not 
always user-friendly, while such mechanisms should be easily accessible by users and not hidden in 
obscurity. One of the NGOs, concerning major social media platforms, pointed out that users have little 
possibility to contest online platforms' decisions on content moderation, and they fail to provide to 
users "a due process and effective remedies for wrongful removal" of online content. In the context of a 
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
PE 652.718 50  
due process, one of the interviewed organisations highlighted that EU Member States should provide 
"an avenue of appeal" once the internal mechanisms of social media companies have been exhausted.  
The aforementioned NGO also observed that platforms can always "hide behind their unclear Terms of 
Service" to justify removing any content, referring to the Council of Europe 2016 study105 in this context. 
The study concludes that "(…) the majority of platforms (52%) explicitly state that they may remove 
content based on third-party notification without offering any justification, notification or opportunity to 
be heard to the user who originally shared it" and "(…) there is also little commitment to offering users 
justification, notice and the right to be heard when content is removed by the platforms' own initiative or 
after notification from third parties" 106. 
Regarding the type of measures which should be taken to improve the transparency of platforms' 
decisions concerning illegal content online reported by users, only one stakeholder (i.e. an industry 
association) stated that the current framework is "appropriate to a high level of transparency" since many 
of its members already publish reports on their content moderation practices and outcomes. For 
example, the aforementioned stakeholder indicated that Amazon releases transparency reports on law 
enforcement information requests, while Facebook publishes Community Standards Enforcement 
reports. Moreover, it was also added by that stakeholder that Google shares transparency reports on 
content removal that comprise data on content delisting due to copyright or to the enforcement of 
YouTube's Community Standards/Guidelines. Importantly, this group of stakeholders, namely NGOs, 
hotlines reporting illegal content online and other trade/industry associations than the 
aforementioned one, argued that there is not one single best practice for transparency reporting. At 
the same time, one of the NGOs indicated that imposing overly strict transparency reporting 
requirements on platforms of different capacity and nature would not give useful results. The vast 
majority of the aforementioned stakeholders have indicated that:  
• online platforms should implement transparent (i.e. clear, accessible, understandable and 
specific) Terms of Service/Terms of Use or Community Standards/Guidelines, which should be 
available in all languages in which the services are offered; 
• online platforms should inform users when a moderation decision is made on their content and 
they should include adequate information on what triggered the decision, the specific rule that 
has been infringed, how the content moderation guidelines were interpreted, the actions that 
will be taken, and clear instructions for an appeal; 
• users should have a possibility to effectively appeal from the platform's decision. The recourse 
process should be easily understandable and accessible; and 
• online platforms should be obliged to regularly publish transparency reports. These reports 
should at a minimum contain comprehensive information about notices, the types of content 
to which they relate, the notifiers, appeals, and staff employed for content moderation.  
Other suggestions on how to improve the transparency of online platforms' decisions concerning 
illegal content reported by users include, according to one of the NGOs: (i) "a stronger Moderation Policy 
and a Charter" which would serve to explain to the users what is considered or could be considered as 
illegal content, including relevant examples; and (ii) a common button and procedure for all platforms. 
In the stakeholder's opinion, this would allow users to know only one procedure to signal and report 
                                                             
105 Venturini and al. (2016).  
106 Venturini and al. (2016).  
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illegal content, as well as to allow users to follow common guidelines, thus ensuring that illegal content 
is understood equally by everyone. 
3.3. Challenges in moderating illegal content online  
3.3.1. Challenges in moderating and reporting illegal content online and enforcing 
legal rules  
An important challenge in reporting illegal content online, mentioned by a few of the NGOs 
interviewed, is the large quantity of online content on platforms. They stressed that there is too 
much content for users to report on and that regulators are hampered by constraints with funding, 
resources and adaptability. These NGOs indicated that 'notice-and-takedown' procedures, requiring 
monitoring and reporting, should thus not be left to companies, users and regulators.  
Another challenge in reporting online content lies in the fact that average users are not necessarily 
capable of accurately identifying illegal content online. An NGO mentioned that most users "are 
not specialised lawyers and therefore the challenge for them is how to adequately identify a piece of content 
as illegal". In practice, this would mean that average users can usually only make an assumption or 
express a suspicion about the potential illegality of content online.  
According to the same NGO, another challenge is linked to the accessibility of reporting tools. The 
NGO claimed that online platforms discourage people from using them by making explicitly inhibiting 
design choices for the user interface (so-called 'dark patterns' that manipulate the user to behave in 
the platform's interest). According to the NGO, an evaluation of the implementation of the German 
Network Enforcement Law showed that the complaint form was relatively hard to access, on Facebook 
in particular 107. It was added, for example, that if all notices/reports require to identify oneself with their 
real identity (national ID number, name, address, etc.), even when it is not necessary to process the 
notice, there is a "potential chilling effect to the use of such reporting system", especially for cases 
involving hate speech (fear for retaliation, discrimination, etc.). 
The online platforms interviewed noted that they are continuously facing new trends and 
challenges in online content moderation. One of the main challenges they face in enforcing legal rules 
on moderation of illegal content online, as mentioned by several NGOs and online platforms, lies in the 
fact that they have to deal with multiple legal frameworks (in their home country, in their countries 
of implementation and in harmonisation between Member States of the EU). These stakeholders 
agreed that having to deal with various prescriptive direction from individual Member State 
governments complicates a platform's ability to be efficient in how it allocates resources. As reported 
by one online platform, an example of fragmentation is the difference in scope and application 
between the German Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) and the French Avia law. For instance, whereas 
the German NetzDG is limited to hate speech and restricts the application to certain social media 
services where the risk of proliferation is high, the Avia law includes an expansive definition of hate 
speech that depends heavily on context. In both cases, these Regulations impose "significant country-
specific reporting and response requirements that obligate the platform to create country-specific processes 
which limit their efficacy and scalability". 
                                                             
107 To defend its argument, the NGO quoted the study, An Analysis of Germany's NetzDG Law, published in April 2019, by Heidi Tworek and 
Paddy Leerssen: "YouTube and Twitter integrated NetzDG complaints into their regular "flagging" interface, which can be accessed through 
direct links next to every piece of content. Facebook, by contrast, placed their complaint form on a separate, less prominent page, requiring 
multiple clicks to access. […] The report data suggest that this design choice had massive impacts on the actual uptake of NetzDG complaints. " 
Study available at: https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/NetzDG_Tworek_Leerssen_April_2019.pdf. 
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Moreover, and as mentioned by an NGO, managing varying content laws by jurisdiction forces services 
to apply the most restrictive content policies worldwide. The consequence of this is a jurisdictional 
conflict resolved only by "overly inclusive restriction of speech, or by limiting access to services by 
geography", which undermines "free and fair access to the open Internet". 
The lack or vagueness of a definition of illegal content was also mentioned, by one online platform 
and several NGOs interviewed, as issues in moderating illegal content online. Vagueness in definitions 
of certain content, such as hate speech or extremism, place a burden on technology companies to 
attempt to ascertain the intent of the speaker often with little context. The definitions of such targeted 
content are not even commonly agreed among researchers, who are using varying definitions in their 
studies. Furthermore, it was mentioned that slang, abbreviations, symbols, and other imagery can have 
"many legitimate uses absent context or clarity of intention – neither of which may be available to or 
understood by artificial intelligence or human moderators". In addition, it was stressed that when the 
penalties for failure to remove hate speech are significant, technology companies are "forced to err on 
the side of blocking lawful content".  
An online platform and several industry/trade associations pointed out that the main challenge that 
platforms have in moderating illegal content online is the fact that the current legislative framework 
is focused on the responsibilities of platforms and "does not provide enough structure to the rights 
and responsibilities of others". The online platform stated that, for example, public authorities do not 
always make available databases of important (and theoretically public) information that would help 
them comply with the law. The online platform added that they have occasionally felt that some brand 
owners (ab)use the 'notice-and-action' (N&A) system to enforce distribution agreements. This latter 
concern was shared also by an industry association. 
Another challenge mentioned by a few of the NGOs interviewed is that online platforms are asked to 
act expeditiously to remove illegal content but to not interfere with the transmission (i.e. not to 
be involved in the processes which would give effective knowledge of the potential illegality of the 
content) in order to benefit from safe harbour protections provided by the e-Commerce Directive. 
According to these NGOs, this may create "a strong incentive for online platforms to either 'look the other 
way' or to over-remove everything that could even remotely be illegal under any jurisdiction somewhere in 
order to avoid legal liability". Consequently, according to these NGOs, it is highly problematic to leave it 
to the private sector to decide over the proper balance between fundamental rights, as this leads to 
arbitrary decisions, in particular when the incentives are imbalanced (risk of liability, reputation, 
authority of the notifying party, etc.). The NGOs at stake also questioned whether intermediaries can 
reasonably be asked to make such rulings of (il)legality based on assumptions/notices made by third 
parties (i.e. other users) before the content provider has had the chance to defend themselves. 
Finally, the last key challenges mentioned in this context by an online platform are the Europe's data 
protection rules, in particular the e-Privacy Directive. It was mentioned that, when scanning for illegal 
content online, particularly child sexual exploitation and abuse, online platforms "need to balance users' 
privacy rights with child safety and law enforcement/government requests particularly, in geographies with 
strict privacy and communications secrecy laws where a breach may result in financial penalties or criminal 
charges". The challenge lies in the fact that the European Union and some Member State laws 108 
prohibit interference with online private communications, rendering scanning for child sexual 
exploitation and abuse material on online platforms, legally questionable.  
                                                             
108 Germany, the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Italy have similar communications' secrecy laws, stemming from both constitutional rights 
to privacy of communication and the e-Privacy Directive (2002/58/EC) that require service providers to obtain explicit consent by one or 
both parties. 
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3.3.2. Duty of care regimes  
A few of the NGOs interviewed agreed that a specific duty of care regime for certain categories 
of illegal content online is needed. However, it was stated that it should not be accompanied by 
"strict requirements and fines that ultimately encourage platforms to remove content more heavily" than if 
a duty of care did not exist. According to these NGOs, the duty of care should require platforms to show 
that "they are making good faith efforts and to give visibility into those efforts but need not obligate certain 
results". It was suggested by one NGO that, in case of failure to perform its duties of moderation, the 
responsibility of the platform to delete illegal content must also be searched on the ground of its online 
duty of care that it must guarantee to all users. Therefore, in case of a conviction, the sanction should 
be aggravated if the Court establishes that the content in question should have required a duty of care 
beyond doubt.  
To increase the transparency of measures and the duty of care regime, an NGO proposed that two main 
categories of intermediaries have to be established beside the duty of care of the platform: 
• common users should be made aware of the duty of care and how it works as well as the 
promotion of an active moderation toward them when they register to the platform; and 
• public or private entities using the platform as a medium for public outreach should be 
considered as well-advised and prepared users able to carry out any action necessary to the 
moderation of their contents, posts, comments and sponsored spaces. The duty of care should 
be ratified by them and should hold them responsible before Courts in case of failure to 
moderate. 
Regarding the question of a duty of care specific for certain types of illegal content, on the one hand, 
some stakeholders (two NGOs) considered that all categories of illegal content should require a specific 
duty (classifying content into different categories risks "creating black boxes without sufficient oversight 
and which risk false-positives and false-negatives"). On the other hand, two other NGOs believed that 
there should be different categories of illegal content with regards to the duty of care. An NGO 
proposed that hate speech, incitement to violence, and child pornography should specifically require 
duty of care.  
However, most NGOs and industry/trade associations interviewed disagreed with the idea of 
specific duty of care regimes. One NGO mentioned that, in their experience, duty of care regimes are 
"usually poorly defined and end up requiring intermediaries to proactively monitor, judge, and remove 
potentially illegal user and third-party content on networks and online platforms in order not to lose liability 
exemptions". Mostly, they take the form of political pressure on platforms to take (formally voluntary) 
measures without clear and understandable obligations, and to set up predictable sanctions for failure 
to comply with these measures. An NGO claimed that this duty of care can be considered contrary to 
Article 52 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, under which "restrictions on fundamental rights must 
have a legal framework which is sufficiently clear to enable both natural and legal persons to regulate their 
conduct".  
Several industry/trade associations indicated that new statutory obligations to remove illegal content 
online should apply horizontally to any type of illegal content to avoid regulatory fragmentation. 
Differing procedures for different types of content should be justified by objective distinctions (for 
example, whether or not the nature and legal status of the content is objectively classifiable; whether 
or not the alleged infringement is of criminal law or instead of private rights). According to one of the 
industry/trade associations, diverse duties of care across different services that are already the subject 
of many varying definitions (Video-Sharing Platforms (VSP) in the Audio-Visual Media Services 
Directive(AVMSD), Online Content-Sharing Service Providers in the Copyright in the Digital Single 
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Market Directive (CDSMD), Internet access and Service Providers under the e-Commerce Directive 
(ECD), etc.) "will only add to layers of parallel liability regimes without creating any legal certainty for service 
providers to actually take action".  
3.3.3. Solutions to improve the moderation of illegal content by online platforms  
Some of the online platforms expressed that a more inclusive legislative framework should be put 
in place, in which all stakeholders (online platforms, users, brand owners, law enforcement authorities) 
have clear and balanced rights, obligations and liabilities. It was also proposed that new responsibilities 
should be considered for all stakeholders, including for example clarifying the liabilities of notice 
providers for damages done to users' rights and the interests of platforms. 
An increased use of fact-checkers was also mentioned by an industry association as a way to improve 
moderation of illegal content online. There should be some in every country and the source of the 
content should be made more transparent, and if the source is not reliable, then the content should be 
limited. 
Regarding an increased use of automated tools, several online platforms mentioned that 
automated tools can "bring efficiency into the content moderation practices", but they are not always 
accurate or reliable, especially depending on the type of content moderated. In line with that, many 
stakeholders (including online platforms and NGOs) mentioned that a human oversight is inevitable. 
One online platform was even more critical regarding automated tools, as it stated that they can 
produce "serious interference with individuals' fundamental rights and cement the power of the handful of 
large companies who have the technology and resources to comply with filtering mandates"; at a 
minimum, automated tools "should not be mandated by law according to the platform". To that end, the 
same stakeholder recommended that the Digital Service Act (DSA) should include requirements or 
incentives for companies to implement effective due process into their deployment of automated 
content moderation technologies, along the lines of those suggested in the Santa Clara Principles109. 
Regarding new measures to improve the EU regulatory framework and its enforcement regarding 
online platforms' moderation of illegal content online, an NGO mentioned that the EU regulatory 
framework needs indicators that will assess processes. Indicators should be used to assess 
platforms' responsiveness to problems like illegal content. This stakeholder suggests that, rather than 
focusing on the threshold of users or on any specific technical feature, regulation should evaluate 
platforms on processes, in particular, those that relate to transparency and accountability, dialogue 
with users, inclusion of civil society and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Several stakeholders, including NGOs and a trade association, agreed that the 'notice-and-action' 
mechanism should be reformed and harmonised. One of those NGOs proposed to implement a 
notice-and-action system, with specific quality criteria for notices including:  
• the name and contact details of the notifying party only in cases where this is necessary to 
process the notice (mainly for copyright and defamation cases); 
• the link (URL) or a similar unique identifier to the allegedly illegal content in question; 
• the stated reason for the complaint including, where possible, the legal basis the content in 
question is allegedly infringing; 
• depending on the type of content, additional evidence for the claim; and 
                                                             
109 Santa Clara principles on transparency and accountability in content moderation, available at: https://santaclaraprinciples.org/. 
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• where a complaint is not anonymous, a declaration of good faith that the information provided 
is accurate in cases of copyright infringement and defamation cases. 
In order to make the notice-and-action system workable, the required online notice forms should be 
straightforward to use and easily accessible. It should also allow content providers to issue a 'counter-
notice' to defend their viewpoint and interests, except where such a 'counter-notice' would conflict 
with an ongoing criminal investigation, which requires to keep the decision to suspend or remove 
access to the content a secret. For example, child sexual abuse material should be made inaccessible 
as quickly as possible, while notices of alleged copyright infringements or defamation need to provide 
the content provider with sufficient time to react before the content in question is removed.  
The same NGO also suggested implementing an alternative dispute settlement, with online content 
dispute tribunals. It stated that, in order to facilitate access to remedies for users in the face of powerful 
online platforms, "the EU should require or at least encourage Member States to establish independent 
dispute settlement bodies for users in their jurisdiction". These independent bodies should serve as a 
tribunal system providing simplified legal procedures tailored to the nature of online content 
moderation disputes. Their task should be to settle disputes between users, as well as with all online 
platforms, regarding the legality of user-uploaded content and the correct application of Terms of 
Service/Terms of Use when they relate to content moderation decisions taken by online platforms.  
Several NGOs and two online platforms suggested that the measures deployed should be 
differentiated according to the type of illegal content and the type of services (size, scale, 
function) displaying the content. One of the NGOs suggested that the EU regulatory framework 
should distinguish between disinformation, hate speech, copyright violation, defamation or libel, or 
terrorist content. One of the online platforms in question added that the measures should differentiate, 
for example, between services whose "primary purpose is to make content widely available to the public 
by default, and those that are used primarily for personal storage of private content and are not designed to 
facilitate broad dissemination of content". One of the NGOs gave the example of a small start-up with 
minimal user-generated content, which in their opinion, needs different moderation practices than a 
publication platform aimed at children or extremist groups. Moreover, regulation should consistently 
differentiate "between service categories that bad actors frequently use to disseminate terrorist content and 
services that they rarely rely on for such purposes".  
To improve the EU regulatory framework and its enforcement regarding online platforms' illegal 
content moderation, an NGO also suggested that the European framework should strengthen 
hotlines at national level so they can "act as public-private partnerships or at least as a national hub for 
receiving and assessing reports of illegal content". In the US, the congressional mandate given to the 
National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), combined with the obligation for online 
platforms to report illegal content to NCMEC, has proved to be an efficient model, as stated by several 
NGOs. It was noted that there is a valuable set of hotlines in the EU but that the model remains 
embryonic and limited in scope (not all hotlines cover hate and terrorism, and none cover copyright 
infringements). As stated by an NGO: "A robust European legal framework organising and empowering 
national multi-stakeholder hotlines would facilitate the regulation of illegal content online, to the benefit of 
the platforms, the regulators, and ultimately the victims of abuse and the citizens". 
Finally, several stakeholders including online platforms and NGOs stressed that the Digital Services 
Act is an opportunity for the EU to adopt a new, more effective regulatory paradigm. The DSA 
framework should be "targeted, proportionate, and infused with the right incentives for platforms to 
address why and how illegal content disseminates through their services".  
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Reforms in areas of the EU Internal Market are necessary to address existing or upcoming barriers 
or inefficiency/ineffectiveness of current legal solutions regarding online platforms' illegal content 
moderation. Two of the online platforms interviewed mentioned that one of the main areas of the EU 
Internal Market that should be reformed is the area of Data Protection. It was suggested to rely mainly 
on the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and to reform the e-Privacy rules to make it explicit 
that "scanning for the purposes of implementing PhotoDNA or equivalent tools should not require user 
consent and will not represent a breach of communications secrecy laws". This would enable to deal with 
the issue mentioned previously that some Member State laws prohibit interference with private online 
communications and, hence, may render scanning for CSAM on online platforms, legally doubtful.  
Reforms in the area of the Digital Single Market were also suggested by a few of the NGOs and online 
platforms, notably regarding the 'country of origin' principle110, which should be strengthened in all 
Internal Market instruments when they come up for review, with derogations being removed wherever 
possible (ECD, AVMSD, CDSMD, etc.). An NGO and three online platforms stressed the benefit of the 
'country of origin' principle, which is fundamental for the development of the EU Internal Market and 
the facilitation of cross-border trade. According to one online platform, the principle makes possible 
the free movement of goods and services within the EU by ensuring that information society services 
are "supervised at the source of the activity". The stakeholders at stake strongly recommend maintaining 
the principle, without which European companies might face increased challenges to scaling up in the 
EU Internal Market. For one of the NGOs interviewed, the Digital Services Act is a very good opportunity 
to achieve a competitive Internal Market in the EU for digital consumer services.  
Finally, reforms of law enforcement action regarding illegal content online across borders have to 
be launched as well according to another NGO. Most online platforms work in several Member States 
and have to face and comply with different jurisdictions. Some of the national laws they are asked to 
comply with may fail to respect human rights law, especially when talking about online content 
restrictions. In addition, problems can arise in circumstances where the substantive law on a free 
speech issue (e.g. holocaust denial) differs from country to country across the EU. The NGO added that 
online platforms often 'solve' these difficulties by applying their Terms of Service/Terms of Use rather 
than the national law, a practice that often leads to the blocking of content that is legal across the EU, 
or at least in some of its Member States. To avoid this, it was suggested that efficient cross-border 
mechanisms that respect the legal principles and safeguards of judicial cooperation should be 
established. 
Regarding the existence of different content moderation practices in EU Member States, almost all 
NGOs, industry/trade associations and online platforms interviewed believed that these differences 
hinder the fight against illegal content. An NGO mentioned that both national and European 
regulatory proposals create a complex patchwork of rules as they usually involve different obligations 
in terms of content qualification, timeframes, proactive and filtering measures, sanctions, and reporting 
duties. On the European regulatory side, for example, initiatives to combat hate speech tend to 
mandate or encourage the removal of content within 24 hours, whilst the TERREG Proposal would 
require the removal of terrorist content within an hour. On the national side, several NGOs considered 
that French and German initiatives against online hate speech are examples of initiatives adding 
another layer of complexity for online platforms operating in the EU.  
It was also mentioned by a few of the NGOs and online platforms interviewed that different and 
diverging legal regimes increase compliance costs while also being a source of legal uncertainty 
                                                             
110 According to Article 3 of the ECD, online service providers in the EU are only subject to the rules of their country of origin or home country, 
i.e. the country where they are established.  
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regarding the qualification of content as illegal and the scope of responsibilities and obligations of 
online platforms. It was mentioned by a trade association that developing moderation tools and rules 
country-by-country "will not help European platform operators to scale, but instead will result in gradual 
or fragmented investment in tools and processes, and ultimately less effective action".  
Several online platforms stressed that harmonised and transparent 'notice-and-action' processes, 
which are implemented coherently throughout the EU Member States are key for facilitating the 
fight against illegal content. A harmonised approach would enable online platforms to have more 
clarity on what they must do to fulfil their legal responsibilities, while upholding fundamental rights. 
EU-wide rules would also help prevent competition distortions and remove obstacles to the free 
movement of information society services. 
Despite the clear wish of most stakeholders for an EU harmonised approach to content moderation of 
illegal content online, a few of the NGOs and industry/trade associations interviewed stressed the 
difficulties linked to harmonisation of the rules at EU level. Harmonisation is in practice difficult as 
there are different definitions of what is illegal depending on the Member State. National laws also vary 
considerably in how they restrict freedom of expression. For example, some Member States criminalise 
content such as blasphemy, while others have abrogated blasphemy laws. Another example is that 
many Member States prohibit hate speech but apply those prohibitions differently based on the 
cultural and historical context of their particular country. Additionally, given the cultural and language 
differences among the EU Member States, several NGOs acknowledged that it is necessary that 
automated content moderation tools respect these dissimilarities. It was suggested that algorithms of 
these tools should be trained with datasets relevant for certain regions and groups of society and 
should be applied locally.  
3.4. Other issues  
3.4.1. Liability under the e-Commerce Directive 
The question on the current EU liability regime of Internet intermediaries enshrined in the e-Commerce 
Directive (ECD) has resulted in a high rate of stakeholders' responses. Most of the online platforms (i.e. 
seven out of the nine platforms interviewed) considered the terms of the existing liability principles 
of intermediary service providers as fit-for-purpose. This is because it allows for protection of 
fundamental rights, the rule of law and the open Internet. Furthermore, most of the platforms stated 
that the 'notice-and-takedown' regime enshrined in Articles 12 to 14 and the no-general monitoring 
obligation principle under Article 15 of the ECD should remain the "cornerstone of online enforcement". 
Consequently, from the majority of online platforms' perspective, this regime is usually the fairest and 
most effective way to tackle illegal content online issues. 
However, two online platforms indicated that the concept of 'active' and 'passive' intermediary 
service providers should be reformed. This is because this concept may no longer adequately reflect 
the economic, social, and technical reality of current services across their lifecycle. Consequently, many 
services find themselves out of the scope of the existing legal framework or are unsure of the applicable 
EU legal regime in question. In addition, one of the online platforms pointed out that although the 
current EU liability regime is "still highly relevant, and future-proof", it should be "strengthened and 
reinforced". This could especially be achieved by clarifying the applicability of intermediary liability 
exemptions, since there is "a significant fragmentation and diverging national interpretations of Articles 
12-15, as well as ambiguities in the e-Commerce Directive".  
In comparison to the online platforms, half of the interviewed NGOs stated that the limited liability 
provisions have proven to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship in the Digital Single Market. 
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Consequently, according to half of the NGOs at stake, the liability exemption should be maintained, 
while the other half of the NGOs pointed out that the current EU liability principles of Internet 
intermediaries have become insufficient (both due to the development of the online platforms and to 
technological advancements). Thus, they would need to be adjusted carefully, in order to take into 
account the diversity of online platforms, and to distinguish between purely content hosting platforms 
and those that actively curate content via algorithmic ordering or other significant mediation. 
Regarding the concept of increased liability of good faith actors, two stakeholders, namely one 
platform and one NGO, referred in their answers to a 'Good Samaritan' clause that is enshrined in US 
law111. These two stakeholders disagreed between themselves upon the reasonableness of potential 
introduction of such a clause into EU law. The online platform at stake stated that the main area of 
reform should be to address the increased liability of good faith actors and that the 'Good Samaritan' 
clause could encourage more online platforms to strengthen their moderation capabilities. On the 
other hand, the NGO emphasised that the clause in question is a US legal concept that is not fit-for-
purpose in EU law. This is because it would not help to address the challenges for platforms' 
responsibility for cyber safety and consumer protection, while encouraging platforms to play a role of 
deciders on what content should be allowed.  
3.4.2. Freedom of speech issues  
In the context of an online content moderation practice which should be implemented to respect the 
freedom of expression and information, five of the online platforms that we interviewed acknowledged 
the need for moderation measures that are tailored to the different online services. It has been 
indicated that such an approach (focusing on adjusting a content moderation mechanism to various 
online services) could ensure the most effective response while safeguarding freedom of expression 
and information. Considering the fundamental freedoms, the interviewed online platforms expressed 
different views on the content moderation mechanism in question. One of the platforms suggested to 
implement certain moderation standards. These standards should require platforms to deploy "clear 
and accessible":  
• policies adequate for the specific service;  
• reporting procedures concerning service misuse; and 
• effective proceedings with such reports. 
This platform has also stated that the system of 'notice-and-takedown' should be maintained, while 
online platforms should refrain from the use of mandating filters or automated technologies. 
Additionally, another platform pointed out the importance of users' access to appeal requests and 
platforms' transparency reports. 
According to another two online platforms, the future EU legislative instruments should avoid 
establishing incentives for undertakings to remove more content online than necessary, for 
instance by enforcing too short timeframes for illegal content online removal and high fines for non-
removal of user-generated items. Consequently, these two platforms acknowledged that platforms' 
incentive to over-remove legal content constitutes the most considerable threat of unjustified 
interference with fundamental rights.  
                                                             
111 Section 230(c) of the US Communication Decency Act states that: "(…) No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers 
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable (…)". 
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Regarding the mechanism related to the respect of the freedom of expression and information, five out 
of eight NGOs agreed that online platforms should establish relevant internal mechanisms. These 
procedures will ensure that platforms reach moderation decisions in a non-arbitrary and transparent 
manner. The building blocks of these platforms' internal mechanisms should, according to the NGOs in 
question, comprise of:  
• transparency reports published on a regular basis and including data on posts removed and 
accounts permanently or temporarily suspended due to violations of their content guidelines; 
• 'notice-and-takedown' processes including a human review that are fair and transparent; and 
• appeal procedures providing a meaningful option for timely appeal regarding any illegal 
content online removal or account suspension. 
Furthermore, one of the NGOs stated that the recommended scheme should be the removal of illegal 
content at source following a Court order. This would prevent law enforcement authorities (i.e. 
administrative authorities), companies, trusted reporters112 (e.g. NGOs) or users to play roles of 
arbitrators of illegality. Another NGO suggested to establish at EU level an independent consultative 
'Observatory on Freedom of Speech and Information'. This independent body could serve to defend 
the principles regarding human rights enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
3.4.3. Online discrimination issues  
Five of out nine online platforms interviewed shared their views on safeguarding the fundamental right 
not to be discriminated against. Two of the platforms and two NGOs emphasised the role of education 
of Internet users. These interviewees indicated that in order to reduce new forms of online 
discrimination, online users and consumers must learn how to tackle prejudices. One of the NGOs 
highlighted that it is crucial for Internet users to have "a strong critical sense" that would allow them to 
better understand the source of information. In the context of hampering the development of new 
forms of online discrimination, one of the online platforms has launched a programme aiming to better 
understand the issues concerning hate speech and to prepare an effective and proportionate reaction 
to it. This programme's objective is to provide online users with "a positive alternative to violence and 
extremism". The programme encompasses campaigns responding to far-right extremism, Islamist 
terrorism, and disinformation and conspiracy theories posted by extremist/hate groups.  
In order to address the issue of online discrimination, another online platform has updated their 
existing Community Standards/Guidelines on hate speech. These Guidelines clearly indicate that 
videos alleging a superiority of a given group or justifying religion, age, race, gender, caste, or sexual 
discrimination, segregation or exclusion, are prohibited.  
One online platform and one NGO pointed out that there are certain user groups, which may 
experience disproportionate impact of incorrect content moderation decisions. According to the 
aforementioned interviewees, such a problem is exacerbated by platforms' intensifying reliance on 
flawed automated content filtering technologies to accomplish content moderation at scale. 
Importantly, the aforementioned NGO stated that machine-learning algorithms "learn about the world 
from their training data, they copy and can further amplify social bias already reflected in the society". 
Consequently, algorithms can become biased based on elements such as ethnicity, political affiliation, 
gender, language dialects and other cultural differences. Therefore, as it has been indicated by one of 
the NGOs, online platforms should not only cooperate more with expert flaggers (such as anti-
                                                             
112 Note that trusted flaggers are private individuals, while NGOs and other civil society organisations are treated as trusted reporters. 
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discrimination groups, anti-racism groups, etc.), but also ensure that content moderation staff "receive 
sufficient training to be able to identify and appropriately deal with discriminatory content".  
3.5. Specific private initiatives 
3.5.1. Facebook: Oversight Board for content moderation decisions 
In September 2019, Facebook proposed to establish by the summer 2020 an independent Oversight 
Board to ensure a fair and independent decision-making on Facebook's content moderation 
practice113. This Oversight Board should be funded by a USD 130 million (estimated EUR 118 million) 
trust fund that is completely independent of Facebook and cannot be revoked for a period of at least 
6 years 114. It will be composed of up to 40 members whose identity is made public with varied and 
diversified skills, knowledge and expertise while ensuring geographical representativeness and 
appointed for a remunerated term of three years renewable twice115. The four co-chairs of the Oversight 
Board have been selected directly by Facebook while the other members will be designated on the 
basis of their qualifications by a committee of the Oversight Board and appointed by the trustees, after 
selection by Facebook and the co-chairs116. A dedicated staff will support the members of the Oversight 
Board117.  
The Oversight Board will provide policy guidance/advisory opinion on Facebook's content policies. 
More importantly, the Oversight Board will also review specific content moderation cases that could 
be submitted by Facebook or its users once the Facebook internal recourses have been exhausted118. 
The Oversight Board is free to decide which cases it reviews but must refrain from reviewing a case if 
its decision is likely to result in criminal liability or regulatory sanctions. A panel of five members takes 
the decision where at least one should come from the region concerned by the case119. The panel 
should obtain from Facebook the information necessary to decide the case and may receive written 
statements from the content author or complainant. It may also gather information (from experts or 
otherwise) necessary to provide context 120. The panel should review the cases on the basis of 
Facebook's content policies and values while taking into account the human rights standards that 
protect freedom of expression121. Decisions taken by the Oversight Board are binding on Facebook122, 
made public and clearly justified123. 
While this is a step in the right direction, some commentators have proposed improvements to 
the Facebook proposal. Article 19 (see Section 3.5.2. below) calls for better transparency and 
improvements in internal removal procedures before the establishment of the Oversight Board. It also 
fears that the global level at which the Board operates will make it difficult to understand local contexts 
                                                             
113 The website of the Oversight Board is available at: https://www.oversightboard.com/. 
114 Oversight Board Bylaws, Article 2, Section 1.3.1., available at:  
https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Byla ws_v6.pdf.  
For more information about the Trust, see Oversight Board Bylaws, Article 4. 
115  Oversight Board Charter, Article 1, available at: https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf. 
116 Oversight Board Charter, Article 1. The four co-chairs are Catalina Botero-Marino (former special rapporteur on freedom of expression of 
the Organization of the American States), Jamal Greene (law professor at Columbia), Michael W. McConnell (law professor at Stanford) 
and Helle Thorning-Schmidt (former prime minister of Denmark). 
117 Thomas Hugues (former Executive Director for Article 19) has been appointed in January 2020 by Facebook as the first Director of the 
administration staff, see https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/facebooks-oversight-board/.  
118 Oversight Board Charter, Article 2. See also bylaws, Article 1, Section 3. 
119 Oversight Board Charter, Article 3. See also bylaws, Article 1, Section 3.1.3. 
120 Oversight Board Charter, Article 3. 
121 Oversight Board Charter, Article 2. 
122 Oversight Board Charter, Article 4. 
123 Oversight Board Charter, Article 3. 
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(social, political, cultural, historical, linguistic, etc.) and their complexity124. Latonero also notes that the 
selection of the Oversight Board members by Facebook may undermine their independence and that 
the decisions will be made based on Facebook's values and content policies and not merely based on 
the international human rights standards125. More radically, Gosh claims that existing problems with 
online content are not related to poor moderation but to the very business model of several online 
platforms in terms of consumer engagement, constant online advertising offers, massive collection of 
personal data and the use of various sophisticated algorithms126. 
3.5.2. Article 19: Social Media Council initiative 
Article 19 (2018), an advocacy charity defending freedom of expression, observes that the initiatives 
proposed by the online platforms to moderate online content in general lack transparency, do not offer 
satisfactory remedies or procedural safeguards to users, and do not sufficiently protect freedom of 
expression and other fundamental rights. Article 19 also notes that the Terms of Service/Terms of Use 
and Community Standards/Guidelines of the online platforms generally restrict more the freedom of 
expression than the international fundamental rights standards, in particular because they are based 
on the lowest common denominator between the different national legislations applicable to content.  
To solve some of these issues, Article 19 proposes the establishment of a Social Media Council (SMC) 
to provide an open, transparent, participatory, independent and accountable forum to review 
moderation practices127. The SMC will gather social media platforms, medias, journalists, bloggers, 
academics, civil society organisations and any other stakeholder. This mechanism would be based on 
international standards of human rights but without creating legal obligations. The SMC will have a 
case review role, which will possibly be complemented with more general advisory roles128.  
Regarding geographic scope, Article 19 envisages a network of councils set up at national level that 
would be governed by a global code of principles based on international fundamental rights standards, 
while applying them according to the local context. Other options were also discussed such as a 
regional or global SMC or a hybrid model combining a global Council with a network of national 
Councils 129. In any case, Article 19 underlines the importance of the national/local level to ensure a good 
understanding of the context (cultural, social, political, historical, linguistic, religious, etc.) of the 
content moderation dispute to be decided. Thus, the initiative proposed by Article 19 could 
                                                             
124 Article 19, "Facebook: New oversight board is not sufficient to safeguard freedom of expression online", 18 September 2019, available at: 
https://www.article19.org/resources/facebook-new-overs ight-board-is-not-sufficient-to-safeguard-freedom-of-expression-online/.  
125 Latonero, Can Facebook's Oversight Board Win People's Trust?, 2020, available at: https://hbr.org/2020/01/can-facebooks-oversigh t-
board-win-peoples-trust. Currently, in the bylaws, a somewhat flawed wording refers to fundamental rights, stating that the Oversight 
Board "will be guided by relevant human rights principles and [...] [will provide] analysis of how the board's decisions have considered or tracked 
the international human rights implicated by a case".  
126 D. Ghosh, Facebook's Oversight Board Is Not Enough, 2019, available at: 
https://hbr.org/2019/10/facebooks-oversight-board-is-not-enough. 
127 See Docquir, The Social Media Council: Bringing Human Rights Standards to Content Moderation on Social Media, 2019, available at: 
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/social-media-council-bringing-human-rights-standards-content-moderation-social-media.  
Article 19 is currently working on the preparation of a document bringing together the relevant recommendations for the establishment 
of the SMC and has obtained funding from the Open Society Foundation and is considering the possibility of launching a pilot experiment 
of SMC in a European country. 
128 One of the main criticisms of a pure case review function was the potentially very high number of requests for review, which seems very 
delicate for a structure such as SMC. It was then proposed that only the most important cases or by group of content types should be 
submitted to SMC for review: Conference Report of February 2019, "Social Media Councils: From Concepts to Reality", organised by 
Stanford University's Global Digital Policy Incubator, Article 19 and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, available at: https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/gdpi/content/social-media-councils-concept-rea lity-conference-report, pp. 12-13. 
129  Each model has its advantages and disadvantages. The national SMC takes maximum account of the realities and needs of local contexts, 
there are risks of interference or even appropriation by States as well as difficulties in determining the jurisdiction of a given country. The 
global SMC would in principle make decisions more uniform but would not take into account local contexts and would have difficulties 
in ensuring diverse and pluralistic representation. 
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complement Facebook's Oversight Board, in particular to provide the necessary insights and 
understanding of local contexts. 
3.5.3. Twitter: BlueSky initiative to build decentralised standards for social networks 
In December 2019, Twitter announced the funding of an independent research group to develop 
decentralised standards for social networks that can be used by different content moderation 
providers130. Compared to the initiatives of Facebook or Article 19 (which consist in 
reviewing/evaluating online platforms' content moderation practices), the Twitter initiative offers a 
different solution. Such standards could both reduce criticism of the platforms' content moderation 
practices and provide opportunities for new competitors, as control of content would no longer be 
concentrated in the hands of a few dominant companies. It also has the advantage of trying to offset 
the dominance and influence of the major platforms on online expression131. 
3.6. Specific practices during the COVID-19 pandemic 
3.6.1. Specific measures to tackle illegal content online 
The COVID-19 outbreak led to an increase of illegal content online such as scams, misleading 
advertising, and unfair, misleading and deceptive business practices by rogue traders. A Common 
Position of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC) and the European Commission 
requires the online platforms to better identify, remove and prevent the reappearance of such 
types of illegal content132. In addition, the European Commission and the CPC notify the online 
platforms of breaches of EU consumer law most often committed in the context of COVID-19, such as 
unsupported claims that products prevent or cure the coronavirus (without strong scientific evidence 
or which are inconsistent with official experts' opinion), pressure selling techniques and excessive 
pricing.  
On that basis, many online platforms have set up specific and privileged communication channels 
to strengthen cooperation with national consumer protection authorities to enable them to 
report illegal practices 133. They have also implemented a series of measures such as automated and 
human monitoring of content based on keywords and product categories at risk of scam, introduction 
of algorithms and proactive measures to combat price fraud, prohibition on the sale or advertising of 
certain products (e.g. masks and disinfectant gel), information campaigns for both consumers and 
sellers. The first results of these measures are positive with a high number of content removal (up to 1 
                                                             
130 K. Paul and M. Vengattil, "Twitter plans to build 'decentralized standard' for social networks", 11 December 2019, available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-twitter-content/twitter-plans-to-build-decentralized-standard-for-social-networks-
idUSKBN1YF2EN.  




See also R. Price, "Twitter is trying to build a new decentralized social media service that could transform its business – or present new 
kinds of headaches", 11 December 2019, available at: 
https://www.businessinsider.fr/us/bluesky-twitter-team-decentralised-social-media-2019-12.  
132 Common position of European Commission and Consumer Protection Cooperation Network 20 March 2020 on stopping scams and 
tackling unfair business practices on online platforms in the context of the Coronavirus outbreak in the EU, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/live_work_travel_in_the_eu/consumers/documents/cp c_common_position_cov id19.pdf.  
On the basis of this common position, the Commissioner for Justice and Consumers has written to various industry players (online 
platforms, social media, search engines and online marketplaces) to ask them to cooperate in removing these coronavirus-related scams 
and unfair practices. See European Commission, "Scams related to COVID-19", available at: 
 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/consumers/enforcement-consumer-protection/scams-related-covid-19_en.  
133 Such as Alibaba, Allegro, Amazon, Cdiscount, eBay, Facebook, Google, Microsoft (Bing), Rakuten, Verizon Media (Yahoo) and Wish. Their 
answers are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/detailed-replies-provided-platforms_en. 
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million per week for the largest online platforms) and with hundreds of thousands of price frauds 
detected134. 
3.6.2. Specific measures to tackle online disinformation 
During the COVID-19 crisis, several online platforms increased their effort to fight disinformation 
and implemented measures related to content removal, promotion of credible, authoritative 
and relevant information, reducing the dissemination of some content, and reducing the possibilities 
of online advertising. Table 4 below contains an exemplary and non-exhaustive list of measures 
adopted by online platforms during the pandemic135. 
Table 4: Online content moderation practices in times of COVID-19 
Online platforms 
Measures 








Removal of erroneous 
information that could lead 
to imminent physical 
damage and of false claims 
regarding treatment, 
availability of essential 
services, location or 
severity of the pandemic. 
Removal of content 
flagged as erroneous by 
fact-checkers and limits 
placed on forwarding 
possibilities on WhatsApp. 
Removal of content 
discouraging people from 
treatment or claiming that 
dangerous substances are 
healthy. 
Removal of content 
containing a clear call to 
action likely to pose a risk 
for health or well-being, 
denial of established 









Centre at the newsfeed's 
top with updates from 
WHO and national health 
authorities. 
Priority given to 
authoritative information 
(e.g. WHO, Centres for 
Disease Control and 
Prevention) from the 
homepages and in 
searches. 
Prioritisation of credible, 
authoritative content at 
the top of search and 
verification of accounts 










Advertising relating to 
necessary health care 
equipment linked to 
COVID-19 (masks, hands 
sanitiser, COVID-19 tests) 
or to products 
guaranteeing cure 
or protection against 
COVID-19. 
On Google Ads, blocking of 
advertising capitalising on 
COVID-19. 
List of restrictions 
established (e.g. 
promotion of some 
products related to 
COVID-19 as necessary, 
health care equipment 
linked to COVID-19, 
distasteful references to 
COVID-19, sensational 
content or likely to incite 
panic, price inflation, etc.). 
                                                             
134 European Commission, Summary of platforms' measures, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/live_work_travel_in_the_eu/consumers/documents/summaryof responses_update_08042020.
pdf. 
135 See also the Joint industry statement of 17 March 2020 of Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Reddit, Twitter and Youtube on working 
together to combat misinformation. 
136 In an update, Facebook gives an overview of the measures put in place in Europe and around the world to counter misinformation about 
the pandemic and harmful content on its apps (Facebook, Messenger, Instagram and WhatsApp). See Facebook, "Keeping People Safe 
and Informed About the Coronavirus", available at: https://about.fb.com/news/2020/04/coronavirus/. The social network also indicates 
its willingness to work on the issue with the European institutions, Member States, WHO and other industry players. 
137 See Twitter, "Coronavirus: Staying safe and informed on Twitter", available at: 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19.html.  
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Covered indirectly by 
advertising prohibitions. 
Reduced opportunities to 
monetise videos that make 
more than one reference 
to COVID-19, except for 
certain actors (e.g. news 
media). 
Reduced opportunities to 
monetise content that 
make direct or indirect 
reference to COVID-19. 
Free advertising 









Yes. Yes. Yes. 
Source: Authors' own elaboration 
3.6.3. Results from the platforms interviews 
Five out of nine interviewed online platforms responded to the question regarding any specific content 
moderation practices implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic to deal with fake news and unsafe 
products. 
According to the first and second of these online platforms, as a consequence of the measures in 
question aimed at responding to COVID-19 and at prioritising the wellbeing of platforms' employees 
and extended workforce, the platforms started relying more on technology to assist with some of 
the work normally done by human reviewers. This means that automated systems will start 
removing some content without human review, allowing the platforms to continue to act quickly to 
remove violative online content and protect their ecosystem. These actions may lead to users and 
creators experiencing increased video removal, including some videos that may not violate the 
platforms' policies. The platforms will not issue strikes on this content except in cases where they have 
high confidence that the content is violative. Creators who think that their content was removed in 
error are allowed to appeal the decision and a dedicated platforms' teams will review the decision. 
However, due to workforce precautions implemented by the platforms because of COVID-19, the 
process will result in delayed appeal reviews. The measures also help people stay informed and 
connected, and support small businesses and other organisations. Moreover, the second of the two 
online platforms at stake is providing easy access to authoritative information from health authorities 
alongside new data and visualisations. This new format allows for user-friendly navigation through 
information and resources, and it will make it possible to add more information over time as it becomes 
available. The second of these two online platforms also committed to be more cautious about what 
content is promoted, including livestreams.  
The third online platform that has provided answers related to measures implemented in relation to 
COVID-19 stated that they have taken precautionary steps, under their policy on disallowed 
content in advertising. Their aim is to block ads that are directly related to COVID-19. This policy bans 
advertising on 'sensitive' issues, and the platform deploys this policy provision to prohibit all 
advertising exploiting COVID-19 for commercial gain, spreading misinformation, or that may pose a 
danger to users' health or safety. To this end, the platform implemented a complex ranking process 
across all search results, which puts emphasis both on data relevance and on ensuring that high-
authority sources of information rank higher in search results than low-authority sites.  
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In this context, the third online platform deployed additional measures aimed at promoting access 
to trusted information and to combat fraud and misinformation. As also explained in Table 4, these 
measures comprise of ensuring that answers and helpful public authorities announcements 
concerning COVID-19 will be listed at the top of search results for a number of COVID-19-related search 
queries. Measures also include displaying (for many searches regarding COVID-19) task panes with 
credible information in main places on the first page of search results, such as the top right-hand side 
of the page. Moreover, the platform cooperates with a highly professional news rating service. This 
service operates a coronavirus misinformation tracker listing all of the news and information sites in 
France, Italy, Germany, the UK, and the US that it has identified as publishing materially false 
information about COVID-19. When users of the aforementioned online platform have installed the 
plug-in and navigate to these sites, a warning label will appear notifying the user that the information 
on the site is not reliable. 
The remaining two online platforms, i.e. the fourth and the fifth, have indicated that in the light of the 
COVID-19 crisis, they have issued a global policy on COVID-19 content to provide guidance to their 
local moderation teams on how to treat COVID-19 related content on their platforms. In addition, the 
fourth platform stated that their Terms of Service/Terms of Use were amended to temporarily prohibit 
posting ads concerning particular goods as a response to local government policies. The fifth platform 
noted that their moderators remain highly vigilant for false information regarding COVID-19. 
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4. INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING 
On the international scale, the EU appears to have one of the most comprehensive regulatory 
frameworks for tackling illegal content online138. In other regions of the world, few regulations apply 
and the online content moderation practices are mainly based on the Terms of Service/Terms of Use of 
the online platforms themselves. The international online platforms often follow the American content 
moderation practices given that the largest online platforms originate from the US. In parallel with 
platforms' standardised practices, NGOs and content moderation platforms around the world suggest 
best practices and recommendations to better moderate illegal content online. 
In this section, the regulatory framework and the best practices related to online content moderation 
in six countries/regions of the world, namely Australia, Latin American countries, Canada, China, Japan 
and the US, are investigated. These countries represent a sample of different jurisdictions from different 
continents with an important population, which imply a large number of Internet users and the need 
to regulate the content they post.  
The objective of this section is to present best practices, which could serve as models to follow at EU 
level. For the purpose of this study, desk research was conducted and, wherever possible, 
complemented with information from the stakeholders interviewed. Three specific criteria were 
applied for the research (regulatory framework, policy framework and recommendations on best 
practices) and the analysis for each country is presented according to these criteria:  
• regulatory and policy framework: in this first section, the legal and policy background of the 
country regarding moderation of online content is presented. The aim is to establish whether 
there are any relevant laws or policy measures regulating illegal content online or online 
content moderation. In the majority of countries where the research has been conducted, a 
regulatory framework related to illegal content online and online content moderation was 
                                                             
138 This is one of the results of our analysis and it has also been mentioned by several stakeholders interviewed while conducting the study, 
notably by a few of the online platforms and an industry association.  
KEY FINDINGS 
The analysis conducted in six countries/regions of the world shows that all of these countries 
have a regulatory and policy framework related to illegal content online. The policies may 
relate either to online hate speech, defamation, child sexual abuse material, copyright 
infringements or online disinformation. The large majority of the countries investigated have 
regulatory measures in place related to at least one or several of these areas. Some policy 
guidelines have also been established by some countries to guide online platforms when 
moderating illegal content online. In almost all countries covered, NGOs and academics have 
recommended ways to improve the online content moderation practices.  
In addition to the regulatory and policy measures put in place to frame illegal content online, most 
of the online platforms worldwide apply their own Terms of Service/Terms of Use to 
moderate online content, which often stem from the large US online platforms. 
In comparison to the set of measures identified in the various countries, the EU seems to have 
one of the most developed regulatory frameworks related to illegal content online and its 
moderation by online platforms.  
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found. In all countries investigated, it was also found that the online platforms mainly apply 
their own Terms of Service/Terms of Use to regulate online content. However, in some 
countries (such as Australia, Latin American countries, Canada, China, and Japan), specific 
guidelines or reports from national authorities or relevant stakeholders (content moderation 
services companies, copyright organisations) explain how online content moderation works; 
and 
• recommendations on best practices: in this second section, some of the best practices 
recommended by academia and NGOs from the countries concerned are presented, on how to 
improve the content moderation mechanisms. In some countries, no specific best practices of 
these types were found (such as China and Japan), while in others, NGOs' website or academic 
papers indicated suggestions on how to better moderate online content (such as in Latin 
American countries, Australia, Canada, and the US).  
4.1. United States 
4.1.1. Regulatory and policy framework  
In the US, the First Amendment of the American Constitution establishes the right to free speech for 
individuals and prevents the government from infringing on this right. The First Amendment, however, 
does not similarly bind online platforms. As a result, they are able to establish their own content policies 
and Codes of Conduct that often restrict speech that could not be prohibited by the government under 
the First Amendment139. For example, Facebook, and most recently Tumblr, prohibit the dissemination 
of adult content and graphic nudity on their platforms. Under the First Amendment, however, such 
speech prohibitions by the government would be unconstitutional.  
The ability of online platforms to moderate content in the US comes from Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA), which gives online platforms broad immunity from liability 
for user-generated content posted on their websites140. The purpose of this grant of immunity was 
both to encourage platforms to be 'Good Samaritans' and take an active role in removing offensive 
content, and also to avoid free speech problems of collateral censorship141. 
One of the online platforms interviewed while conducting this research suggested that the current EU 
regime applicable to online platforms should get inspired by the immunity stemming from Section 230 
of the CDA. According to the interviewee, the EU regime does not include a clear provision which would 
protect online platforms from liability should their proactive content monitoring prove imperfect. It 
was thus suggested that the EU regime should use an approach similar to the US one to minimise risks 
in this area and focus on 'Good Samaritan' principles – whereby platforms that take good-faith 
proactive action against illegal content are not deemed to have 'actual knowledge' of illegality as a 
result. The interviewee believed that this could remove negative incentives that prevent proactive 
measures today. 
In addition, in August 2010 the US adopted the Speech Act, which shields US journalists, publishers 
(both print and online) and bloggers from foreign lawsuits142.  
                                                             
139 Singh (2019). 
140 Codified at Title 47, Section 230 of US Code, available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230. 
141 See Zeran v. America Online, Incorporated, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Circuit 1997), available at: https://www.eff.org/files/zeran-v-aol.pdf. 
142 An act to amend title 28, US Code, to prohibit recognition and enforcement of foreign defamation judgments and certain  
foreign judgments against the providers of interactive computer services, August 2010, available at: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ223/html/PLAW-111publ223.htm. 
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In the field of illegal content online of sexual character, the mandate given by the US Congress to 
the National Centre for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) can be a best practice. The US 
dropped from hosting 43% of such content in 2017 to 25% in 2018 and 2019143. Given this success, the 
European legislators could consider transposing the reporting obligation that applies to online 
platforms in the US144. The Children´s Internet Protection Act145 requires that US schools and libraries 
adopt measures to protect children from harmful content (pornography and child pornography). The 
Law does not block content per se, but it requires these organisations to block the content as a 
condition for federal funding. The US considers the production, distribution and use of child 
pornography as a criminal offence146. 
The legal framework related to freedom of speech in the US and the protection offered to online 
platforms enable the platforms to regulate illegal content online on their own, through the use of 
their Terms of Service/Terms of Use147. 
4.1.2. Recommendations on best practices 
Several American academic papers explained how the largest online platforms regulate online content 
in the context of the American legal system. Some researchers argue that "to best understand online 
speech, we must abandon traditional doctrinal and regulatory analogies and understand these private 
content platforms as systems of governance" 148. This is interesting in order to understand how to best 
address the issue of illegal content online, and especially how regulation can interact with these online 
platforms to combat illegal content online.  
The online platforms are seen by some American researchers as "self-regulating149 private entities,  
governing speech within the coverage of the First Amendment150 by reflecting the democratic culture and 
norms of their users" 151. Researchers argue that the biggest threat this private system of governance 
poses to democratic culture is the "loss of a fair opportunity to participate, which is compounded by the 
system's lack of direct accountability to its users". Solutions to this issue could be simple changes to the 
architecture and governance systems put in place by the platforms. If this fails and that regulation is 
needed, some argue that it should be designed to strike a balance between preserving the 
democratising forces of the Internet and protecting the generative power of the online platforms, with 
a full and accurate understanding of how and why these platforms operate152.  
Several US scholars show that it is important to keep in mind how the online platforms are operating 
and to understand the specificities of these entities before implementing regulatory changes in the 
area of online content moderation.  
In parallel with the standardised online content moderation practices put in place by US-based 
platforms, some best practices on how to better moderate illegal content online have been 
proposed by American NGOs and content moderation platforms. For example, the NGO Anti-
Defamation League established best practices for responding to cyberhate, from the side of online 
                                                             
143 See page 26 of the INHOPE annual report published in 2019: https://bit.ly/2VN0dti. 
144 Title 18 US Code, Section 2258A, Reporting requirements of providers, available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2258A. 
145 Children's Internet Protection Act, available at: http://ifea.net/cipa.pdf. 
146 Citizen's guide to US Federal law on child pornography, available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-child-pornography. 
147 Samples (2019). 
148 Klonick (2017). 
149 See generally Freeman (2000) and Michael (1995). 
150 See generally Schauer (2004). 
151 See generally Balkin (1995). 
152 Klonick (2017). 
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platforms and the Internet community153. On the side of online platforms, it recommends for example 
that platforms should take reports about cyberhate "seriously, mindful of the fundamental principles of 
freedom of expression, human dignity, personal safety and respect for the rule of law". The platforms 
should offer user-friendly mechanisms and procedures for reporting hateful content. They should also 
respond to user reports in a timely manner. Finally, they should enforce whatever sanctions their Terms 
of Service/Terms of Use contemplate "in a consistent and fair manner". On the side of the Internet 
community, the NGO advises that the Internet community "should identify, implement and/or encourage 
effective strategies of counter-speech", including direct response, comedy and satire when appropriate, 
or simply setting the record straight. The Internet community should share knowledge and help 
developing educational materials and programmes that encourage critical thinking in both proactive 
and reactive online activity. 
Best practices on how to moderate and manage content on news and political websites were also 
proposed by a leading industry publication based in the US154. For example, they suggested that there 
is a need for "human eyes" reviewing the content, that the online platforms should coordinate with law 
enforcement officials and support social bureaus (such as suicide lines), and should build "a cultural 
model that supports the brand values".  
4.2. Canada 
4.2.1. Regulatory and policy framework 
The Canadian government is "actively considering" regulating online platforms since 2019 as it believes 
that "self-regulation of the platforms has failed" 155. Notably, on 30 January 2019 the government of 
Canada announced a series of actions to strengthen the Canadian electoral system facing October 
2019 elections, including a call for action from online platforms to increase transparency and 
authenticity in their systems156. Hate speech in Canada is addressed in the Criminal Code (Revised 
Statutes of Canada, 1985, c. C-46) and is not specific to digital communications157. 
Regarding online child sexual abuse material, a specific law (Act respecting the mandatory reporting 
of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an Internet service, 2011) applies to online 
platforms 158. It requires them to report to the Canadian Centre for Child Protection tip-offs they receive 
regarding websites where child pornography may be publicly available, to notify police and to 
safeguard evidence if they believe that a child pornography offence has been committed using an 
Internet service that they provide. The production, distribution or use of child pornography are criminal 
offences in the Criminal Code159. Regarding the limitation of liability of online platforms, it applies only 
in case of 'innocent dissemination'. This occurs if there is no actual (or supposed) knowledge of the 
defamation contained in the material being disseminated and no negligence in failing to know that 
                                                             
153 Anti-Defamation League, Best Practices for Responding to Cyberhate.  
Available at: https://www.adl.org/best-practices-for-responding-to-cyberhate. 
154 See Woodul, 7 best practices for managing and moderating user content on news and political sites, Social media today, 2011, available at: 
https://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/7-best-practices-managing-and-moderating-user-content-news-and-political-sites. 
155  See Boutilier, Oved and Silverman, Canadian government says it's considering regulating Facebook and other social media giants, 2019, 
available at:  
https://www.thespec.com/news/canada/2019/04/09/canadian-government-says-it-s-considering-regulating-facebook-and-other-
social-media-giants.html. 
156 Initiatives of the Government of Canada related to democratic institutions, Government of Canada's website, available at: 
https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions.html. 
157 Canadian Criminal Code, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, c. C-46, available at: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-46.pdf. 
158 An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an Internet service, Statutes of Canada, 
2011, c. 4, Justice Law Canadian website, available at: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/annualstatutes/2011_4/FullText.html. 
159 Section 163.1., Canadian Criminal Code, available at: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/section-163.1.html. 
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the material contained the defamation at the time of its dissemination. This position was confirmed in 
the Internet context in several Supreme Court decisions (example: Crookes vs. Newton, 2011)160. 
Concerning the Canadian policy framework related to online content moderation, in December 2018 
the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics published a report, in which it 
acknowledged the nature and gravity of online content moderation and spread of disinformation 
on online platforms161. It also proposed several recommendations to improve Canada's response to 
the challenges. One of the recommendations was for example that the Government of Canada enact 
legislation to further regulate online platforms. This would impose certain obligations on online 
platforms regarding: 
• the labelling of content produced algorithmically; 
• the labelling of paid advertisement online; 
• the removal of inauthentic and fraudulent accounts; and 
• the removal of manifestly illegal content, such as hate speech. 
The idea to provide the mandate (to an existing or a new regulatory body) to proactively audit 
algorithms was also put forward. 
Despite several debates on the topic in the country, at the date of the present study no laws were 
passed in Canada to regulate online content moderation or online platforms. Hence, in Canada the 
online platforms are applying their own Terms of Service/Terms of Use to moderate content. 
4.2.2. Recommendations on best practices  
In Canada, academics from the University of British Columbia and Concordia University have prepared 
a report which outlines how governments and online platforms can better address hate and 
harassment. This is the initiative to improve the current regulatory approaches in Canada that cannot 
address the speed, scale and global reach of harmful speech on online platforms.  
The list of recommended actions162 that shall be taken by the government to improve the regulatory 
approach towards online content moderation include the creation of a task force to improve 
government enforcement of existing policies. It also includes ensuring platform transparency and 
launching a public process to develop responses to issues of harmful speech and online content 
moderation more broadly.  
It also includes the development of a multi-stakeholder Moderation Standards Council to 
strengthen and coordinate action by online platforms and stakeholders. This Council would enable 
online platforms, civil society and stakeholders to meet public expectations and government 
requirements on content moderation. It would improve transparency and help online platforms 
develop and implement Codes of Conduct on addressing harmful speech. It would create an appeal 
process to address complaints about content moderation policies and decisions.  
Finally, the report recommends the establishment of a civil society capacity to address harmful 
speech online. In the context of civil society, governments could assist in various ways such as, direct 
funding, indirect funding via research institutes and academic granting agencies, pressuring online 
                                                             
160 Crookes v. Newton, Supreme Court of Canada, 2011, available at: https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/7963/index.do. 
161 Report of the Canadian Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, Democracy under threat: risks and solutions in 
the era of disinformation and data monopoly, December 2018, 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, available at: 
https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/ETHI/rep ort-17. 
162 Tenove, Tworek, McKelvey (2018). 
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platforms to share data or provide reports to civil society, and addressing liability concerns of online 
platforms. The recommended practices also include building capacity for research and monitoring 
campaigns of disinformation, computational propaganda and harmful speech or 'Election Contact 
Group' in Canada to improve communication between civil society and online platforms before and 
during elections.  
4.3. Australia  
4.3.1. Regulatory and policy framework  
Regarding the regulatory framework, Australia passed a law in 2019 163 that requires online platforms 
to "expeditiously" remove violent content from their platforms in light of the Christchurch massacre 
in New Zealand. According to that law, social media executives are subject to jail sentence or their 
companies face fines if the content is not taken down "expeditiously". 
As for the policy framework, Australia put in place tailor-made strategies and guidelines for moderating 
content submitted by a business' end-users. At present, online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and 
Instagram are consistently finding ways on how to improve their existing moderation practices. 
Maintaining a solid plan and a flexible approach to checking user-generated content is important to 
prevent majorly alarming and damaging content from surfacing online164. 
Among the most common strategies mentioned by the Australian moderation services company New 
Media Services Pty Ltd., are165:  
• assigning moderators for different social media pages, accounts and community threads; 
• adding content filters and keywords to automate which terms and phrases to ban; 
• enabling member participation in moderating content, either through flagging or reporting 
spam and inappropriate comments; 
• expanding the scope of moderation by allowing moderators to check direct messages, 
comments, reviews and reports sent directly by community members; and 
• muting notorious spammers or disabling their account for days. 
4.3.2. Recommendations on best practices 
As discussed in the previous section, the Australian company New Media Services has created a list 
of DO's and DON'Ts regarding online content moderation166. On the one hand, the list presents the 
DO's of online content moderation stating, for example, that the nature of the business needs to be 
considered, as it will dictate what content should be allowed or denied. The company suggests also 
that the target audience needs to be known, as it helps create boundaries on what can be considered 
appropriate and inappropriate. It was also recommended that a platform's users should always be 
informed of any issues with moderated content to ensure they understand why one image gets 
approved while another does not.  
                                                             
163 Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Bill 2019, A Bill for an Act to amend the Criminal Code Act 1995, and 
for related purposes, available at:  
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/s1201_first-senate/toc_pdf/1908121.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf. 
164 The Fundamental Basics of Content Moderation, by New Media Services Pty, 2019, available at: 
https://newmediaservices.com.au/2019/01/22/fundamental-basics-of-content-modera tion/. 
165 Ibidem. 
166 Content moderation DO's and DON'Ts, by New Media Services Pty, 2017, available at: 
https://newmediaservices.com.au/content-moderation-dos-and-donts/. 
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
PE 652.718 72  
On the other hand, the company proposes DON'Ts regarding online content moderation167, for 
example, automated filters should not be too much relied on, given that "programmes are only as smart 
as we make them", and a person will always find a way to bypass auto filters (like profanity filters). The 
company also advised against being overly general in moderation practices and that not making 
moderation practices fit the audience affects business negatively. It also mentions the dangers of over-
moderation and of under-moderation.  
4.4. Latin American countries 
4.4.1. Regulatory and policy framework 
In Brazil, there are no specific laws regulating fake news or hate speech online. Former President Tamer 
vetoed the provisions of Law 13488, of 6 October 2017 (on electoral rules) which aimed to impose 
obligations on platforms to take down hate speech and fake news content against political parties and 
politicians during electoral campaigns168. Regarding online child sexual abuse material, the Federal Law 
11,829/2008 amended the Child and Adolescent Statute to criminalise the production, reproduction, 
fixation (by any means), sale and distribution of abusive content (video or photo containing sex/nudity 
scenes/images of children/minors) on the Internet169. Internet law (12,965/14) determines that users 
have the right to exercise parental control over online content. Online platforms and public authorities 
must jointly promote the use of parental control tools and digital inclusion of children and teenagers 
(Article 29)170. In Brazil, there is no liability of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for illegal content online 
but there is a liability for online service providers. Indeed, Internet Law171 establishes subsidiary liability 
for hosting third party-generated content if a violation of intimacy rights (nudity/sex content, for 
example) is found (Article 21); the Civil Code establishes a general liability rule (Article 927) and 
indemnities also applied for defamation (Article 953)172; and the Criminal Code (Article 139) establishes 
imprisonment (3 months to 1 year) and a fine as penalties.  
In Argentina, the National Institute Against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism has an observatory 
on discrimination on the Internet173. They have a mediation role between industry and citizens. The 
Institute gathers the queries and complaints made by citizens and contacts the social networks or other 
platforms to reach agreements that satisfy all the parties (for discrimination of any type, including 
cyberbullying). In Argentina, illegal content online can be taken down, if ordered by a Court. Enacom, 
an autonomous and decentralised entity that operates within the scope of the Head of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of the Nation, publishes Court decisions to block illegal websites 174. According to a 2014 
Supreme Court ruling, extrajudicial requests can take down content that is obviously illegal, while the 
remaining cases require an order of a competent (judicial or administrative) authority 175. 
                                                             
167 Ibidem. 
168 Law 13.488 of 06 October 2017, available at: http://legis.senado.leg.br/norma/26248253. 
169 Law 11.829 of 25 November 2008, available at:  
https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei/2008/lei-11829-25-novembro-2008-584363-norma-pl.html. 
170 Law 12.965 of 23 April 2014, available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2014/lei/l12965.htm. 
171 Ibidem. 
172 Law 10.406 of 10 January 2002, available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2002/L10406.htm. 
173 Website of National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism, available at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/inadi. 
174 List of court orders for website blocking, on National Communication Entity's website, available at: 
https://www.enacom.gob.ar/bloqueo-de-sitios-web_p3286. 
175 Rodríguez, María Belén c/Google Inc. and other s/damages, 2014, available at: http://www.saij.gob.ar/corte-suprema-justicia-naci on -
federal-ciudad-autonoma-buenos-aires-rodriguez-maria-belen-google-inc-otro-danos-perjuicios-fa14000161-2014-10-28/123456789-
161-0004-1ots-eupmocsollaf. 
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In Colombia, the anti-discrimination law 1482/2011176, amended by law 1752/2015177, punishes acts of 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, political or philosophical ideology, sex or 
sexual orientation, disability or other forms of discrimination. Penalties are increased if a conduct is 
carried out through the use of mass media (there is no definition of mass media but it could apply to 
widely used platforms). Regarding fake news shared online, the Colombian National Police 
implemented a strategy entitled 'TRUE' to prevent fake news attacks178. Concerning the child sexual 
abuse online material, the Law 679/2002 (fight against child abuse) establishes that all persons must 
prevent, block, combat and denounce exploitation, accommodation, use, publication, distribution of 
images, texts, documents, audio files, improper use of global information networks, or establishment 
of telematics links of any kind related to pornographic or alluding to sexual activities of minors material. 
4.4.2. Recommendations on best practices 
The Latin American Observatory for Regulation, Media and Convergence has proposed the Latin 
American perspective for content moderation processes that are compatible with international 
fundamental rights standards179. The document entitled "Contributions for the democratic 
regulation of big platforms to ensure freedom of expression online" contains a number of 
recommendations on specific principles, standards and measures designed to protect users' freedom 
of expression and guarantee a free and open Internet180.  
The recommendations concern a wide range of aspects, such as:  
• the scope of content moderation; 
• online platforms' Terms of Service/Terms of Use and conditions; 
• transparency of the actions; 
• application of online platforms' policies; 
• the right to defence and repair; and 
• the accountability of online platforms for content moderation. 
Some of the recommendations include for example that platforms should directly incorporate into 
their Terms of Service/Terms of Use or Community Standards/Guidelines the relevant fundamental 
rights principles that ensure the measures related to the content will be guided by the same criteria 
governing the protection of freedom of expression by any means. These principles include 
transparency, accountability, due process, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination and the right 
to defence and repair.  
According to these recommendations, platforms should also ensure full respect for consumer rights 
and they should issue periodic transparency reports on the application of their Community 
Standards/Guidelines that include at least full data describing the categories of user content that are 
restricted, data on how many content moderation actions were initiated by a user's report (flag), a 
trusted flagger programme or by the proactive application of Community Standards/Guidelines (for 
                                                             
176 Law 1482 of 2011 National Level, available at: http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=44932#1482. 
177 Law 1752 of 2015 National Level, available at: https://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=61858#1. 
178 National Police of the Republic of Colombia's website, Article Policías vs 'fake news', 2018, available at: 
https://www.policia.gov.co/noticia /policias-vs-fake-news. 
179 Latin American Observatory for Regulation, Media and Convergence's website, available at: https://www.observacom.org. 
180 Contributions for the democratic regulation of big platforms to ensure freedom of expression online, A Latin American perspective for content 
moderation processes that are compatible with international human rights standards, Latin American Observatory for Regulation, Media and 
Convergence. Available at: https://www.observacom.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/C ontributions-for-the-democratic-regulati on -
of-big-platforms-to-ensure-freedom-of-expression-online.pdf. 
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example, through the use of a machine learning algorithm). It should also include the data on the 
number of decisions that were effectively appealed or determined to have been made in error and the 
data reflecting whether the company performs a proactive audit of its non-appealed moderation 
decisions, as well as the error rates that the company found.  
4.5. China  
4.5.1. Regulatory and policy framework 
Regarding the Chinese regulatory system on online content moderation, according to a China-based 
company TechNode dealing with Chinese technology and start-up ecosystems, new online content 
regulations, namely 'regulations on ecological governance of online content' have been passed in 
December 2019181. As TechNode has indicated, the Chinese authorities (i.e. the Office of the Central 
Cyberspace Affairs Commission)182 are likely to come down heavily on rule-breaking content after the 
March 2019 deadline and may suspend or shut down offending online platforms. The rules linked to 
online content moderation practices stemming from the analysed Chinese regulatory system 
encompass:  
• the ban of exaggerated, rumour-laden, sexually provocative, and dangerous content which 
may incite copycats; 
• the ban of acts which infringe on personal privacy, use of new technology to engage in illegal 
acts such as artificial intelligence-powered face swapping, buying traffic, and use of the 
Communist Party or state symbols in marketing campaigns; 
• platforms using personalised recommendation algorithms must include controls for manual 
intervention and user choice; 
• advertisements are considered online content; and 
• platforms are encouraged to create content versions suitable for minors. 
Regarding the policy framework, according to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Copyright 
Society of China launched in April 2017 its 12426 Copyright Monitoring Centre, which is dedicated to 
scanning the Chinese Internet for evidence of copyright infringement183. This Centre is said to be able 
to monitor video, music and images found on "mainstream audio and video sites and graphic portals, 
small and medium vertical websites, community platforms, cloud and Peer-to-Peer sites, Smart TV, external 
set-top boxes, aggregation apps, and so on" 184. 
More precisely, when the 12426 Copyright Monitoring Centre finds content that matches material 
submitted to it by a copyright holder, the Centre provides them with a streamlined notification and 
takedown machine, from the issuance of warning notices through to the provision of mediation 
services. The Centre's technology service provider also provides platforms with filtering technology 
that can allow infringing materials to be blocked from upload or download to begin with, obviating 
the need for a separate takedown procedure185. 
                                                             
181 See Au, Online content rules leave platforms holding the bag, 2019, TechnNode, available at:  
https://technode.com/2019/12/23/online-content-rules- leave-platforms-holding-the-bag/. 
182 The Regulations are available in Chinese on the website of the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission at: 
http://www.cac.gov.cn/2019-12/20/c_1578375159509309.htm. 
183 Malcolm, Chinese Government and Hollywood Launch Snoop-and-Censor Copyright Filter, Electronic Frontier Foundation. 2017, 
available at: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/04/chinese-snooping-foreshadows-future-copyright-enforcement. 
184 Ibidem.  
185 Ibidem. 
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4.5.2. Recommendations on best practices 
No specific best practices recommended by NGOs, academia or other relevant stakeholders could be 
found in China.  
4.6. Japan  
4.6.1. Regulatory and policy framework 
No specific legal framework related to online content moderation could be found in Japan.  
Regarding the policy framework, in Japan the rules governing the online platform users are enshrined 
in their extensive Terms of Service/Terms of Use and include the regulation of adult content and 
Intellectual Property. Generally, the rules are enforced by a user-based reporting system and volunteer 
moderators who investigate complaints and impose sanctions where necessary186. The identified 
online content moderation practices stemming from the analysed Japanese system are:  
• a user-based reporting system and volunteer moderators who investigate complaints and 
impose sanctions; 
• sanctions for users which include temporary suspension of the user's privileges and in the most 
extreme cases can extend to the deletion of the user's profile; 
• the content labelling system which is fundamental to the rules and indeed a failure to 
adequately label content is a breach of the rules in itself. The voluntary labelling is an effective 
mode of regulation and constitutes a potential source of community cohesion through 
neighbourly practices; 
• posting works created entirely by others is not allowed; 
• works that are created using references (including photos) must provide a link or citation to the 
original reference material; 
• use of official art, trademarks, or copyrighted materials, such as corporate logos or commercial 
music, is not allowed; and 
• the moderators' attempts to ensure that online content is consistent with the United States' 
censorship practices and conventions. 
4.6.2. Recommendations on best practices 
No specific best practices recommended by NGOs, academia or other relevant stakeholders could be 
found in Japan.  
  
                                                             
186 Pearson, Giddens and Tranter (2018).  
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5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DIGITAL SERVICES ACT  
KEY FINDINGS 
The revised EU regulatory framework for online content moderation, which will result from the 
forthcoming Digital Services Act, could be based on the following objectives and principles: 
• sufficient and effective safeguards to protect fundamental rights; 
• a strengthening of the Digital Single Market; 
• a level playing field between offline and online activities; 
• technological neutrality; 
• incentives for all stakeholders to minimise the risk of errors of over and under removal of 
content; 
• proportionality of the potential negative impact of the content and the size of the 
platforms; and 
• coherence with existing content-specific EU legislation. 
The baseline regulatory regime applicable to all types of content and all categories of platforms 
could strengthen in an appropriate and proportionate manner the responsibility of the online 
platforms to ensure a safer Internet. To do that, it could include a set of fully harmonised rules 
on procedural accountability to allow public oversight of the way in which platforms moderate 
content. Those rules could include: (i) common EU principles to improve and harmonise the 
'notice-and-takedown' procedure to facilitate reporting by users; (ii) the encouragement for the 
platforms to take, where appropriate, proportionate, specific proactive measures including with 
automated means; and (iii) the strengthening of the cooperation with public enforcement 
authorities. Those new rules could be based on the measures recommended by the European 
Commission in its 2018 Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal online content 
as well as on the measures imposed on Video-Sharing Platforms by the revised 2018 Audio-Visual 
Media Services Directive. 
This baseline regulatory regime could be complemented with stricter rules imposing more 
obligations, when the risk of online harm is higher. Stricter rules are already imposed 
according to the type of content: more obligations are imposed for the moderation of the online 
content with the highest potential negative impact on the society such as terrorist content, child 
sexual abuse material, racist and xenophobic hate speech and some copyright violations. Stricter 
rules could also be imposed according to the size of the platform: more obligations could be 
imposed on the platforms whose number of users is above a certain threshold, which could be 
designated as Public Space Content-Sharing Platforms (PSCSPs). 
As often in EU law, enforcement is the weak spot and therefore, the forthcoming Digital Services 
Act should ensure that any online content moderation rule is enforced effectively. Such 
enforcement should be ensured by public authorities, in particular regulatory authorities and 
judicial courts. The 'country of origin' principle should be maintained, hence the online platforms 
should in principle be supervised by the authorities of the country where they are 
established. However, the authorities of the country of establishment may not have sufficient 
means and incentives to supervise the largest platforms; hence, an EU authority could be set up 
to supervise the PSCSPs. In addition, the enforcement could be improved with, on the one hand, 
a better coordination between national authorities by relying on the Consumer Protection 
Cooperation Network and, on the other hand, better information disclosure in the context of 
Court proceedings. 
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Based on the results of the previous sections, this section makes proposals to improve the EU regulatory 
framework for the moderation of content online within the context of the forthcoming Digital Services 
Act and the expected revision of the e-Commerce Directive.  
5.1. Principles on which a reform should be based 
The EU regulatory framework for the moderation of content online should protect effectively the 
victims of illegal content while guaranteeing an appropriate balance among fundamental rights. 
This could be achieved by efficiently sharing the responsibility for the detection and the removal of 
illegal online content among the many actors involved in the diffusion of such material and evolving 
towards a system of 'cooperative responsibility' 187. Indeed, all stakeholders (such as platforms, users, 
competent authorities, experts, CSOs, NGOs, trusted flaggers, fact-checkers, news media and 
journalists, and researchers) should be involved for effective long-term solutions. 
The regulatory framework could be based on the following principles: 
• provide sufficient and effective safeguards for EU standards relating to all fundamental 
rights, in particular, freedom of expression, the right to privacy, the prohibition of 
discrimination and the right to a fair trial/effective remedy; 
• strengthen the Internal Market and alleviate national regulatory fragmentation; this 
requires confidence of the Member States (and their citizens) that the regulation in the country 
of establishment is sufficiently protective and effectively enforced; in turn, this requires, on the 
one hand, a harmonisation of the main rules aimed to protect users and, on the other hand, 
cooperation and mutual assistance between the competent authorities of the Member States 
in charge of enforcing the rules; 
• ensure a level-playing field between online and offline activities and ensure that what is illegal 
offline is also illegal online; the rules should also be technologically and business neutral and 
not favour one technology or business model over others; 
• provide to all stakeholders involved in the removal of illegal online content the right 
incentives to minimise the risk of errors, of type I errors (over-removal) and of type II errors 
(under-removal); 
                                                             
187 As suggested by Helberger, Pierson and Poell (2018). Also Buiten, de Streel and Peitz (2020). 
Given the massive explosion of online content, public authorities may not be sufficiently well- 
geared to ensure the enforcement of content moderation rules and may need to be 
complemented with private bodies. Those could be the platforms themselves, self-regulatory 
bodies or co-regulatory bodies. The involvement of private bodies seems inevitable, but should 
not lead to full delegation of State sovereign power to private firms or a privatisation of the public 
interest, hence co-regulation could be an effective tool, preferred to self-regulation. 
Next to specific obligations regarding the moderation of illegal content online, complementary 
broader measures are also necessary such as more transparency on the way moderation is done 
and support to journalists, Civil Society Organisation or NGOs, which contribute to the fight against 
illegal content. 
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• be proportionate, which could lead to a differentiation of rules according to the type of 
content (and its potential negative impact on the society) and according to the size of platforms 
(and their means and societal reach); at the same time, the multi-layered regulatory framework 
to which differentiation leads should remain coherent; 
• be sufficiently general to be easily adaptable to technology and business models, which 
evolve quickly and often in unpredictable ways; to ensure legal certainty, these general rules 
could then be clarified by the European Commission in delegated or implementing acts or 
interpretative guidance; and 
• be enforced effectively, on the basis of a smart combination of traditional State 
enforcement mechanisms with administrative and judicial authorities and alternative 
private enforcement mechanisms such as self- and co-regulation and out-of-courts dispute 
resolution tools. 
5.2. The baseline regime: strengthening procedural accountability of 
online platforms 
The baseline liability regime contained in the e-Commerce Directive could be amended or replaced by 
a Regulation in order to strengthen in an appropriate and proportionate manner the responsibility of 
the online platforms to ensure a safer Internet. The new rules could include a set of fully harmonised 
rules on procedural accountability to allow public oversight of the way in which platforms 
moderate content. These rules could make sure that platforms abide by good governance rules and 
practices which reflect EU democratic and fundamental right values. They could ensure oversight of 
the policies, processes and tools put in place by platforms to ensure that illegal content is taken down 
where needed. To remain proportionate, the smaller platforms could need to abide by the same set of 
procedural rules, but tailored according to their size, type and reach. 
Those rules on procedural accountability could relate to the 'notice-and-takedown' procedure to 
facilitate reporting by users, the possibility and the need to take proactive measures to facilitate 
platforms' detection and the cooperation with public enforcement authorities (see Sections 5.2.1. and 
5.2.2.). They could be based on the measures recommended by the European Commission in its 
Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal online content as well as on the measures 
imposed on Video-Sharing Platforms by the revised Audio-Visual Media Services Directive188. In other 
words, it could be an integration into the hard-law of some soft-law recommendations and an 
extension of the rules currently applicable to VSPs to all online content platforms. 
Importantly, fewer obligations should be imposed for harmful content than for illegal content as 
freedom of speech needs to be preserved. Relevant measures could include: closing false accounts and 
fighting bots; promoting independent counter-speech, relevant, authentic and trustworthy content 
(e.g. from experts); encouraging the finding of alternative content on general interest content; 
strengthening transparency measures, media literacy and democracy education; and making available 
parental control tools and rating systems. 
                                                             
188 European Commission Recommendation 2018/334, Points 5-28; AVMSD, Article 28b. In addition, our proposed reforms would also meet 
the Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation: https://www.santaclaraprinciples.org/. 
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5.2.1. Increased role for users and trusted flaggers 
The forthcoming DSA with the expected revision of the ECD could introduce more expansive rules on 
transparency concerning content removal, their processing, mistakes, actors and notifications189. 
Such rules could also ensure personalised explanations for affected users and audits for authorities or 
researchers190. 
Providers of hosting services could set up mechanisms for notices that are easy to access, user-friendly 
and allow for automated submission. The 'notice-and-takedown' system could be facilitated and 
based on common principles defined at EU level 191. Husovec (2018) suggests to legislate only on the 
essential requirements of the process, and then leave the details to the standardisation process at the 
European Standards Organisations (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI), which can better reflect industry-wide 
best practices in different areas. Such technical standards could then serve as a proof of the provider's 
best efforts to comply with the 'notice-and-takedown' system as diligently as possible192. Technical 
standardisation could better foresee and keep up with automation, new techniques used and other 
market developments. 
To reduce the risks of type I errors (over-removal) and ensure an appropriate balance among 
fundamental rights, the platform could193: 
• encourage notices which are sufficiently precise and adequately substantiated; 
• when practical and proportionate, first inform the content provider of the intention to suspend 
access to the supposedly illegal material and the reason of such suspension and give the 
provider the possibility to contest such suspension by submitting a 'counter-notice'; and 
• the platform could only remove the material from all platforms active in the EU after having 
assessed in a diligent manner, on the basis of the information given, the validity and the 
relevance of this 'counter-notice'. 
However, in exceptional circumstances, when the illegality is manifest and relates to serious criminal 
offences involving a threat to the life or safety of persons (such as terrorist content), content may be 
removed immediately. 
Online platforms could also cooperate more closely with hotlines and trusted flaggers that could be 
designated on the basis of clear and objective criteria based on expertise. Such cooperation may lead 
to fast-track procedures for notices submitted by trusted flaggers194. 
5.2.2. Preventive measures 
Online platforms could be encouraged to take, where appropriate, proportionate and specific 
proactive measures in respect of illegal online content, including with automated means195. However, 
some safeguards could be in place and such proactive measure could not lead to a general monitoring 
that should continue to be prohibited.  
                                                             
189 Some of these recommendations are also mentioned in de Streel and Husovec (2020). 
190 As recommended by the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (2019) and by the European Parliament Resolution of 
12 February 2020 on Automated decision-making processes: Ensuring consumer protection, and free movement of goods and services. 
191 Also Husovec (2017), Sartor (2017). 
192 This is similar to the so-called "New Approach" used by the EU since the eighties in the field of technical standardisation and product 
safety and security. 
193 European Commission, Recommendation 2018/334, Points 5-13; AVMSD, Article 28b(3) (d)-(e). 
194 European Commission, Recommendation 2018/334, Points 25-27. 
195 European Commission, Recommendation 2018/334, Points 18-20. 
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A 'Good Samaritan' clause could be affirmed explicitly to ensure that the online platforms taking on 
proactive measures are not treated in a less favourable way than the ones not taking these measures196. 
Such a 'Good Samaritan' clause could aid platforms when taking voluntary measures, by removing the 
risk of being sanctioned for under-removal.  
Reliance on automated detecting tools by intermediaries or users could be encouraged as an 
effective detection means, provided some safeguards be in place. This is part of the wider debate on 
the EU Regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI), which should be based on the application of six key 
requirements:  
• human agency and oversight;  
• technical robustness and safety; 
• privacy and data governance; 
• transparency, diversity, non-discrimination and fairness; 
• societal and environmental wellbeing; and 
• accountability 197. 
It is also key to note that the explainability obligations already imposed by the GDPR and other recent 
EU laws apply to automated content moderation practice198. Moreover, there may be a need for the 
large online platforms (which have the data, the expertise and the financial means to develop 
automated techniques) to share these technologies with the small and medium-sized or new 
platforms 199. 
5.3. Aligning responsibility with risks 
In addition to reforming the baseline regime applicable to all categories of platforms and all types of 
content, stricter rules increasing the responsibility of the platforms should be imposed when the risks 
of online harms also increase200. To reflect such risk-based approach, differentiation could be made 
according to: 
• the type of online content: more extensive obligations could be imposed regarding the 
moderation of the illegal content with the highest negative impact on the society. This is 
already the case today as stricter rules are imposed against terrorist content, child sexual abuse 
material, racist and xenophobic hate speech and some copyright violations. All those rules 
should, on the one hand, be coherent with each other and with the baseline regime and, on 
the other hand, provide sufficient and effective safeguards to ensure the appropriate balance 
among fundamental rights set by the Court of Justice of the EU and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR). 
• the size of the online platform: more extensive obligations could be imposed on the 
platforms with the largest size. Thanks to their innovation, some content-sharing platforms 
have become so large and so important in the life of citizens that they are not merely running 
                                                             
196 Also in this sense, Sartor (2017:29). As already explained, the European Commission considers that the 'Good Samaritan' clause is already 
compatible with the e-Commerce Directive: Communication on tackling illegal online content, COM(2017), p.13. 
197 European Communication White Paper of 19 February 2020 on Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust, 
COM(2020) 65; High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Guidelines of 8 April 2019 for Trustworthy AI. 
198 On these obligations and their technical implementation, see Bibal, Lognoul, de Streel and Frenay (2020). 
199 European Commission, Recommendation 2018/334, Point 28. 
200 For a law and economics approach of the liability rules of online platforms, see Buiten, de Streel and Peitz (2020). 
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a private space but now hosting part of the public space201. Such differentiation by platforms 
size is already emerging in EU law but should be affirmed more clearly in the forthcoming DSA. 
In practice, platforms with a number of users above a certain threshold, which could be 
designated as Public Space Content-Sharing Platforms (PSCSPs), could be subject to more 
extensive procedural accountability obligations. They could also be required to adopt regular 
transparency reports explaining how they moderate content with clear and comparable 
statistics. Finally, to increase the incentive to comply with those rules, the liability exemption 
of the ECD could be conditioned, for the PSCSPs, to the compliance with the stricter procedural 
accountability obligations. In other words, if a PSCSP does not set up an appropriate 'notice-
and-takedown' mechanism or does not take appropriate proactive measures, the platform 
would not be able to rely on the liability exemption provided in the ECD. In addition, as 
explained below, those PSCSP could also be subject to a differentiated oversight and be 
supervised by an EU authority and not the authority of the Member State where the PSCSP is 
established. 
5.4. Improving the effectiveness of the monitoring and enforcement  
Effective enforcement is key and is often of the main weakness of EU law. To adapt the famous quote 
of Bill Clinton's strategist James Carville to EU law, "it's enforcement, stupid!". To ensure more effective 
enforcement mechanisms, the DSA could smartly combine traditional enforcement mechanisms with 
public authorities (along with a differentiation between small and big platforms) with alternative 
enforcements tools with private bodies. 
5.4.1. Enforcement with public authorities 
a. Public enforcement by independent authorities 
The online platforms should be supervised by the authorities of the country where they are 
established according to the 'country of origin' principle. These authorities should be fully 
independent given the importance of their role in upholding freedom of expression, media plurality 
and press freedom. Moreover, the cooperation and mutual assistance between Member States, in 
particular between the country of origin where the online platform is established and the country of 
destination where the platform is offering its services, should be strengthened. 
However, the authorities of the country of establishment may not have the ability nor the incentive to 
regulate the largest online content platforms, i.e. the PSCSPs subject to stricter moderation obligations 
(see above). For those platforms, EU rules could be enforced by an independent EU regulator - in 
close partnership with the national regulatory authorities - which would be sufficiently well funded to 
also conduct investigations into the operation of platforms202. Moreover, the EU independent authority 
could also maintain a database of which national authority is in charge of which platform. 
b. Private enforcement 
Where a moderation practice breaches the rights of users in at least two EU countries other than 
the EU country where the infringement originated or for widespread infringements, the 
mechanism set up under the EU Consumer Protection Cooperation Network Regulation could 
                                                             
201 As suggested by Smith (2020), those public space platforms should now be regulated according to public law values and not any more 
according to private law values. 
202 In that regard, the enforcement of financial regulation on systemic banks by Single Supervisory Mechanism within the European Central 
Bank is an interesting starting point: Council Regulation 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, O.J. [2013] L 287/63. 
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come into play203. According to this Regulation, national authorities should give a coordinated 
response to cross border infringements of EU consumer protection legislation, through a network that 
has been established between them. As explained above (Section 3.6.1.), the Consumer Protection 
Cooperation Network adopted a common position on stopping scams and unfair business practices on 
online platforms in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak204. Progressively, the mechanism has been 
broadened to cover breaches of a wide range of EU legislative instruments, which are no longer 
necessarily linked to consumers per se, such as breaches of the AVMSD. Alternatively, the EU 
independent authority could be called on to coordinate national responses and/or to adopt a decision. 
Moreover, users should always have access to a Court or another relevant judicial authority to 
defend their rights. In the case of illegal activities carried out through the platforms, the victims should 
be able to initiate civil or criminal proceedings against the authors of such activities, in order to get 
compensation. To facilitate the identification of the authors, the victims should be able to receive the 
necessary information which is available to the platforms. Information requirements are already 
imposed by the ECD205 but, in some Member States, the implementation of those obligations does not 
allow the victims to get such identification data. Thus, those information disclosure requirements could 
be strengthened (or, at least, clarified) in full compliance with the fundamental rights (in particular the 
right to privacy and the presumption of innocence). 
5.4.2. Enforcement with private bodies 
a. Codes of Conduct, self- and co-regulatory bodies 
Codes of Conduct should continue to be encouraged as they can be very useful in fast moving 
industries where the best manners to achieve regulatory goals set in the law are not easy to determine. 
However, given their increasing importance, the DSA could impose additional safeguards on the 
manner such Codes are established and monitored under in order to increase their legitimacy, their 
effectiveness and compliance with fundamental rights, thus leading to a co-regulatory approach. In 
particular, the DSA could impose, on the one hand, that the Code of Conducts should be accepted by 
the main actors representing different interests at stake and, on the other hand, that their 
implementation should be regularly monitored independently with transparent and robust 
methodologies206. 
Moreover, as in the German NetzDG, the possibility of using a self-regulatory body, recognised by 
the State to rule on the illegality of online content (when it is not obviously illegal) could be 
explored in order to alleviate the risk of over-removal. This mechanism has only just been put in place 
in Germany so there are still lessons to be learned. However, the approach is attractive as it could 
discharge platforms from taking difficult decisions, while giving users certain safeguards and 
alleviating the possible incentives of platforms to over-removal out of fear of heavy fines and therefore 
prefer to remove content that is legal in case of doubt. 
b. Out-of-Court dispute resolutions mechanisms 
Dispute resolution is of fundamental importance as users need to be able to challenge decisions by 
platforms which may affect fundamental rights. Access to dispute resolution should be made as 
                                                             
203 Regulation 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities  
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation 2006/2004, OJ [2017] L 345/1. 
204  The common position is available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/live_work_travel_in_the_eu/consumers/documents/cp c_common_position_cov id19.pdf. 
205 ECD, Article 5. Also Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, O.J. [2004] L 195/16, Article 8. 
206 See AVMSD, new Article 4a introduced by Directive 2018/1808. 
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simple as possible, which is why Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) systems should be available in 
the country and language of where the alleged victim is located. These ADR systems should be 
independent and well-funded and provide for rapid, effective and impartial relief. In that regard, Fiala 
and Husovec (2018) propose to create an external ADR, which would be financed by higher fees paid 
by providers which erroneously take down the content and lower fees by users who complain without 
success. Such fees are meant to incentivise providers to improve their internal processes and provide 
a credible remedy to users to get their content reinstated and be heard by an impartial body. 
5.5. Complementary measures 
5.5.1. Transparency 
Transparency obligations contribute to effective moderation of illegal and also harmful content 
while safeguarding fundamental rights. They inform users on key issues (such as origin of the 
content, identity of the author, possible sponsorship, amount paid to prioritise content, etc.) without 
affecting the content as such. They provide users with important contextual elements enabling them 
to assess the content they are confronted with. They help, for example, to detect online disinformation 
while respecting freedom of expression. Moreover, there is also a need to improve the transparency 
of online advertising (origin, identity of the sponsor, amounts received, etc.). 
5.5.2. Supporting and empowering journalists and news media 
Journalists and the news media also have a key role as they offer a wide range of information to 
develop critical thinking skills and equip citizens to detect manipulation and assess the illegality or 
harmful nature of online content. Subject to their own deontology rules, they provide independent, 
verified and objective information while cross-checking their sources. This allows, on the one hand, to 
raise public awareness of issues of general interest such as racism, xenophobia and terrorism and, on 
the other hand, to counter-balance and dilute online disinformation by providing deontological quality 
information as a counter-discourse. Thus, journalists and news media should be supported to enable 
them to propose a diversified and pluralistic offer of information. In addition, content moderation 
practices should not affect the journalistic content disseminated on online platforms.  
5.5.3. Civil Society Organisations/NGOs and research/academic institutions 
Civil Society Organisations and NGOs also contribute to the fight against illegal and harmful online 
content. They are developing media literacy, citizenship and democracy education actions as well as 
initiatives to develop critical thinking skills. Similarly, the academic and research community is 
essential to understand illegal and harmful online content, their origin, the identity of their authors, the 
reasons for their actions and to develop inclusive, innovative and effective solutions that respect 
fundamental rights. 
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ANNEX I: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL LAWS AND POLICIES ON 
ONLINE ILLEGAL AND HARMFUL CONTENT MODERATION 
1. GERMANY: NETWORK ENFORCEMENT ACT (NETZDG) 
The German Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) was adopted in June 2017 to improve the enforcement 
of existing criminal provisions on the Internet and, more specifically, on social networks 207. 
1.1. Scope of application 
The NetzDG applies to social networks with more than 2 million registered users in Germany208. Two 
types of online platforms are excluded from the scope: the online platforms intended for the 
dissemination of specific contents (such as online gaming platforms, professional social networks, and 
online sales platforms) and the online platforms for journalistic and editorial contents209.  
In order to determine what is covered by illegal content, the NetzDG refers to 22 offences of the German 
Criminal Code210 which includes child sexual abuse material, illegal hate speech (xenophobic and racist) 
and other types of hate speech, terrorist content, content infringing Intellectual Property Rights or 
online disinformation. 
1.2. Obligations imposed on online platforms 
With regard to the reporting of illegal content, online platforms must put in place an effective and 
transparent procedure that is easily recognisable, directly accessible and permanently available to 
users 211. Such procedure must ensure that the online platform immediately becomes aware of the 
complaint submitted, that it analyses the legal or illegal nature of the litigious content and the 
possibility of its removal or blocking 212. Moreover, in the event of the removal of illegal content, the 
online platform must ensure that it is secured and kept for evidence purposes for ten weeks213. 
After receiving a complaint about an alleged illegal content, the online platform has seven days to 
remove or block it. This time limit can be exceeded in two cases: (i) when the illegality of a content 
depends on the veracity of a factual allegation or other identifiable factual circumstances as the online 
platform may give the user the opportunity to comment on the complaint before taking a decision; (ii) 
                                                             
207 The NetzDG, is available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/netzdg/BJNR335210017.html. A new bill is currently proposed to amend 
the NetzDG. The Minister of Justice introduced a draft law in December 2019 to combat right-wing extremism and hate crime. It will 
necessarily have an impact on the NetzDG, particularly with a view to impose on social networks an obligation to transmit all content and 




208 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 1 (2).  
209 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 1 (1). It should be noted, however, that the situation of journalistic or editorial content that would be 
disseminated, not on journalistic and editorial content platforms, but on social networks remains uncertain. See Holznagel (2018). 
210 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 1 (3). See also Tworek & Leerssen (2019). These illegal contents refers to: Dissemination of propaganda material 
of unconstitutional organisations and use of symbols of such organisations; Terrorist acts and formation of a terrorist organisation; 
Preparation or instructions for the commission of a serious act of violence that endangers the State; Counterfeiting (of objects as well as 
of information, news or factual assertions which, if believed, could have an influence on external security or on Germany's relations with 
other States); Public incitement to commit criminal offences, disturbance of the public peace by the threat of criminal offences or reward 
and approval of criminal offences; Incitement to hatred, violence or arbitrary measures according to the national, racial, religious or ethnic 
membership as well as outrages upon human dignity by insult, malicious denigration or defamation; Insulting denominations, religious  
communities and ideological associations; Representation/depiction of violence; Child pornography and making pornographic content 
accessible to minors; Defamation, insult and threat; Violation of intimate privacy through the taking of pictures; Falsification of evidentiary 
data. 
211 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 3 (1). 
212 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 3 (2). 
213 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 3 (4). 
Online Platforms' Moderation of Illegal Content Online 
 
 
 89 PE 652.718 
when the online platform requires an ad hoc regulated self-regulatory body to rule on the illegality of 
a content 214. The time limit is reduced to 24 hours in case of obviously illegal content (unless longer 
period is granted by the competent law enforcement authorities)215.  
Online platforms are also subject to transparency obligations and are obliged to inform and justify their 
decisions without delay to the complainant and the content's author216. Moreover, platforms that 
receive more than 100 complaints a year must publish a report detailing how they deal with them every 
six months 217. Online platforms are also obliged to designate a representative in Germany to receive 
notifications or requests for information 218. 
When an online platform fails to comply with those obligations, it faces an administrative fine, between 
EUR 500,000 to EUR 5 million depending on the type of infringement 219. If the administrative authority 
justifies the infringement on the grounds that illegal content has not been blocked or removed, it must 
first obtain a judicial decision on the illegality 220. 
1.3. Assessment 
Holznagel (2018) and Tworek & Leerssen (2019) criticised the NetzDG for its impact on fundamental 
rights, in particular the freedom of expression. First, the scope of illegal content subject to the new 
obligations is too broad and could have been limited to content which denies the right of persons to 
exist or likely to lead to a disturbance of the public peace. Second, the law may lead to over-blocking 
as the sanctions are asymmetric, the online platforms being fined if they maintain illegal content but 
not when they remove legal content. The short timing under which online platforms should act 
exacerbates this perverse effect. Third, the NetzDG provides few redress mechanisms for the author of 
allegedly illegal content to complain. Although the author is informed about the online platform's 
decision regarding the content, the online platform has no obligation to allow them to express their 
point of view. 
2. FRANCE: AVIA LAW ON ONLINE HATE SPEECH 
The French Parliament has just adopted in May 2020 the law to fight hate speech over the Internet, the 
so-called Avia law221.  
2.1. Scope of application  
The law applies to online platforms sharing public content and search engines whose activity in France 
exceeds a threshold that will be determined by decree, regardless of where they are established222. The 
                                                             
214 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 3 (2) point 3.  
215 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 3 (2) point 2. In the sense of the NetzDG, the obvious illegality of a content is met when it can be identified as 
such within 24 hours by online platform employees qualified for this task. 
216 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 3 (5). 
217 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 2 (1). It should be noted that (2) of the same provision lists the various items of information that must be 
included in this report, including: the number of complaints received per year relating to illegal content; information relating in particular 
to the organisation and staff assigned to deal with complaints; a general description of the prevention efforts implemented by the 
platform; a description of the processes for transmitting complaints and the criteria for the removal or blocking of illegal content; figures 
reflecting the action taken on complaints (withdrawal, blocking, contestation, etc.); a report on the response times of the platforms to 
remove or block the reported illegal content; the measures put in place by the social network to inform both the complainant and the 
user affected by the removal or blockage of the illegal content; etc. 
218 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 5. 
219 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 4 (1) and (2). 
220 NetzDG, Article 1, Section 4 (5). 
221 French draft law to fight hate content on the Internet, as adopted in final reading by the National Assembly, adopted text n° 419, 
13 May 2020. The law will enter into force on 1 July 2020. However, the text of the law has not yet been published in the Official Journal 
of the French Republic. Note that, on 18 May 2020, more than sixty senators appealed against the law to the French Constitutional Council. 
222 French draft law, Article 1. 
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law imposes a range of measures to combat the dissemination of illegal content online such as hate 
speech, child sexual abuse material and terrorist content223.  
2.2. Obligations 
The French law imposes the following obligations:  
• the strengthening of transparency at all levels, such as regarding processing of notifications, 
decisions taken and their justification, removal of content, sanctions and penalties, modalities 
applied to moderate illegal content online, technological and human means implemented by 
online platforms, internal appeal mechanisms, Community Standards/Guidelines, for 
advertisers which have commercial relationship with online platforms that have been subject 
of removal measures and also for minors224; 
• the implementation of a single notification system for illegal content on all online platforms 
that is directly accessible and easy-to-use225; on the basis of a notification system, online 
platforms and search engines will be obliged to remove any "manifestly illegal content" within 
of 24 hours; for terrorist content and child sexual abuse material, the law is stricter by requiring 
the removal within one hour 226; and 
• a series on enforcement mechanisms: the establishment of internal appeal mechanisms227; the 
strengthening of cooperation with judicial authorities228, the imposition of heavy sanctions229, 
the reinforcement of the powers of the High Audio-Visual Council230, and the creation of a Hate 
Observatory231.  
2.3. Evaluation by the Commission  
Contrary to the NetzDG, the European Commission issued critical observations against the French bill, 
pointing at risks of incompatibility with the ECD232. The Commission noted a risk of infringement of the 
'country of origin' principle and a restriction of the freedom to provide information society services as 
a result of the obligations imposed to online platforms established outside France.  
The Commission also mentioned a risk of incompatibility with the liability regime for intermediaries (in 
particular Articles 14 and 15 of the ECD). In its view, the drastic reduction of the information to be 
provided when sending a notification of illegal content to online platforms would not allow the 
                                                             
223 The offences concerned are those listed in Law 2004-575 on confidence in the digital economy: glorification of war crimes, of crimes  
against humanity, of certain other crimes and of terrorism, incitement to commit acts of terrorism, child pornography and offering 
pornographic content to minors, insults or incitement to hate based on a ground relating to race, religion, ethnicity, sex, sexual 
orientation or identity, gender identity, disability, negationism, sexual harassment, incitement to violence (including sexual and gender-
based violence) and attacks on human dignity. 
224 French draft law, Articles 1, 4, 5 and 9. 
225 French draft law, Article 4. Article 2 of the French law also specifies the content and mandatory information to be included in notifications, 
depending on the status of the notifier.  
226 This measure has been hotly debated, including by senators, who believe that it is inconsistent with the TERREG Proposal: Public Sénat, 
"Loi Avia: le Sénat rétablit sa version du texte et supprime le délit de "non-retrait" pour les plateformes Internet", 26 February 2020, 
available at https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/parlementaire/loi-avia-le-senat-retablit-sa-vers ion-du-texte-et-supprime-le-delit-de-non. 
227 French draft law, Article 4. 
228 French draft law, Articles 1, 5 and 8. A whole series of measures are imposed by French law to strengthen cooperation with judicial 
authorities. For example, online platforms and search engines must temporarily keep removed content for judicial authorities and they 
must designate a representative on French territory. The judicial authorities that have imposed the removal of a content may also 
authorise an administrative authority to impose measures to prevent access to websites that re-broadcast such content. 
229 French draft law, Articles 1, 6 and 7. 
230 French draft law, Article 7. The High Audio-Visual Council is responsible for ensuring that online platforms and search engines respect 
their obligations. It may impose specific measures or penalties on them. The High Audio-Visual Council must also publish an annual report 
on the measures implemented and their effectiveness.  
231 French draft law, Article 16. 
232 Commission Decision of 22 November 2019, Notification 2019/412/F, Loi visant à lutter contre les contenus haineux sur internet: Emission 
d'observations prévues à l'article 5, paragraphe 2, de la directive 2015/1535, C(2019) 8585.  
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presumption of knowledge of the presence of illegal content and would constitute an "insufficiently 
precise and substantiated notification". The Commission also stated that the ECD does not preclude 
national legislators from requiring online platforms established on their national territory to act within 
a specified period. However, such a time limit must be proportionate and reasonable and must allow 
for more flexibility in justified situations (in particular, where the illegal nature of a content would 
require a more consequent assessment). Thus, the Commission considers that the imposition of the 
24-hour time limit combined with heavy sanctions in case of non-compliance could create a 
disproportionate burden on online platforms and, in certain circumstances, a risk of excessive removal 
of content, thus infringing freedom of expression. Furthermore, the obligation to implement 
appropriate means to prevent the re-dissemination of deleted content is intended to impose a general 
obligation of monitoring on platforms, which is prohibited by Article 15 of the ECD. Indeed, online 
platforms may have to put in place automatic and generalised filtering of all their contents (including 
those that would require an in-depth assessment of their contexts to discover the illegality) in order to 
comply with this obligation. 
3. FRANCE: LAWS ON INFORMATION MANIPULATION 
In December 2018, two (one ordinary and one organic) laws relating to information manipulation were 
adopted to fight against the spread of false information during election periods233. 
3.1. Scope of application 
The French laws refer to "false information" without giving a clear definition, although in the provision 
establishing the possibility of making an application to the judge hearing the summary proceedings 
("juge des référés"), false information is defined as "inaccurate or misleading allegations or imputations 
of a fact likely to alter the truthfulness of the forthcoming election [...] disseminated in a deliberate, 
artificial or automated and massive manner through an online public communication service" 234. The 
Constitutional Council decided that, to comply with respect the freedoms of expression and 
communication, the inaccurate or misleading nature of such allegations must be manifest and could 
not refer to opinions, parodies, partial inaccuracies or mere exaggerations and that the risk of altering 
the truthfulness of the election must also be manifest235.  
3.2. Obligations  
The French laws introduce a new provision in the French Electoral Code imposing the following 
information requirements on online platforms whose activity exceeds 5 million unique visitors per 
month in France236: clear, fair and transparent information on the identity of the persons who pay them 
in order to promote certain information contents participating in the general interest debate and on 
the use of personal data in the promotion of such content; above a certain threshold, these online 
platforms must also make public the amounts of remuneration received for the promotion of content. 
Those obligations apply for the three months preceding the elections 237. The platforms fulfil their 
                                                             
233  Loi organique 2018-1201 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l'information, J.O.R.F., 23 décembre 2018 and 
Loi 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l'information, J.O.R.F., 23 décembre 2018. Both laws have 
been validated by the Constitutional Council with a narrow interpretation of the laws. 
234 Code électoral français, Article L163-2. Authors' own personal translation.  
235 Décision 2018-773 DC du Conseil constitutionnel du 20 décembre 2018, points 22-23. 
236 See Code électoral français, Article L163-1. See also Décret n° 2019-297 du 10 avril 2019 relatif aux obligations d'informations des 
opérateurs de plateforme en ligne assurant la promotion de contenus d'information se rattachant à un débat d'intérêt général, J.O.R.F., 
11 avril 2019. 
237 Code électoral français, Article L163-1. 
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transparency obligations through a register that is kept up to date and made publicly and electronically 
available238. If they fail to do so, they may be fined up to EUR 75,000239.  
The new provisions of the French Electoral Code allow the Public Prosecutor's Office, election 
candidates, various political parties, and any person with an interest, to submit an application to the 
judge hearing the summary proceedings. The aim of such action is that hosting platforms or, failing 
that, Internet service providers take proportionate and necessary measures to stop the dissemination 
of false information240.  
Online platforms whose activity exceeds a threshold of number of visits in France are also required to 
take several measures to fight the dissemination of false information likely to disturb public order or to 
distort the truthfulness of an election 241. On the one hand, the French legislator imposes the 
introduction of a visible and easily accessible mechanism enabling Internet users to report false 
information 242. On the other hand, the legislator foresees a non-exhaustive list of additional measures 
relating to the nature, origin and methods of dissemination of content, the fight against accounts 
disseminating massively false information, transparency of the algorithms used, the provision of 
information on the identity of persons whose contents participating in the general interest debate is 
promoted in return for payment and promotion of contents from media companies and news agencies 
and media literacy 243.  
Online platforms must report annually to the French media regulator (the High Audiovisual Council) 
on the measures implemented244 and must also appoint a legal representative to act as a point of 
contact on French territory245. 
In addition, if online platforms use algorithms to reference, classify or recommend information content 
participating in the general debate, they are subject to an obligation to publish aggregated statistics 
on the operation of the algorithms246. These statistics should indicate, for each content, the percentage 
of accesses not influenced by the recommendation, ranking or referencing algorithms and the 
percentage of accesses influenced by such algorithms. 
The powers of the media regulator to contribute to the fight against the dissemination of false 
information that could disturb public order or undermine the elections have also been strengthened. 
The High Audiovisual Council must ensure compliance with the obligations imposed on online 
platforms and may make recommendations247. It is thus a co-regulatory mechanism that leaves the 
online platforms free to choose how to implement the measures to be taken, while forcing them to 
report to the media regulator. 
4. UNITED KINGDOM: ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER 
In April 2019 and on the basis of the work of Wood and Perrin (2019), the Online Harms White Paper was 
adopted with proposals to reduce online harms248. 
                                                             
238 Code électoral français, Article L163-1. 
239 Loi 2018-1202, Article 1. 
240 Code électoral français, Article L163-2. 
241 Loi 2018-1202, Article 11. 
242 Loi 2018-1202, Article 11, al. 2. 
243 Loi 2018-1202, Article 11, al. 3. 
244 Loi 2018-1202, Article 11, al. 4. 
245 Loi 2018-1202, Article 13. 
246 Loi 2018-1202, Article 14. 
247 Loi 2018-1202, Article 12. 
248 Online Harms White Paper, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper/online-harms-wh ite-
paper. The White Paper was opened for public consultation from April 2019 to July 2019. After receiving responses from a wide range of 
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4.1. Scope of application  
The proposals apply to online platforms that allow users to share or discover user-generated content 
or interact with each other online249. The White Paper covers a wide range of online harms which can 
be sorted in three categories:  
• harms with a clear definition (such as child sexual abuse material, terrorist content, organised 
immigration crime, modern slavery, extreme pornography, revenge porn, hate crim); 
• harms with a less clear definition (such as cyberbullying, extremist content and activity, 
disinformation); and 
• underage exposure to legal content (such as children accessing pornography). 
However, the White Paper does not contain a clear definition of illegal content nor harmful content250. 
4.2. Obligations: A statutory duty of care 
The White Paper recommends to impose a new statutory duty of care, under which online platforms 
would need to show how they take care of their users. Online platforms would be required to explicitly 
state what content and behaviour are acceptable on their sites and enforce this consistently and 
transparently. In practice, online platforms would have to determine and establish appropriate systems 
and processes to react to concerns over harmful and illegal content such as effective internal complaint 
mechanisms, transparent decision-making over actions taken in response to reports of harm; and 
relevant Terms of Service/Terms of Use251. 
The White Paper promotes a proportionate and risk-based approach 252. This means that the regulator 
should focus on those online platforms that "pose the biggest and clearest risk of harm to users, either 
because of the scale of the platforms or because of known issues with serious harms"253. Moreover, 
differentiated expectations would be established on online platforms, depending on the legality of 
content and online platforms would not be forced to remove specific harmful content. Furthermore, 
specific rules would be applied to two types of illegal content (child sexual abuse material and terrorist 
content)254. Finally, the UK government also intends to introduce this legislation proportionately, 
minimising the regulatory burden on small online platforms255.  
The regulator would set out how to fulfil this duty of care in Codes of Practice. If online platforms want 
to fulfil this duty in a manner not set out in the Codes, they would have to explain and justify to the 
regulator how their alternative approach will effectively deliver the same or greater level of impact. An 
independent regulator would thus assess the compliance with this duty of care. The regulator is not 
defined yet, but most probably would be the OFCOM (the regulator and competition authority for the 
                                                             
respondents and having undertaken engagements with representatives from industry, civil society and others, the UK Government 
published its initial response in February 2020 and the full response is expected later this spring. 
249 In practice, this definition captures social media platforms, cloud hosting providers, file hosting sites, public discussion forums, retailers  
who allow users to review products online, messaging services and search engines. In its initial response, the Government promises that 
the regulator will provide guidance to help companies understand whether or not they would fall into the scope of the Regulation. See 
the initial consultation response: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper/public-feedback/onlin e-
harms-white-paper-initial-consultation-response. 
250 Online Harms White Paper, para. 2.2.  
251 For a detailed list see Online Harms White Paper, para. 7.4.  
252 Online Harms White Paper, para. 5.3.  
253 Online Harms White Paper, para. 31 (Executive summary). 
254 In this regard, the White Paper states that: "Companies will be required to take particularly robust action to tackle terrorist use of the internet 
and online CSEA [Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse]. The government will have the power to issue directions to the regulator regarding the 
content of the codes of practice for these harms, and will also approve the draft codes before they are brought into effect. Similarly, the regulator 
will not normally agree to companies adopting proposals which diverge from these two codes of practice, and will require a high burden of 
proof that alternative proposals will be effective". Online Harms White Paper, para. 3.10. 
255 Online Harms White Paper, para. 4.5.  
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UK communications and media industries). The regulator would therefore have the power to take 
action against companies that do not meet their duty of care (e.g. issuing substantial fines, imposing 
liability on individual members of senior management, etc.).  
4.3. Assessment  
Wood and Perrin (2019) note that the ECD permits duties of care introduced by Member States and 
that the AVMSD already requires Member States to take some form of regulatory action in relation to 
Video-Sharing Platforms. However, many commentators criticise the proposed duty of care of the 
White Paper for being too broadly framed (Graham, 2019; Nash, 2019; Tambini, 2019)256. If not correctly 
framed, such a duty of care may create a chilling effect on online speech (Tambini, 2019). It may also 
not be consistent with the prohibition of proactive measures under Article 15 of the ECD257. Another 
objection is the broadness and vagueness of the definition of the harms, as the White Paper aims at 




                                                             
256 Also Graham, A Ten Point Rule of Law Test for a Social Media Duty of Care, 2019, available at:  
https://www.cyberleagle.com/2019/03/a-ten-point-rule-of-law-test-for-social.html. 
257 Graham, Take care with that social media duty of care, 2018, available at: 
https://www.cyberleagle.com/2018/10/take-care-with-that-social-media-duty.html. 
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ANNEX II: LIST OF INTERVIEWED STAKEHOLDERS  
The table below provides an overview of all the stakeholders that have been interviewed by the study 
team. In total, 24 stakeholders agreed to participate to the consultation and provided their input. This 
means that for the purpose of this study, 9 online platforms, 6 industry/trade associations, 1 hotline, 
and 8 NGOs have been interviewed. 
Type of stakeholder Organisation 
Online platform eBay 
Online platform  Facebook 
Online platform  Google 
Online platform JustPaste.it 
Online platform  Microsoft 
Online platform  Mozilla 
Online platform Olx 
Online platform Snap 
Online platform YouTube 
Industry/Trade association European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) 
Industry/Trade association Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) 
Industry/Trade association  European Internet Services Providers Associations (EuroISPA) 
Industry/Trade association  News Media Europe 
Industry/Trade association  Communication Agencies Association  
Industry/Trade association  European Digital Media Association (EDiMA) 
NGO Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) 
NGO  Counter Extremism Project (CEP) 
NGO Cyber Data Coalition 
NGO European Digital Rights 
NGO Fundacja Panoptykon 
NGO Renaissance Numérique 
NGO Respect Zone Against Cyber Violence 
NGO Rettighedsalliancen 
Hotline  Point de Contact 
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ANNEX III: QUESTIONNAIRE TO ONLINE PLATFORMS 
Measures to moderate illegal content & effectiveness 
1. How and what measures does your platform deploy to distinguish legal from illegal content 
online?  
• Are your Terms of Service/Terms of Use stricter than the legal rules, in identifying content to 
be removed? 
• Do you see an important fragmentation between the Member States on what illegal content 
is? If yes, for which content in particular? Does such fragmentation affect your operations and 
if so, how? 
2. What are the measures you put in place to detect and remove illegal content? 
• How far are those measures automated? What are the pros and cons, the opportunities and 
the risks for Artificial Intelligence tools for content moderation? 
• Which transparency policies do you have? 
• Which safeguards did you put in place to protect fundamental rights? 
• Do you differentiate your measures according to the type of illegal content? 
3. Did the policies put in place by your platform to moderate content contribute to reducing the 
aggressiveness and quantity of illegal content? Please explain how and provide relevant 
data/sources to support your reply. 
4. What is the impact of measures you deployed in relation to illegal content moderation on:  
• making information accessible; 
• facilitating communication and interaction; 
• increasing choice of products and services; and 
• accessing new market and business opportunities? Please provide data. 
5. How do you ensure that decisions to remove illegal content from your platform are accurate and 
well-founded, especially when automated tools are used? 
Involvement of platforms' users  
6. What complaint mechanisms have you implemented for users of your platform to report on illegal 
content? What is the share of content taken down as a result of the reporting by users?  
7. What are the pros and cons, the opportunities and the risks of having content providers be able to 
give their views to your platform on the alleged illegality of the content through a 'counter-notice' 
procedure? Please give reasons for your answer and where available, quantitative indicators. 
8. Once a decision is taken against illegal content such as depublication, delisting, downranking, or 
censorship of information or accounts; how long does this measure remain effective? How do 
you address the stay-down issue? Do you think EU law should address such issue beyond the 
recent Facebook case? 
9. Do you warn the users of your platform when a content they flagged as illegal has been taken 
down or censored?  
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Challenges & potential solutions  
10. What are the challenges faced by your platform to enforce legal rules and/or private regimes (e.g. 
Terms of Service/Terms of Use) on the moderation of illegal content online? 
11. What do you think could be done/implemented at the EU level to improve the moderation by 
online platforms of illegal content?  
• In particular, do you think different rules should be adopted for different types of illegal 
content? 
• How should the increasing use of automated tools be addressed? 
• How should fundamental rights be protected and well balanced? 
12. Do you estimate that the different content moderation practices in EU Member States may 
hinder or, to the contrary, facilitate the fight against illegal content in the EU overall? Please explain. 
Do you think more harmonisation should be imposed at the EU level? 
13. In which areas of the EU Internal Market (e.g. the Digital Single Market; the area of freedom, 
security and justice; the free movement of services; the access to business opportunities and 
cultural richness) and its regulatory framework, do you consider reforms necessary to address 
existing or upcoming barriers or inefficiency/ineffectiveness of current legal solutions regarding 
online platforms' illegal content moderation? 
14. Could you please provide examples of best international practices regarding online platforms' 
illegal content moderation which can serve as models to follow at European level? 
Others  
15. In the context of a limited exemption of certain categories of Internet intermediaries from 
secondary liability 258 are the existing liability principles of intermediary service providers (on 
which Section IV of the e-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC is based) fit-for-purpose (Articles 12-
15)? Please provide reasons for your answer.  
16. What kind of content moderation mechanism should be implemented to respect the freedom of 
expression and information? 
17. How to ensure the fundamental right of not to be discriminated against (prohibition of 
discrimination) is respected? How to hamper the development of new forms of online 
discrimination (e.g. homophobic remarks on online games' platforms)? 
18. Is there anything else you would like to add in the context of online platforms' illegal content 
moderation practices? 
  
                                                             
258 i.e. liability resulting from illegal users' behaviour, which has different possible rationales: promoting the activity of the intermediaries,  
preserving their business models, preventing excessive collateral censorship (i.e. preventing the intermediaries from censoring the 
expressions of their users). 
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ANNEX IV: QUESTIONNAIRE TO OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 
Measures to moderate illegal content & effectiveness 
1. Have you put in place any voluntary or proactive measures to control certain categories of illegal 
content from your system? 
2. How effective do you estimate the measures deployed by online platforms have been in 
moderating illegal content? Please provide information and data/sources to justify your reply. 
3. How effective do you consider the measures deployed by online platforms to distinguish legal 
from illegal content online? Please provide information and data/sources to justify your reply. 
4. What is the impact of measures deployed in relation to online platforms' illegal content 
moderation on:  
• making information accessible;  
• facilitating communication and interaction;  
• increasing choice of products and services; and  
• accessing new market and business opportunities? Please provide data.  
Involvement of platforms' users 
5. Should online content providers be able to give their views to the hosting service on the alleged 
illegality of the content through a 'counter-notice' procedure? Please provide reasons for your 
answer. 
6. How effective are the measures deployed by platforms to enable users to report on illegal 
content?  
7. Which types of measures should be taken to improve the transparency of platforms' decisions 
regarding illegal content reported by users?  
Challenges & potential solutions  
8. What are the challenges which you are faced with in reporting illegal content from an online 
platform? 
9. What are the challenges which online platforms and other Internet intermediaries face in 
enforcing legal rules and/or private regimes (e.g. Terms of Service/Terms of Use) on illegal online 
content moderation? 
10. What are the possible solutions, new measures to improve the EU regulatory framework and its 
enforcement regarding online platforms' illegal content moderation?  
11. In which areas of the EU Internal Market (e.g. the Digital Single Market; the area of freedom, 
security and justice; the free movement of services; the access to business opportunities and 
cultural richness) and its regulatory framework, do you consider reforms necessary to address 
existing or upcoming barriers or inefficiency/ineffectiveness of current legal solutions regarding 
online platforms' illegal content moderation? 
12. Is there a need to impose a specific duty of care regime on online platforms and other Internet 
intermediaries for certain categories of illegal content online?  
If yes, please specify: 
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• What are the categories of illegal content online requiring a specific duty of care? 
• What actions (i.e. scope and format) shall constitute such a specific duty of care in relation to 
active and passive online intermediaries? 
• Which measures shall be deployed to increase transparency related to the duties of care for 
online intermediaries with regard to the general content restrictions policies and practices by 
online intermediaries? 
13. Do you estimate that the different content moderation practices in EU Member States may 
hinder or, to the contrary, facilitate the fight against illegal content in the EU overall? Please explain.  
14. Could you please provide best international practices regarding online platforms' illegal content 
moderation which can serve as models to follow at European level? 
Others  
15. In the context of a limited exemption of certain categories of Internet intermediaries from 
secondary liability 259, are the existing liability principles of intermediary service providers 
(on which Section IV of the e-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC is based) fit-for-purpose (Articles 
12-15)? Please give reasons for your answer.  
16. What kind of content moderation mechanism should be implemented to respect the freedom of 
expression and information? 
17. How to ensure the fundamental right of not to be discriminated against (prohibition of 
discrimination) is respected? How to hamper the development of new forms of online 
discrimination (e.g. homophobic remarks on online games' platforms)? 
18. Is there anything else you would like to add in the context of online platforms' illegal content 





                                                             
259 i.e. liability resulting from illegal users' behaviour, which has different possible rationales: promoting the activity of the intermediaries,  
preserving their business models, preventing excessive collateral censorship (i.e. preventing the intermediaries from censoring the 
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Online platforms have created content moderation systems, particularly in relation to tackling illegal 
content online. This study reviews and assesses the EU regulatory framework on content moderation 
and the practices by key online platforms. On that basis, it makes recommendations to improve the 
EU legal framework within the context of the forthcoming Digital Services Act. 
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